tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-67001839218843689622024-03-18T09:48:02.138+00:00ArabdemocracyA space for political freedom and cultural creativityArab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.comBlogger322125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-63144827914068060082013-02-15T14:14:00.000+00:002013-02-15T14:20:15.647+00:00Lessons from Syria<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<a href="http://gdb.voanews.com/5902BA08-3FD7-4353-82FE-58044E587BAA_mw1024_n_s.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="291" id="il_fi" src="http://gdb.voanews.com/5902BA08-3FD7-4353-82FE-58044E587BAA_mw1024_n_s.jpg" style="padding-bottom: 8px; padding-right: 8px; padding-top: 8px;" width="400" /></a></div>
<br />
<b>Jade Salhab</b><br />
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There
are two parts to <a href="http://alhayat.com/OpinionsDetails/482295">this</a>
brilliant article by Beesaan el Shaikh in Al Hayat (Arabic) which I believe is an
imperative read for anyone interested in the Arab uprising.<br />
<br /></div>
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The
first part of the article uses the tragedies generated by the revolution as a
very compelling argument NOT to support it. The second part, near the end,
turns the argument around making a simple but slam-dunk case for the
revolution.<br />
<br /></div>
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I
want to use the first part to rephrase a position I expressed in the very
beginning of this revolution, days before the first Assad speech and the
subsequent violent turn of the uprising: I expressed then my hope that Assad
would do the wise thing and grab the opportunity to reform the regime by
himself, because that was the only transition that would avoid destroying Syria,
or handing it to Islamic extremists.<br />
<br /></div>
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I
was naïve in my hopes, obviously. But I believe that hope is a moral
imperative. I knew then, like all those who lived through Lebanon's civil war, that
no matter where it happens on this earth, or why, or how legitimate, when an
uprising turns into an armed rebellion, there is absolutely no controlling of
the damage it can make to the structure of society and its ability to recuperate
post conflict (think Iraq, Lebanon, but also Salvador, Tchetchnia, or Sri Lanka
more globally).<br />
<br /></div>
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The
unspeakable price of civil violence in terms of social dismantling (even more
so than the toll on human life and heritage), is why I still believe that any
people who has regime change in progress (i.e Tunisia, Egypt) - or in
perspective (i.e Jordan, Morocco, or the Gulf in the coming 5 to 15 years) -
must bend itself backwards twice, maybe thrice, before engaging in violent struggle,
or violent ‘defense of the achieved revolution’ – as opposed to radically
peaceful rebellion or political compromise.<br />
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One
of the reasons I respect Moaz el Khatib so deeply is his awareness of this
fact, and his courage to remain constantly open to compromise with the regime
for the sake of ending violence – because he knows that no matter how high the
price of such compromise is, it will always be lower than the one of sustained
violence.<br />
<br /></div>
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Don’t
get me wrong, just like Beesaan el Sheikh says in her article, I believe that there
is no choice BUT to support the Syrian revolution because it is the only
legitimate and humanly acceptable path forward. But I certainly hope that idealists
learn the lesson and understand that wars are, under all circumstances,
unwinnable: because even by winning them, we destroy the basic social
infrastructure that makes that victory worth anything.<br />
<br /></div>
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This
might sound obvious to some, but the consequence is less so: only a slower
transition, or a stubbornly peaceful uprising can come at a lower cost.<br />
<br /></div>
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I want
to end by drawing a relevance to Tunisia and Egypt: compromise is a high price
you might need to pay to avoid the higher price of a torn society. And if
compromise is impossible (and it should take a lot before you get to this
conclusion), than maintain your struggle peaceful at all cost (i.e no military repression
of ‘medieval forces’). The alternative is worse than you can ever imagine or
calculate.</div>
</div>
Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com133tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-91681071033910932582012-09-07T18:11:00.001+01:002012-09-07T18:11:07.202+01:00Syria: enter the worst-case scenario<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Cambria;"><strong>Bassem Hassan</strong></span><a href="http://www.blogger.com/null" name="_GoBack"></a></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><o:p><span style="font-family: Cambria;"> </span></o:p></span></div>
<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Cambria;">Well over a year ago – 16 months to be precise –shortly after the
start of the Syrian revolt against the Baathist regime, I made the </span><a href="http://www.arabdemocracy.com/2011/05/calculation-mistake.html"><span style="color: blue; font-family: Cambria;">prediction</span></a><span style="font-family: Cambria;">
on this blog that the regime’s violent response was the sort of grave error that would put what
was then still largely a peaceful popular uprising at a point of no return.</span></span><br />
<br />
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<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Cambria;">Truth be told, that was more hope than insight, and an optimistic
bet that the fires of the Arab Spring would not be quelled in Syria. Today, no more
than 18 months since the start of the Syrian uprising it has potentially
reached a second point of no return. This prediction however, is the product of
fear and a gut-wrenching pessimism, rather than hope. The revolt in Syria is
going to triumph, to be sure and the regime will, sooner or later, fall. The
question is what comes next. Judging by the current situation, the outlook is
far from rosy. It is rather crimson: the color of blood. Many areas in Syria
today are in a veritable state of civil war. Encounters with many Syrians
living in Lebanon reveal tales that are eerily familiar. Neighbors with whom
one shared one’s life, are suddenly turning into mortal enemies simply because
they are of a different sect. The burning of houses and the killing of innocent
civilians is going on in Syria at two levels: the horrendous atrocities
committed almost daily by the regime, and the “spontaneous” attacks among the
population on the basis of sectarian and ethnic differences. This does not bode
well for the post-Baathist era and the long term future of Syria, as a chilling
</span><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/world/middleeast/in-syrian-conflict-children-speak-of-revenge-against-alawites.html?pagewanted=all"><span style="color: blue; font-family: Cambria;">New
York Times report</span></a><span style="font-family: Cambria;"> from a Syrian refugee camp reveals. We would argue that a
sectarian civil war is in fact a greater danger to the Syrian revolt, than the
power of the regime’s security forces.</span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Cambria;">There is, however, a second, equally profound, threat to the Syrian
revolution: its lack of unity. Every popular revolt is made of an alliance of
different factions. This is inevitable, and not necessarily a threat in and of
itself. However, if the different factions do not resolve their disagreements
through a political, ideally non-violent, mechanism, the consequences can be
