Friday, January 21, 2011

!فليتوحد اللبنانيين في ثورتهم جميعاُ



داليا عبيد

دفعت أحداث تونس اللبنانيين إلى التسلح بالحماس الشديد وقد لمست ذلك عن قرب عبر الشعارات التي رفعت على المواقع والمدونات الالكترونية حيث عكست المتابعة الدقيقة للشباب والنخب اللبنانيين خاصة الذين ليسوا على ارتباط مباشر بأطراف الحكم.

أثناء سقوط بن علي، كانت تسقط حكومة ائتلاف وطني في بيروت ولكن ليس عبر ثورة شعبية داخلية أتت نتيجة احتراق جسد مناضل للقمة العيش يدعى محمد بو العزيزي، بل نتيجة أزمة مستمرة تتفاعل منذ احتراق جسد رفيق الحريري في بيروت في شباط 2005. هذا الجسد الذي أدى بدوره إلى إشعال ثورة شعبية دفعت الناس بالزحف إلى وسط مدينة بيروت.

في ذلك الوقت، لم تتلاحم مكونات هذه الثورة وعناصرها. فلم تأخذ شكل كتلة مجتمعية واحدة موحدة تتظاهر نقمة على النظام السياسي اللبناني أو غضباً في مواجهة الأزمات الاقتصادية. إنما تشكلت من كتل طائفية ذو دعم دولي (تختلف الأسباب التي دفعت بكل منها إلى ساحة الحرية) في مواجهة كتلة طائفية أخرى ذو عمق إقليمي. وقد أتت اللحظة المليونية بثمارها ودفع رفيق الحريري ثمن تخلص اللبنانيين من شبح الخوف فخرج الجيش السوري الذي كان يحكم لبنان بقبضة بوليسية. وأمام تأملنا لهذه الأحداث، نستنتج بأن ما حصل لم يكن بالمسألة العادية بل هو حدث تاريخي كان بمثابة حلم لمعظم اللبنانيين صغاراً وكباراً.

وقد قدر لأقلية خارجة عن السياق الطائفي، شاركت في صنع الحدث، أن تتأمل في متابعة الثورة باتجاه تقويض دعائم النظام السياسي اللبناني ولكنها اصطدمت بهذا الحائط اصطداماً شديداً بعد أن خرج نظام الأسد من لبنان ولم يخرج معه رموزه اللبنانيين من دائرة الحكم. واستمر تفاؤل هذه الأقلية بالتآكل وصولاً إلى الانقراض حيث ظهر ذلك جلياً في تصاعد حماسهم تجاه ثورة الياسمين واختفاء وسائل تعبيرهم أمام ثورة تقويض الاستقرار اللبناني. وقد نتجت هذه اللامبالاة عن اليأس والملل من تكرار السيناريوهات المعهودة بعد كل أزمة: فراغ حكومي فوساطات دولية وإقليمية(بالرغم من نكهة تركية مميزة هذه المرة) فاحتقان في الشارع فدماء فاغتيالات ف ف ف ..... حيث النتيجة معلقة بانتظار تطور الأحداث في الأيام المقبلة التي من الممكن أن تكون سوداء قاتمة!

وهذا السيناريو إذ يبرهن على شيء فهو على وهن مشهد يعيد نفسه منذ الاستقلال الأول ويدل على فشل النظام السياسي اللبناني في الاستمرار وعلى قدراته الانفجارية المتجددة نتيجة احتدام تناقضاته! وقد كان زلزال الحرب الأهلية الذي اخذ معه مئات الآلاف من الأجساد المحترقة بنيران القصف العشوائي، أحد انجازات هذه التناقضات. ولم تؤدي دماء هؤلاء الشهداء ودموع الأمهات ونحيب الآباء إلى الاعتذار من اللبنانيين والاعتراف بالمجازر والمحاولة لإعادة النظر ببنية صلبة للبنان بل ذهبت الآلام هدراً واستمرينا في إنتاج الأزمات!