dire. It can be argued that the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, although
they brought to power the Islamist parties that were certainly not among the
leaders of the revolution, did so by institutionalized mechanisms (elections)
that can be in turn used to unseat them from power. This is a highly advanced
achievement, that should be recognized as such, but one that is in fact rare in
the history of revolts. The norm for revolutions is that they devour their
children. The violent struggle after the French revolution (arguably the mother
of all modern revolutions!) brought a period of oppression and dictatorship
that resolved only slowly and over a significant amount of time. Closer to home
– literally – the Iranian revolution resulted in the violent oppression of
liberal Islamic and leftist parties that initiated the revolution, and the
establishment of a veritable theocratic dictatorship of fundamentalist
Islamists. That is precisely what the Syrian revolution is at risk of.</span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Cambria;">It is no secret that the Syrian rebels are currently a collection of
factions with little in common other than the immediate goal of the fall of the
Asad regime. The rise in sectarian tensions is strengthening the hand of the islamists,
particularly the more virulent fundamentalists among them, as is the active
involvement of Saudi and Qatari money and Turkish logistical support. Although
much of the resistance to the regime stems from the heroic fighting of local,
self-organized citizen militias, it is easily imaginable that the islamists
with foreign financial and military support will grab the reigns of power,
particularly if the fall of the regime brings with it a widened sectarian civil
war. It is very unlikely that their rule will be any less violent and
oppressive than that of the Iranian clergy. The repercussions for neighboring
Lebanon and the region at large could be dire.</span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><o:p><span style="font-family: Cambria;"> </span></o:p></span><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: Cambria;">In sum, the Syrian revolution today is facing a serious double-edged
risk. While it will certainly end the Baathist regime, as it stands, it is
likely to end up plunging Syria into a nightmarish civil war that is likely to
end with the rise of a fundamentalist Salafist take over. This might yet be the
worst legacy the Asad-led Baathist regime leaves behind!</span></span></div>
</div>
Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com24tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-22585241891728895312012-09-05T06:59:00.000+01:002012-09-05T06:59:19.375+01:00The Ghost of Bachir Gemayel<br />
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<span style="font-family: Calibri;">Joseph El-Khoury</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Calibri;">This year, August, as opposed to
September was the month of Bachir Gemayel.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The change in month is also coupled with a change in image. A new
re-looked Bachir, better suited for the 21<sup><span style="font-size: x-small;">st</span></sup> century, was unveiled
for the celebrations organised by his son Nadim in memory of the former’s 1982
election. The Lebanese Forces, stuck to a more traditional portrait of their
historical leader for the annual mass honouring their martyrs.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Calibri;">In times of crisis, and this is
certainly one for Lebanese Christianity, the soul searching seems to bring this
community back to the ‘golden era’ of Maronite domination ...and Bachir.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Calibri;">Few will argue convincingly
against the new reality in effect since the mid 1990s. The balance of power is
now unashamedly shared between three population blocks, with Sunnis and Shiaas
no longer constituting a single political and social ‘Islamic’ entity. As the
heating conflict between Sunni sand Shiaas escalates to boiling point, we hear
a deafening silence on the Christian front of the Lebanese confessional
arrangement. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The burning tyres in the
Southern suburb and the sniper shots in Tripoli seem to have a muffling effect
on the figureheads of the Christian camp, all affiliation included. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Calibri;">Nonetheless the delusion of power
seems unshakable. For many of these a return to pre-1989 if not 1943 remains a
realistic goal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The nostalgia for better
times is certainly deeply engrained in the Christian Lebanese psyche and
perpetuated by the affiliated media. Politically, it is fuelled mostly by the
posturing of General Michel Aoun, darling of the Christian middle classes and
embodiment of their state of denial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Michel Aoun for his supporters is what they want him to be; father
figure, saviour, astute political mover, and visionary. The man himself is less
important than the function he fulfils: Michel Aoun is everything they would
have expected from an older Bachir Gemayel, had the latter not been brutally
assassinated on that fateful day of 14<sup><span style="font-size: x-small;">th</span></sup> September 1982. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Calibri;">It is well known that those who
die young, at the height of their productivity, are always idealised in the
minds of their public.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This applies to
Bachir Gemayel (who died age 35), as much as it did to the guerrilla leader Che
Guevara (died age 39) or the singer from the doors Jim Morrison (died age 27)
with the obvious differences between these characters.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Exploiting their memory is often a cleansing
experience to those left behind, who end up being compromised by life and
experience.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Calibri;">The grief suffered by the
Christian population, at the time hurled in an ever narrowing ghetto, and
gripped by the paranoia of a threatening increasingly alien surrounding,
lingered for many years. There were no obvious replacements to Gemayel. Neither
the mild mannered, always neatly dressed Ameen could fill his brother’s shoes,
neither did the second nor third in command in the Lebanese Forces, who had
operated under Bachir as loyal sidekicks without much clout.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For the following years, the leadership
struggle resembled more a boardroom overhaul rather than a true fight for the
soul of the Christians. This is until the final showdown in the mid-1980s
between Samir Geagea and Elie Hobeika, resulting in the dominance of the first
and the exile of the second. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
Christians of the ‘centre’, effectively those who originated from parts of
Mount Lebanon and Beirut did not take to Geagea, son of a northern village.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>His humble origins did not fit with their
image of themselves as the country’s intellectual and financial elite. The fact
he had not completed his medical studies, although for very justifiable
reasons, did not sit well with the liberal professionals (doctors, lawyers). Despite
his articulate style and his ruthless determination, Geagea in military garb or
in a suit could simply not replace Gemayel. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Calibri;">Enters Michel Aoun in 1988. Until
then a respected yet not over-influential army general, Michel Aoun became the
last minute attempt at avoiding a complete disintegration of state
institutions. The man brought in as a stop-gap until better solutions could be
found had other plans and a well-rehearsed rhetoric to accompany his ambitions.