لقد أعاد مشهد جسد محمد بو العزيزي المحترق إليَ مشاهد الجثث المحترقة في الحرب الأهلية والتي ذهبت تضحيات أصحابها هباءً (المقارنة قائمة حول مشهد النار فقط) ولكن لم يعيد الشعب التونسي الموحد والمنتفض على الديكتاتورية إلا انبعاث أحاسيس بالانكسار وبذل الحصار. ولكنها في الوقت عينه، وأمام عجزي عن مواجهة الطرق المسدودة في لبنان وبالرغم من إدراكي لاثمان معرفة الحقيقة الباهظة، فهي جعلتني انتفض على حصاري وعلى انكساري وعلى نفسي وعلى كل اللبنانيين المتموضعين في الخنادق الطائفية والمذهبية والخارجية والداخلية لأواجه الظلم اللاحق بالشعب اللبناني ولأقول لنفسي:

ليس في لبنان ديكتاتور كبن علي ومعظم زملائه العرب (الذين لم يسقطوا بعد) ولكنه في لبنان ديكتاتوريات قادرة أن تضع الشعب اللبناني في خندق واحد في مواجهة: الفوضى والفقر والبطالة والارتهان للخارج، وفي إسقاط ديكتاتور الطوائف الأكبر الذي يتسلط على رقاب المواطنين!

فأليست هذه الأسباب بالوافية والكفيلة لتوحد اللبنانيين في ثورتهم جميعاُ؟





Sunday, January 16, 2011

Lebanon: The Clash of Narratives

By Joseph El-Khoury


If the leaked New TV Hariri recordings reveal anything, it is the extent of the rift between the Lebanese. Since 2005, two narratives have evolved in parallel with no intersection points, even during periods of intense crisis or external aggression, such as in July 2006. Given any political development, half the country is almost guaranteed to reach an opposite interpretation and draw different conclusions from the other half. Concomitantly there is a dehumanising process in full motion of the other, initially the politician belonging to the other camp, but which is rapidly extending to the ordinary supporter or member of a religious sect. Lebanon is not alien to this process, which mirrors the sequence of events from the late 1960s and the growing conflict around the Palestinian resistance and culminated with the non-discriminatory sectarian killings of 1976. It is not unusual to hear in a Beirut salon the total denigration of Hariri as morally corrupt in pervasive sense of the word: financially, politically and...Sexually. In another salon, Michel Aoun, who gathers the unwavering support of a significant constituency among the Maronite Christian population, is called a ‘nutter’ with references to a supposed mental imbalance and psychiatric illness. There are very few individuals capable of escaping this narrow-minded classification of all things Lebanese into two camps: March 8th and March 14th, Pro-resistance and anti-Hezbollah, pro- Iranian and pro-American, in essence Good and Evil (not in any particular order).

Even the latest events in Tunis were adopted by both camps as a vindication of their respective struggles. Those excitable elements within the March 14th forces that still believe in a democratic offensive led by the US department of State (or the Pentagon when the former falters) twinned it with their Cedar revolution. In their enthusiasm they omitted to mention the admiration that French and American administrations held for the Ben Ali regime until he made the request to land his plane in Paris-CDG en route to exile. Their counterparts in the pro-Resistance camp saw it as an extension of their anti-imperialist struggle against all things foreign while happily gathering support from other undemocratic Middle Eastern regimes in Iran, Syria and Qatar. Many tried to draw more intelligent comparisons between the two developing stories in Beirut and Tunis with little success. Yes both countries are part of the Arab league and marred by corruption, foreign influence and underdevelopment but Tunisia is a country with a homogenous population and no minorities. Its recent involvement in the Israeli-Arab struggle has been an emotional one and its importance in the geo-strategic quagmire of the Middle East is peripheral. Lebanon is by all measures a more complicated affair. The most obvious question would be which Lebanon would have to rise up and against which heads of state?