Words such as ‘state’ army’ ‘order’ security’ have the effect on the Christian
Middle Classes you would expect from a 7 year old child presented with a cone
of ice cream.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Aoun used them again and
again in a litany that mimicked the simple message that had sold Bachir Gemayel
(the one of 1982, not 1976) to the hearts of that population: We, the
Christians can reverse the effect of the civil war and can bring back order and
prosperity to this country, working hand in hand with those from other
confessions who choose to be as patriotic as us.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Calibri;">This perverse view of patriotism
as more inherent to one sect over others, unfortunately explains why the
alliance between Aoun and Hezbollah is viewed so positively by large sections
of the Christian population, despite its obvious imbalance in favour of the
Shiaa militant organisation, with which they have little in common, culturally,
politically and socially. It also explains why March 14<sup><span style="font-size: x-small;">th</span></sup> has not succeeded
in breaking Aoun’s popularity. By adopting Geagea, maybe by default, as a
Christian figure head and allowing the Hariri clan to treat their disparate
array of Christian allies with some disdain, they had gone too far in trampling
on the pride of the Christian middle classes. This situation persists
today.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Despite the shift in his
discourse, which should assure him a broader appeal, Geagea, it is doubtful
that he will ever be in a position to capture the imagination of the majority
of Christians. This handicap is what maintains the hope of the new generation
of Gemayels<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>in regaining a position of
leadership they believe is rightfully theirs. But their real challenge is
elsewhere. If they ever manage to ever place their differences to one side, it
is primarily the Patriotic movement they will need to wrestle for the ghost of Bachir
Gemayel.</span></div>
Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com12tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-88063398293799682562012-08-24T09:07:00.003+01:002012-08-24T09:14:59.625+01:00From Stockholm to Ezzaz - The saga of the Lebanese hostages in Syria<div style="text-align: justify;">
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<span style="mso-hansi-font-family: "Arial Unicode MS";"><span style="font-family: Helvetica;"></span></span> </div>
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<span style="mso-hansi-font-family: "Arial Unicode MS";"><span style="font-family: Helvetica;"><strong>Joseph El-Khoury</strong></span></span></div>
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<span style="mso-hansi-font-family: "Arial Unicode MS";"><span style="font-family: Helvetica;"></span></span> </div>
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<span style="mso-hansi-font-family: "Arial Unicode MS";"><span style="font-family: Helvetica;">I rarely
agree with Hasan Nasrallah. But the comments he made in his latest televised
speech on the media's handling of the Lebanese detainees in Syria resonated
profoundly with me. Nasrallah was less composed than usual as he accused the
media of prioritising their need for a scoop over any other implications.</span></span><br />
<o:p><span style="font-family: Helvetica;"> </span></o:p></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
</div>
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<span style="mso-hansi-font-family: "Arial Unicode MS";"><span style="font-family: Helvetica;">I shared
that feeling from the time that Tania Mehanna irrupted all cameras blazing into
that living room flanked by a smiling Abou Brahim. the detainees, whose
political affiliation would be fairly predictable went on, in response to
Mehanna's questions to voice unconditional support to the cause of their
captor. some were more restrained than others, but all displayed fear and
despair. </span></span><br />
<o:p><span style="font-family: Helvetica;"> </span></o:p></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
</div>
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<span style="mso-hansi-font-family: "Arial Unicode MS";"><span style="font-family: Helvetica;">I do not
know who thought that the visit to Ezzaz, the town near the Turkish-Syrian
border, was a good idea. Where did the inspiration for the scoop come from? Was
there any consideration given to the impact it would have on the detainees,
their families or the wider public. Until that date most Lebanese had had a fairly
abstract relation with the subject. We knew the detainees had been kept safe
and were awaiting for the unravelling of some regional arrangement so they
could return home.</span></span><br />
<o:p><span style="font-family: Helvetica;"> </span></o:p></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
</div>
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<span style="mso-hansi-font-family: "Arial Unicode MS";"><span style="font-family: Helvetica;">The
prolonged visit of the Lebanese TV crew created an unprecedented personal bond
between the public and all the actors in this tragic soap opera.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is hard to see how this would not have
played a role in the retaliatory kidnappings carried out by Shiaa clans over
the last few days.</span></span><o:p><span style="font-family: Helvetica;"> </span></o:p><br />
</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
</div>
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<span style="mso-hansi-font-family: "Arial Unicode MS";"><span style="font-family: Helvetica;">LBC and
New TV, for all their declared good intentions, in effect contributed to the
humiliation imposed on these detainees by the Syrian rebels. Parading them
helpless and fearful; asking them to make statements under duress while
portraying an atmosphere of osmosis between captor and captive can only be
described as unethical. One would remind these media professionals that PRESS
TV, the English language outlet of the Islamic Republic of Iran, had recently
been prevented from broadcasting in the UK under the premise that they had
interviewed an opposition activist who had been detained and tortured by
Iranian security forces. I agree totally with the principle. Being forced to
make statements you do not agree with is humiliating. Humiliation is traumatic,
whether it follows torture or intimidation. Broadcasting the humiliation of a
human being makes you complicit in it.</span></span><br />
<span style="mso-hansi-font-family: "Arial Unicode MS";"><span style="font-family: Helvetica;"> </span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
</div>
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<span style="mso-hansi-font-family: "Arial Unicode MS";"><span style="font-family: Helvetica;">Many who
followed the saga in screen drew parallels with the 'Stockholm syndrome'. This
psychological term was coined by experts following a bank robbery in 1973
Sweden. It refers to the situation whereby a hostage develops empathic bonds
with his captor and becomes complicit in his own kidnapping. There are a number
of variants of this syndrome, which rely on many factors; the need for
self-preservation being one of them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Thanks to Tania Mehanna and her colleagues, we have now a
media-manufactured Stockholm Syndrome. The consequences so far have been
dreadful and with the bombing that followed and might have cost the lives of
some hostages, the dust is still to settle both literally and psychologically. </span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica;"><span style="mso-hansi-font-family: "Arial Unicode MS";">Better