I get asked a lot about my solutions for the Lebanese problem, given that I spent a significant amount of time lamenting the absence of a political movement able to challenge the structural flaws in the Lebanese system. I still believe that bold grass-root work motivated by clear democratic, secular and socially responsible principles would be a winning formula. Interestingly, one element that could explain the success in toppling the regime in Tunis is the presence of an active secular left-leaning opposition with influence within the middle classes. The Islamist movement, although active, did not appear to have taken a leading role in the uprising. I might be wrong and the days to come will reveal the full picture.

Thursday, January 13, 2011

Lebanon's self-induced paralysis

By Karl Sharro


Published with permission from Karlremarks.

Firstly, the significance of latest ‘crisis’ to hit the Lebanese political system following the resignation of 11 cabinet ministers yesterday, and the de facto resignation of the cabinet that ensued, should be properly understood. The Lebanese confessional system appears to be exhibiting the symptoms of the law of diminishing returns: in the past this system used to function for a couple of decades in between major crises. This cycle how now been shortened to two years. By any objective measure, this system has now completely exhausted itself. Nevertheless, a viable alternative remains conspicuously absent.

Secondly, it is important to observe how both sides across the political divide have contrived to arrive at a standstill, purposefully avoiding taking decisions that would avert a crisis. It seems that both March 8 and March 14 were content to leave the country in a state of political vacuum in anticipation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s awaited indictment in the case of the assassination of late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Rather than seeing this complacency for the stark abdication of responsibility that it is, many voices assert that either side ‘must know something we don’t know.’ This twisted political logic must be confronted.

The evidence: Prime Minister Saad Hariri and his political allies have effectively paralysed the cabinet for months now, for fear of a confrontation with the ‘cabinet opposition’ over the ‘false witnesses’ issue. Hariri extended his stay outside Lebanon at a time of turmoil, leaving his allies and supporters in a state of confusion and disarray. His presence in the US during this week reinforced the notion that the US was behind scuppering the long-awaited Syrian-Saudi deal that was expected to absorb the impact of the STL indictment. While I remain completely opposed to any outside intervention, be it Syrian, Saudi or American, Hariri’s behaviour seemed to indicate that he is placing his confidence in the US instead of other regional powers. No matter what the explanation is, this is not strong leadership.

The opposition: the cabinet resignations were the least disruptive option they could have chosen. I don’t mean this in a good way. Hezbollah and its allies are victims of their own high-pitched rhetoric: having agitated for so long and so vocally over the STL they were forced to ‘do something’ when the Syrian-Saudi deal fell apart. As it happens, they deliberately chose a course of action that instead of forcing a resolution would now ensure a protracted process of wrangling and accompanying political paralysis. They have wisely avoided street demonstrations, for now, as these would be likely to lead to violent confrontations in the current tense climate, but they had other options they could have exercised.

The ‘big unknown’ now is where does Walid Jumblatt stand exactly. The reason of course is that his 11-memeber parliamentary block could swing the parliamentary majority from one side to the other. As it happened, Jumblatt seems to be still negotiating a space in the middle, for the time being, his ministers did not resign yesterday despite his assertions that he is now firmly back in the Syrian camp. This is not a detail: we now have a parliament that is ambiguous in its constitution. Neither camp can claim legitimacy under these circumstances. Typically, the voice of the citizens is the first thing to be suspended in a time of a crisis.

Had the opposition had more self-purpose and clarity, they should have forced Jumblatt to choose sides and speed up the resolution of this crisis. The first option they had was to force a motion of no-confidence and bring down the government in the parliament. Despite the language used yesterday, this would have been the ‘democratic and constitutional’ option, not their weak mass resignations. Furthermore, they should have then used the parliamentary majority that Jumblatt would supply to govern on their own, nominating their own Prime Minister. Instead, they will now start a protracted process of arriving at a suitable replacement for Hariri while the country remains in limbo.