care next time. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: #0400; mso-bidi-language: X-NONE; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: #0400;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-114242023641326282012-01-16T20:38:00.001+00:002012-01-16T21:45:08.677+00:00Difficult Conversations: Syria as seen from Lebanon<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><strong>Joseph El-Khoury</strong></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";">Few Lebanese can pretend to be fully objective when it comes to events in Syria. The emotional baggage from the 'Pax Syriana', the infamous Status quo imposed by the Assad's regime on the country, still runs deep in the Lebanese psyche bringing significant bias to any cold-hearted analysis.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";">From the mid 1980s onwards the Syrian regime through its instruments of domination and deception determined the balance of power between the various religious sects; and also within these sects. The winners and losers from this orderly distribution of musical chairs that followed the chaos of the civil war are the same principal actors of the current political stage, characterised by the confrontation between March 8th and the March 14th alliances (pro- and anti-Hezbollah respectively). Ever since that fateful day in 1976 when troops under the banner of the Arab dissuasion forces rolled across the border at Masnaa, we have had a pro-Syrian camp and an anti-Syrian one. Neutrality was not an option, and contrary to the politically correct discourse, it is that dichotomy that trumps all others, including the divergence of position vis-a-vis Israel and the Palestinians.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";">And Syria; from Lebanon; for all intent and purposes is Assad's Syria; with its figures, its slogans and its modus operandi.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";">My compatriots can pretend, on both sides of the argument, that their interest in the future of Syria is primarily motivated by a sense of justice and deep empathy for those dying in the uprising that has raged on in March 2011. Te truth is that their position on this matter is neither selfless nor shaped by facts. For most Lebanese It is pre-established and unshakeable.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";">Personally, I am from that generation that was at the receiving end of that mixture of humiliation, pain and fear that simply won’t go away; and invariably I seek some form of retribution. Still, which opinion is not shaped by personal experience; and who can argue with a straight face that it is unreasonable to wish for the demise of the Baath regime or at least a radical overhaul? My position is unashamedly based on its track record since 1970, not March 2011, in Syria and also in Lebanon. For me, it avoids the distraction of arguing over whether the demonstrators in Deraa were armed infiltrators who shot first or those in Homs are trained Jihadists with Salafi ambitions.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";">Even if Assad can claim support among sections of the population, including minorities and the business classes, his assessment sheet should make disappointing reading for any outsider sympathisers. With the threat of an Islamic Emirate internally and the challenge of an Arab-Western a coalition externally, after 40 years of totalitarian rule a self proclaimed secular progressive regime has failed at delivering its socialism, freedom and unity; at home and abroad.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Verdana;">As for us Lebanese; the neighborhood is changing and a radical adjustment is on the cards.</span></div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com10tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-36720987467469227522011-12-11T11:34:00.001+00:002011-12-11T11:58:23.271+00:00Arab Spring’s Silver Lining: A Search for the Soul of Arab Islam<div class="yiv1243016493MsoNormal" style="margin: 0.1pt 0cm; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: small;"><strong>Elie Elhadj</strong></span></div>
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<em><span style="font-family: inherit;">Posted with permission from </span></em><a href="http://daringopinion.com/"><em><span style="font-family: inherit;">daringopinion.com</span></em></a><span style="font-family: inherit;">.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: small;">Non-Arab Muslims in predominantly Sunni Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey, representing two thirds of world Muslims, have a moderate and modern attitude towards Islamic dogma and Shari’a laws. They conduct democratic parliamentary elections and have had female prime ministers and presidents.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: small;">By contrast, Sunni Arab countries treat women like chattel. For decades, Arab states have been ruled by non-representative dictators. Until the Arab Spring in 2011, the Arab peoples never had a democratic election, save for those farcical presidential referendums. <br />
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Why the difference between the Sunni way of life of Arab and non-Arab Muslims? The answer may be found in the fact that Arab rulers and their palace ulama exploit those parts of the Islamic creed that help prolong their control over their people. Arabs consider themselves as the guardians of the “true” Islam of seventh century Arabia. That the Prophet, his companions, the Quran, and the sanctuaries in Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem are all Arabic cement that belief. The Quran describes Arabs as the “best people evolved to mankind” (3:110). <br />
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<strong>The Arab Spring might reform Arab Islam</strong><br />
<br />The Arab Spring has triggered big conflicts between Arab rulers and their palace ulama, on one hand, and the anti-ruler ulama and the masses, on the other. The palace ulama have been for decades actively protecting the excesses of their benefactor kings and presidents. They preach that blind obedience to the Muslim ruler is a form of Islamic piety, citing God’s word in the Quran (4:59): “Obey God and obey God’s messenger and obey those of authority among you”. The palace ulama teach that the Prophet Muhammad had reportedly said, according to canonical Hadith collection of al-Bukhari and of Muslim: “He who obeys me obeys God; he who disobeys me, disobeys God. He who obeys the ruler, obeys me; he who disobeys the ruler, disobeys me”. <br />
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The anti-ruler ulama believe rebelling against an impious or unjust Muslim ruler to be an Islamic duty. To justify their belief, anti-ruler ulama invoke the words of the Prophet, quoted in Abi Dawood, Muslim, and al-Nasai: “Whoever of you sees an evil action, let him change it with his hand; and if he is not able to do so, then with his tongue; and if he is not able to do so, then with his heart”.<br />
<br />The anti-ruler ulama helped to remove from office in 2011 the rulers of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Anti-ruler Islamic groups performed impressively in all of the democratically held parliamentary elections during the last quarter of the year. In Tunisia, al-Nahda Party achieved 41% of the vote. In Morocco, the Justice and Development Party achieved 27% of the votes, more than any other party. In Tunisia and Morocco, the leaders of the winning parties became prime ministers. In Egypt, Islamic politicians will undoubtedly form the next cabinet when parliamentary elections are completed in early 2012. Already, in the first round, the Freedom and Justice Party, a reincarnation of the Muslim Brothers organization, achieved 37% of the votes and the fundamentalist al-Nour party achieved 24%. Likewise, anti-ruler ulama and Islamic parties are most likely to perform well in the forthcoming parliamentary elections in Yemen and Libya, and in Syria, too, whenever the Asad family finally falls. <br />
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The victorious anti-ruler ulama in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen will undoubtedly provide the intellectual vigor and inspiration to the anti-ruler ulama in other Arab republics and monarchies to rise against their own unjust and corrupt presidents and kings.<br /><br />Within the ranks of the winning Islamic groups there are shades of moderation and extremism. The moderates; like Morocco’s Justice and Development, Tunisia’s al-Nahda, and Egypt’s Freedom and Justice might prove to be akin to Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, if they translate their electioneering pledges into action—time will tell. Fundamentalist parties like Egypt’s al-Nour, are Islamist salafis who find their guidance in Wahhabi extremism. Their members aspire to emulate the Prophet’s seventh century way of life in the Arabian Desert. Some salafis, for example, refrain from using spoons or forks because such implements did not exist during the Prophet’s life. Islamist salafis choose to focus on the intolerant and the violent parts of the Quran and the Sunna, to the exclusion of the tolerant and peaceful parts on the same issues. <br />
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Wahhabism is influenced by the teaching of Ahmad Bin Hanbal (d. 855), founder of the most orthodox among the four surviving Sunni Schools of Jurisprudence. Less than 5% of world’s Sunnis today follow Wahhabi tenets, mainly in Saudi Arabia plus those among the millions of expatriate workers who became indoctrinated in the Wahhabi creed as a result of working in Saudi Arabia over the past 35 years. <br />
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<strong>The search for the soul of Arab Islam</strong><br /><br />
During the struggle against their tormentors, Islamic and Islamist parties were united. However, now that the dictators are gone from a few Arab capitals and leaders of moderate Islamic political parties took their place the next confrontation will be between the new religiously moderate rulers and the Islamist salafis. The Islamist salafis will attack the policies and laws of the new rulers as insufficiently Islamic, even heretical (kuffar) deserving death. The new rulers will defend their policies and laws as perfectly Islamic, supported by legitimating reasoning drawn from the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet.<br /><br />
The coming battle will engulf the moderates and the Islamists over the soul of Islam. The battle will be fought over whether Islam is going to be the intolerant violent religion of the Bin Laden Wahhabi type; or, the enlightened moderate and modern Islam of the Recep Tayyip Erdogan Turkish type? <br />
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In the ensuing fight, the Islamist salafis will most likely be sidelined. The results of the recent parliamentary elections in Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt point in the direction of a victory for the moderates. <br />
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Most importantly, however, this battle might finally give birth to a reformation movement in Islam after a thousand years of suppression of innovation and persecution of whoever dares to think outside ancient and rigid religious constructions and dogma. The battle might very well produce an Islamic reformation movement similar to Martin Luther’s sixteenth century reformation of Christianity. If that happens, the world will become a safer place. <br />
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<strong>Policy implications</strong><br />
<br />Should Washington and the West fear moderate Arab Islamic regimes? The answer is no. Why? Because to be Islamic need not be anti-America or anti-West. Wahhabi Saudi Arabia, the world’s most Islamist regime has been obsequious to U.S. policies and interests. <br />
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Islamic rule will not necessarily be more Islamic than the current Arab regimes. Already, in all Arab countries, Islam is the religion of the state (in Syria, Islam is the religion of the president) and Shari’a is either the source of law or a main source of law.<br />
<br />Consider, for example, the so-called “secular” regime in Damascus. Although the Asad clan, apologists, and propagandists constantly propagate that theirs is a “secular” regime, evidence shows otherwise. In fact, the Syria of 2011 is more Islamic than the Syria of 1963, when Hafiz Asad and his five compatriots put an end to the rule of Syria’s last legitimate parliament and President Nazem al-Qudsi’s cabinet. <br />
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In Mr. Asad’s “secular” Syria today seventh century Shari’a laws and courts control personal status, family, and inheritance affairs (Christians follow their own archaic religious courts). Shari’a law is the antithesis of the liberal laws of the modern age. It denies women human and legal rights compared with Muslim men. Shari’a law reduces the status of women to that of chattel—a Muslim man can marry four wives, divorce any one of them without giving reason, with limited child custody rights, housing, or alimony; a Muslim woman is prohibited from marrying a non-Muslim man while the Muslim man is allowed to marry non-Muslim women; a woman cannot pass her nationality on to her foreign husband and children while the man can; “honour killing” of a woman by a male relative results in a light sentence for murder; and two women equal one man in legal testimony, witness, and inheritance. Such maltreatment of one half of society is in spite of the regime’s energetic attempts to project an image of secularism, modernity, and equality between the genders.<br />
<br />The Islamic curriculum in Syria’s elementary, middle, and high schools teaches Muslim Sunni Islam regardless of the Islamic sect to which they belong. The textbooks are discriminatory, divisive, and intolerant of non-Muslims.<br /><br />More mosques, bigger congregations, and more veiled women than ever before have become the order of the day in Syrian cities. To flaunt his Islamic credentials, Mr. Asad even ordered a special rain prayer throughout Syria's mosques performed on December 10, 2010 to ask God to send rain. <br />
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With such credentials, it is difficult to see how a moderate Muslim Brothers rule in Syria would be more Islamic than the Asad regime.</span><span id="yui_3_2_0_1_1323602774797131" style="font-size: small;"></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><strong>Joseph El-Khoury</strong></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: Helvetica;">The
tragic murder of Myriam Achkar on 21<sup>st</sup> November in the town of Sahel
Alma generated significant turmoil in Lebanon. While the family of the victim
and her loved ones cannot be blamed for the flare up of emotions and the call
for retribution in rather crude words, the reaction of the more removed public
is worth a pause for reflection. As the story unraveled, both mainstream and
social media commentaries were awash with bigoted and racist overtones. : At
its heart the interpretation of the event as yet another symbol of the
persecution of Christianity in a hostile environment. This permanent kink in
the psyche of Arab Christian community has resurfaced recently in the wake of
the Arab Spring but stretches back to the inception of Islam and the search for
an Eastern identity that is simultaneously distinct and in tune with its
Islamic surrounding.</span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><o:p><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> </span></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: Helvetica;">I
contrasted the social and official reaction (as distinct from the personal one)
to the murder of Myriam with the aftermath of the slaughter of 62 adolescents
on a Norwegian Island earlier this year. Following a meticulous and protracted
process, Anders Brehing Breivik, the murderer at the heart of these events has
only this week been found clinically insane by two Forensic Psychiatrists. More
importantly they found that his actions could be blames on delusional beliefs
emanating from a diagnosis of Paranoid Schizophrenia. Breivik is likely to
spend the rest if his life in a secure psychiatric institution; an outcome that
has not pleased everyone but as one bereaved parent insisted, the important
point is that society will no longer be at risk from him.</span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><o:p><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> </span></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: Helvetica;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">The
protection of others is an important function of well-established mental health
services in European countries where specialists coordinate their work with
other agencies, including law enforcement agencies and social services. It is
of course fanciful to expect the development of such services in the Arab
world, at least in the short term.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But
as shown in the Breivik case, the use of mental health expertise to help
provide satisfactory answers following a crime that impact society beyond the
immediate environment of the victim and the perpetrator can be a positive
investment for the concerned authorities.</span> </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: Helvetica;">There
is no evidence that Fathi Jaber Salateen, the Syrian who committed the gruesome
murder in Sahel Alma was mentally ill in the clinical sense. In fact the event is
shocking in its simplicity, in the sense that it appears to be the pure product
of a criminal psychopathic mind. Myriam, a loving and loved 28 year old who happened
to be at the wrong place and at the wrong time, was as such sacrificed to
appease dysfunctional basic sexual instincts. What followed remains mostly
speculation until details are further revealed.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: Helvetica;">But
this is not the account reported by various media outlets, either for reasons
of ignorance or ulterior motives. Instead the social and sectarian dimension
was exploited ad nauseaum overshadowing the personal tragedy. This became a
story of an innocent Christian girl killed by a Muslim Immigrant worker. The discrepancy
between the real and perceived cultural and religious values of both victim and
perpetrator were emphasized to explain the murder. A political solution was
even sought for what is essentially a problem inherent to the human mind; the
dysfunctional psyche independent of creed. Little context or analysis was
provided for these types of murder, which are mostly advertised in the
Christian West.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For what it’s worth
another chilling parallel could be drawn between this case and the murder of 25
year old Jo Yeates last Christmas in the English city of Bristol. The convicted
murderer was no other than her neighbor, Vincent Tabak, a distinctively middle
class Dutch architect who led an unremarkable crime-free existence.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Verdana","sans-serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: Helvetica;">The
death of Myriam could not come at a worse time for the Lebanese authorities.