Typically, most of the analysis I’ve come across has focused on the minutiae of the situation, remaining oblivious to the fact that we’re in a system that cannot guarantee stability for more than a few months at a time. This is a self-induced crisis orchestrated by the political classes for lack of any real vision or sense of purpose, action through inaction. Attempts at rationalising this behaviour through tactical justifications are entertaining but meaningless diversions. The system itself is failing, and neither camp can be trusted to propose an alternative. Can we see this abdication of responsibility for what it is?

Look at the situation again: the Lebanese confessional leaders are failing to resolve their differences through their respective chaperons, but meanwhile they are content to suspend democratic mechanism and more importantly the voice of the citizens. (The ambiguous parliament). I suppose dissolving the parliament and having new elections so we know at least where we stand would be out of the question? The self-induced paralysis it is, then.

Thursday, January 6, 2011

Angry (Christian) Arabs

By Joseph El-Khoury


'We are this East's saints and its devils, we are its cross and its spear, we are its light and its fire; We are able to burn it if they burn our fingers, and we are able to light if they leave us with our freedom.' Bachir Gemayel (1947-1982)

No doubt some will be outraged that I choose to start this post by a quote from a controversial figure in the mind of many, but in these few powerful words that echo a supposed pre-Islamic golden era (Phoenician in Lebanon, Pharaonic in Egypt and Mesopotamic in Iraq) the then militia leader managed to articulate the image that Middle Eastern Christians have of themselves, whether they are Copts from Alexandria, Chaldeans from Baghdad, Greek Orthodox from Damascus or Maronites from the Lebanese mountains. The interesting thing about this perennial existential anxiety is that throughout history it has led Christian individuals to adopt dramatically opposed strategies to deal with it.

Some, like Gemayel have chosen to treat their religious community as a fortress, withdrawing behind sectarian legislation in Lebanon (The latest example being MP Boutros Harb proposal to ban the transfer of land between communities), an unpopular dictatorship in Iraq and an attitude of malignant neutrality in Egypt. Others (Aflak, Saadeh, Habache etc.) have instead ventured out in force onto the broader Arab hinterland shedding their religious identity or leaving it aside as they challenged social and religious dogmas responsible for centuries of stagnation and foreign dominations. It is the failure of the common efforts of the latter to establish an alternative nationalist or humanistic bond to replace the strict Islamic one that can be directly linked to the situation that Arab Christians find themselves in. Obviously it is not, and never was, their responsibility to enlighten the Arab world. It is their status as a minority and their later relatively privileged position under western mandate that placed them at the forefront of Arab reform.

That reform effort has now clearly failed and on most significant indicators the Arab world is socially, religiously and politically in a state of flux from which radical forces, but also undemocratic governments and Western interests are benefiting. It is not as a community that Arab Christians should be responding to the attacks of Al-Qaeda and various brands of fundamentalists, it is as individuals firmly requesting from those who govern them their human right to live, love, pray (or not for that matter) and finally die in this land. It is also as individuals that Arab Muslims should be standing against terrorism, bigotry and social oppression whether it affects them directly or not. This fight should not be about the Crescent and the Cross coming together or about brotherhood across a religious divide... and yes I am critical of the slogans and imagery that appeared on Facebook, which reminded me of the pacifist marches that took place in the early years of the Lebanese civil war and were always followed by another round of sectarian killing. This fight should be about rational Egyptian, Lebanese and Iraqi citizens finally realising that it is time to resuscitate the reformation project on a national and regional level. New mechanisms suited to this century are needed and nostalgia for the era of charismatic leaders and enthusiastic revolutionaries should not prevent serious introspection and productive self criticism. Solely blaming the Western media or the Zionist conspiracy for the nation’s sorry state of affairs no longer convinces even those who utter them like parrots. I personally have had enough of the fears and the tears. The time has come to galvanize!