For months, public paranoia has been at its peak fuelled by heightened local
and regional political tension but also a genuine lack of security. In a
desperate attempt to minimize public outcry, many in positions of
responsibility made populist statements lumping together unrelated events and
reaching erroneous conclusions. The measures suggested might reassure a
traumatized community, but do little to prevent another Salateen from striking
in Sahel Alma, or elsewhere when we least expect it.<o:p></o:p></span></div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-25142152075297902402011-10-16T13:31:00.004+01:002011-12-07T20:09:50.034+00:002011: The rise of the Arab Ego<div style="text-align: center;">
<strong><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Joseph El-Khoury</span></strong></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-fareast-font-family: Helvetica;">A healthy ego is essential for the sound functioning of any individual. Societies and groups also require the healthy equivalent of an ego, which can be defined as a set of guiding principles in how they perceive themselves and their relationship with others.<br />
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-fareast-font-family: Helvetica;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the Arab ego had been fairly damaged over the course of the 20th century but even probably beyond that to the era of Turkish domination, from Seljuk to Ottoman.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The last century was particularly harsh as it opened on hope in a dawn of self-determination, prosperity and unity. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What follows is well documented: From the failure to establish an Arab state in the wake of the 1916 revolt to the Invasion of Iraq in 2003, passing through the Sykes-picot agreement and the creation of the state of Israel, Arab history reads as a succession of defeats, retreats, disappointments and foreign domination. For lack of better strategies, the Arabs fell back on an unhealthy introversion; the type that generates resentment, suspiciousness and misunderstanding of the other without providing viable paths for self-validation. The series of civil/sectarian/ethnic/social conflicts that have plagued the Arab hemisphere for decades with frequent overspills onto the global scene can be, in my view, directly linked to this battered and bruised ego in need of rescuing.</span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-fareast-font-family: Helvetica;">Enters the Arab spring… Pushing the Arab masses to the global stage as a force to be reckoned with and lifting in its wake the Arab ego. As the action unravels months later, this exercise in confidence building might actually be the only long-lasting tangible effect of the Uprisings.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-fareast-font-family: Helvetica;"><o:p> </o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-fareast-font-family: Helvetica;">We will soon celebrate the one year of anniversary of the Tunisian spark of what later became the Arab Spring, suitably dubbed by a Western media machine until then hostile and dismissive. We have also started discovering the vulnerability of the process and how easily it could be reversed, compromised or hijacked. Any of these three scenarios are likely to lead to a fragmentation of the Arab ego; an outcome with practical implications for individual countries and for the leading nationalist ideological drives that have dominated the political scenes for in excess of 100 years. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Arab nationalism, in its secular and religious (Pan-Islamist) components is unlikely to resist another humiliating failure. The more so humiliating as it would be self-inflicted through internal divisions, the lack of direction and a naïve dichotomous outlook on the modern world. The unfortunate scenes in Maspero, Cairo a few days ago should not have come as a surprise to anyone not blinded by the myths of a united Arab society liberating itself from foreign shackles in one deep breath of freedom. </span></span><br />
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-fareast-font-family: Helvetica;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The Arab uprisings are a necessary evil, akin to a painful corrective surgical procedure; and an equally painful convalescence is to be expected. It would still be wrong to delude ourselves with an inflated sense of our self importance and our achievements. But if the Arab twittersphere is anything to go by, grandiosity and stubbornness is on the agenda uniting Islamic revivalists, pro-western liberals and traditional Nationalists from Egypt to Syria. At the time of writing, a summary report would include a change of guards in Egypt, an unsettled democratic process in Tunisia, a tribal struggle in Yemen, a religious rift in Bahrain, a revolution backed by NATO in Libya and a bloodbath with sectarian undertones in Syria.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The umbrella term of ‘Arab spring’, which is essentially another Orientalist myth fails to capture the essence of these events or to predict their outcomes. Our own misguided contribution has been to dismiss the internal contradictions plaguing the Arab land and the Arab identity from long before the first Zionist settler and the first oil pipeline.</span></span><br />
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-fareast-font-family: Helvetica;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">A new Arab ego based on self delusion is still an unhealthy one. Honest blunt introspection is required, but no progressive political force or intellectual circle has so far been willing to provide it while remaining effectively connected with the wave of popular anger. This is leaving the fray open for the hordes of populists and opportunists with less than shiny credentials.</span></span><br />
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<span lang="EN-US" style="mso-fareast-font-family: Helvetica;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Hope remains that in the coming months someone somewhere will rise to this challenge.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-81863055250331777182011-08-22T16:42:00.000+01:002011-12-07T20:10:09.821+00:00Autumn leaves... the promise and threat of the Arab spring<div style="text-align: center;">
<strong>Bassem Hassan</strong></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgNkQXv6dPq1rlwG1QWxIdcNVcD1R2ZuPVK3GnPrnm6k0XzssQynHpYmJbtucEjgyWiwOpqQrdO3eNQWdtX90gGR1tMP8PiZM5xrqUPwJTSSO0Wr0pXm9P5rUQaOemGbWk8-JVfMc-U5M3G/s1600/110331_6_110035013.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="266" qaa="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgNkQXv6dPq1rlwG1QWxIdcNVcD1R2ZuPVK3GnPrnm6k0XzssQynHpYmJbtucEjgyWiwOpqQrdO3eNQWdtX90gGR1tMP8PiZM5xrqUPwJTSSO0Wr0pXm9P5rUQaOemGbWk8-JVfMc-U5M3G/s400/110331_6_110035013.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<em><span style="font-size: x-small;"> Photo Roberto Schmidt AFP/ImagesGetty</span></em><br />
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As the popular Arab revolts approach autumn, the tree of Arab dictators is shedding its leaves. One after the other they fall. Some fell when the tree was merely shaken, others after a strong wind and still others after a raging storm. The storm still rages, the tree is shaking violently and the remaining leaves will fall… yellow, crooked and dry.</div>
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Arab societies are vastly different from one another in terms of their social organization, institutions of state and history of independence and governance. Yet, they share the fact that they are governed by corrupt oligarchies often lead either by a family or a single brutal figure. As such it is perfectly understandable that the discussion over the future of post-revolutionary Arab nations centers upon the idea of democracy. Clearly, no Arab future is likely to be bright and hopeful without democracy. However, democracy is a vast and complex notion and today exists in almost as many forms as there are democratic states. The question therefore is what basic standards of democracy might we call for in the new Arab nations emerging from the settling dust of the liberation battles?</div>
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Perhaps a useful parameter against which to measure this notion is the path of democracy in modern Arab history. Today, one might speak of two democratic countries in the Arab world: Lebanon and Iraq. The former has a relatively long experience with its democratic system, while the latter has a rather new experience with its system. What the two countries share is a very troubled unstable history with their democracies. A logical assumption therefore is that the common elements of the two systems underlie the shared trouble they have with democracy. Those common elements are a system of power sharing based upon religious sects and heavy intervention in internal affairs by conflicting outside powers. Thus, the Arab revolutionaries in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and soon Syria would be well advised to avoid anything resembling the Lebanese or Iraqi “democracies”.</div>
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Arab people across the region deserve the freedom and democracy they have paid for with decades of oppression and poverty and months of bloodshed. They also deserve a democracy likely to sustain them in the long term. They deserve a democracy that will allow their societies to develop solid economies, modern educational systems, sustainable infrastructures and institutes of knowledge creation. The brave young Arabs who rose to defy the heritage of their defeated and defeatist fathers, but also in equal measure the dark prophecy and evil instruments of small but violent minority of religious extremists, deserve a future in which they are all equal in rights and duties regardless of age, gender, ethnic origin, spiritual conviction and life style. Those who paid with their bodies and risked their lives, and the memories of those who lost theirs, deserve a future in which Arab peoples stand in social solidarity within and between their countries, while respecting each other’s right to independence and self-determination.</div>
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All these gifts do not come cheap and they do not come easy. All these rights and privileges are not given, but rather created. All this promise held within the very nature and course that the Arab revolutions have decided to take, does not come merely through claiming democracy and holding elections. Lebanon and Iraq are a sadly non-shining example. For the Arab spring to someday shine a beautiful sunlight and for the Arab tree to finally bear the fruit of progress, it needs to be planted in the soil of secular, socialized democracy. Any other form is short-term recipe for regression to the dictatorship of tribalism and its favorite mechanism of governance: civil war!</div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-82381309707591045812011-07-27T15:44:00.000+01:002011-12-07T20:10:36.481+00:00Zeid Hamdan and General Suleiman: The Authoritarianism of Fragile Egos (or vice versa)<div style="text-align: center;">
<strong>Karl Sharro</strong></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiXyByZ3z4PMmC2jBPQ_skF3D3OLEpLpmQzmo_H_pc7PJfkh2Ieizu3jITfRPRvkXFi6DoBBXz48x78vXDTCl6Gm3LD2ocC-ovsM3OfqJ0qxp8r_UjaEUrly-Jf_ZkGlOMx_YLXnkBJnyy2/s1600/44468_424143027583_40801722583_5013522_5511899_n.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiXyByZ3z4PMmC2jBPQ_skF3D3OLEpLpmQzmo_H_pc7PJfkh2Ieizu3jITfRPRvkXFi6DoBBXz48x78vXDTCl6Gm3LD2ocC-ovsM3OfqJ0qxp8r_UjaEUrly-Jf_ZkGlOMx_YLXnkBJnyy2/s400/44468_424143027583_40801722583_5013522_5511899_n.jpg" t$="true" width="400" /></a></div>
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<strong>Republished with permission from </strong><a href="http://karlremarks.blogspot.com/"><strong>Karlremarks</strong></a><strong>. Follow him also on twitter @Karlremarks.</strong></div>
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Message from Zeid Hamdan in prison: '<em>Dear friends, I am now in the prison of the police station of the palace of justice in Beirut because of my song "General Soleiman". They are prosecuting me for defammation of President Soleiman. I dont know, until when I am staying in prison. Please mobilize!'</em></div>
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The Lebanese musician Zeid Hamdan, recently back from participating in the Shubbak Festival in London, sent this message from his detention cell in Beirut earlier today. Shubbak was intended as a 'window on contemporary Arab culture', the bitter irony is that this incident has now given an all too realistic view of the contemporary culture of repression and arbitrary use of power in Lebanon. The song in question, General Suleiman, is a light-hearted reggae number that has has provoked the humourless authorities to go after Zeid Hamdan, in all likelihood for the 'offence' of demeaning the position of the President of the Republic. This archaic residue of the French mandate period has often been used by the authorities to clamp down on the freedom of expression. </div>
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Last year I reviewed General Suleiman, and I may have been too harsh on the borrowed imagery in the video clip and the soft satire it employed. Zeid explained at the time that the idea for the song came out of the political frustrations of the power vacuum that the country experienced, and how he saw the election of General Suleiman as a positive step. The song is in fact is a plea for change, for stability, for normalcy. As a result of the authorities' incompetence, lack of humour and heavy-handedness, perhaps it will now spark a genuine drive for change. The reaction to the detention has been swift, the news travelled very quickly and protest will hopefully follow very soon.</div>
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While it's tempting to defend Zeid on the basis that the song isn't actually offensive, I think this is the wrong approach. What we need to defend here is the freedom of expression, without qualifications, and push for abolishing the archaic laws that provide the legal basis for such arrests. No politician or public figure should be beyond critique, and they shouldn't be allowed to use those laws in a desperate bid to gain the respect that their political record hasn't gained them. The role of art and music isn't to flatter the fragile egos of insecure public figures. Let's say a resolute no to these forms of intellectual intimidation and fight for our freedom to offend the clique of fools that is ruling us.</div>
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Join the <a href="http://www.facebook.com/pages/Free-Zeid-Hamdan-from-Jail/198043086920262?ref=ts&sk=wall">Free Zeid</a> page on facebook.Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-91924229297431745662011-07-11T15:49:00.002+01:002011-12-07T20:10:55.653+00:00A Premier League Guide to Lebanese Politics.<div style="text-align: center;">
<strong>Karl Sharro</strong></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh7ciDzO15JKaxBxRPY8CeZrwqV3rZgYm7hU4mO2O-JVUl-5-Y8iXPE6VIIsriG-7z1cKthI4P-gPSjtDtOpSW6PIdynYsBlSRvCFeViMOCoM-LETTvavllqoyG-2ntfJlLCcHDk_J30Crn/s1600/lebanese-politicians-play-football.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="248" m$="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh7ciDzO15JKaxBxRPY8CeZrwqV3rZgYm7hU4mO2O-JVUl-5-Y8iXPE6VIIsriG-7z1cKthI4P-gPSjtDtOpSW6PIdynYsBlSRvCFeViMOCoM-LETTvavllqoyG-2ntfJlLCcHDk_J30Crn/s400/lebanese-politicians-play-football.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
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<em>Republished with permission from </em><a href="http://karlremarks.blogspot.com/2011/07/premier-league-guide-to-lebanese.html#more"><em>Karlremarks</em></a><em>. Follow him also on twitter @Karlremarks.</em><br />
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Lebanese politics can appear confusing to the outside observer. Indeed, most of the time, it appears confusing to the inside observer. However, Lebanese politics has inherent logic and rules and, once those are grasped, following it can offer hours of entertainment for the whole family. In an effort to demystify some of the conceptual and technical aspects of Lebanese politics, I offer you the Premier League Guide to Lebanese Politics. It’s a handy metaphorical guide that will help you tell the difference between a Jumblatt and a Aoun, and answer questions like why they can never be on the same side. </div>
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But what do Lebanese politics and the English Premier League have in common, I hear you ask? Simple, it’s all about the relaxed rules about foreign ownership and player transfers. Like the Premier League, most parties in Lebanon are financed by foreign owners who are mostly connoisseurs that invest heavily in their hobby. Lebanese politicians are very pragmatic about their affiliations, and can often be convinced to switch sides. Lebanese politics is also divided into competition seasons and periods of rest during players assess their performance and the tourists are allowed to come for the summer. </div>
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So let’s find who’s who in Lebanese politics:</div>
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Hezbollah: Hezbollah are the Manchester United of Lebanese politics. They were around for a while, but didn’t become really successful until they found the right manager, their own Alex Ferguson. Under his leadership, they acquired a winning touch and they’ve done very well since he took the helm. Many others are jealous of their successes and want to end their dominance. Like Man U, their fans don’t like Americans. </div>
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The Future Movement: Future are the ‘blues’ of Lebanese politics. They also are bankrolled by a tycoon and have had some success in recent years, but not enough to meet their expectations. They’ve managed to lure players from other teams often, but they haven’t all been good signings. They also experimented with young and inexperienced managers. </div>
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The Lebanese Forces: The Lebanese Forces are the Liverpool of Lebanese politics. They were successful in the 80s, but then they spent years in the shadows. Like Liverpool, they brought back their manager from the 80s in hope of finding the winning formula. He spent years away from the game for personal reasons. </div>
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The Free Patriotic Movement: Had Blackpool not been relegated, it would have been the perfect equivalent of the FPM. Both like the colour orange and both are led by loud-mouthed, hot-headed individuals who seem to speak their own language. Both Blackpool and the FPM have bigger ambitions than their resources and skills merit. However, since Blackpool were relegated last season, this analogy doesn’t actually work. </div>
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Walid Jumblatt: Walid Jumblatt is the ‘libero’ of Lebanese politics. He has a classic sweeper’s ability to ‘read the game’ and anticipate the opponent’s movements. His own movements are impossible to predict. Like Ashly Cole, he has switched sides between red and blue teams, but he doesn’t have Cole’s commitment and sense of loyalty. </div>
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The National Bloc: Arsenal. Both are led by men who are more comfortable when speaking French and nobody takes either seriously. </div>
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A Second part will follow soon. Help complete the guide and send your own suggestions. </div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-50101604008220513822011-05-22T21:26:00.002+01:002011-05-22T21:34:30.094+01:00Why Syria’s Christians Should Not Support the Assad Regime<div style="text-align: center;"><strong>Elie Elhadj*</strong></div><br />
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<div style="text-align: justify;">At the Dormition of Our Lady Greek Catholic cathedral in Old Damascus, Father Elias Debii raises his hands to heaven and prays for divine protection for embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Bishop Philoxenos Mattias, a spokesman for the Syriac Orthodox Church said: “We are with the government and against these movements that oppose it”.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Those among Syria's Christian clerics and civic leaders who publicly support the Asad regime are short sighted. They are courting long-term disaster for themselves and their congregations. Why? Because, the Asad regime will not remain in power forever; it is immoral to support non-representative unjust rule; the Asad clan’s exploitation of Sunni Islam has emboldened Islamism and thwarted the development of secularism in Syria; and because scaremongering for blackmail legitimacy will not work forever. The following explains each reason.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><strong>The Asad regime will not remain in power forever</strong></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Since the March 8, 1963 military coup d’état against the democratically elected parliament and government of President Nazim al-Qudsi, an unelected minority of the Alawite Asad clan has been ruling Syria with an iron fist; notwithstanding, those seven uncontested referendums for the two Asad presidents.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">In addition to impoverishing Syria; despite billion of dollars in oil revenues, the regime has committed horrific atrocities—extra-judicial killings of hundreds of Muslim Brothers detainees in the Palmyra prison in 1980, mass murder in 1982 of between 3,000 citizens, according to the regime’s apologists, and 38,000 in the city of Hama, let alone the torture of residents at the slightest suspicion and the disappearance of opponents. The killing of more than 1,000 demonstrators during the seven weeks since the March 26, 2011 popular uprising adds to the regime's grim catalogue of human rights violations.</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Such a system of governance is unsustainable. It cannot last forever. When the day of reckoning will come, the support that certain priests and civic leaders had given to the regime will place all Christians in danger.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be predicted when the Asad regime might fall. However, should the demonstrations become larger and spread to downtown Damascus and Aleppo, the demonstrators could overwhelm the security forces; rendering a Hama or a Palmyra type atrocity impossible. If the demonstrations get bigger, more Sunni clerics would join the uprising. Ultimately, even the Sunni palace ulama could turn against their benefactor president.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">There is no love lost between Sunnis and Alawites on a religious level. Accommodation between the Asad regime and Sunni palace ulama is a matter of convenience. Orthodox Sunnis regard Alawites as heretics. Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), condemned the Alawites as being more dangerous than the Christians, and encouraged Muslims to conduct jihad against them. Likewise, Alawites despise Sunnis. To Alawites, the howls of jackals that can be heard at night are the souls of Sunni Muslims calling their misguided co-religionists to prayer.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">If parts of the army, which is a conscripted institution, would refuse killing demonstrators or if the army would stand up to the republican guards and the intelligence brigades, then the regime might very well collapse.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><strong>It is immoral to support non-representative unjust rule</strong></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">That leading priests of certain Syrian churches publicly support the Asad dictatorship does not reflect well on the sense of justice, morality, or benevolence of the priests. It is not very Christian for priests to abandon their duty to stand up to oppression, corruption, and injustice.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">There might be an argument in favour of tolerating an illegitimate dictatorship if the dictator were benevolent. But, Mr. Asad’s dictatorship is neither legitimate nor benevolent. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">For some priests and civic leaders to publicly embrace short-term convenience and abandon long-term security and defense of justice and human rights can be very expensive for the Christian community as a whole. Syria’s Sunni majority will forever remember Christians’ support of Mr. Asad’s misrule. A thousand years later, the memories of Christian and Alawite support of the Crusades are still vivid in the collective consciousness of Sunnis.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><strong>The Asad clan’s exploitation of Sunni Islam emboldened Islamism and impeded the development of secularism in Syria</strong></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Islamism has been gaining strength over the recent decades, thanks to the Asad clan’s strategy of exploiting Sunni Islam to prolong their hold on power.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">That the regime and its apologists and propagandists describe Mr. Asad’s rule as ”secular” is an exaggeration, if not false. The Asad regime is neither secular nor sincere in its promotion of the Sunni creed. Since their seizure of absolute power more than four decades ago, the Asad government did not secularize Syria in the slightest. Syria of 2011 is no less Islamic than Syria of 1963.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Exploiting Sunni Islam, together with the excesses of the ruling elite, corruption, abuse of human rights, poverty, and unemployment have been driving increasing numbers of young men and women to extremism. The longer this situation continues, the more fertile the ground will become for Islamism to grow.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Here is how the Asad dynasty has been impeding the development of secularism in Syria and exploiting Sunni Islam.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Article 3.1 of the Syria constitution makes Islam the necessary religion of the president. Christians are barred from the country’s highest political office. Article 3.2 makes Islam as “a main source” of legislation.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Seventh century Shari’a laws and courts are in force in personal status, family, and inheritance affairs (Christians follow their own archaic religious courts). Shari’a law is the antithesis of the liberal laws of the modern age. It denies women legal rights compared with Muslim men. It impinges on women’s human rights. Shari’a law reduces the status of women to that of chattel—a Muslim man can marry four wives, divorce any one of them without giving reason (with limited child custody rights, housing, or alimony), a Muslim woman is prohibited from marrying a non-Muslim man while the Muslim man is allowed to marry non-Muslim women, a woman cannot pass her nationality on to her foreign husband and children while the man can, “honour killing” of a woman by a male relative results in a light sentence for murder, and two women equal one man in legal testimony, witness, and inheritance. Such maltreatment of one half of Syria’s society is in spite of the regime’s energetic attempts to project an image of secularism, modernity, and equality between the genders.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">The Islamic curriculum in Syria’s elementary, middle, and high schools teaches Muslim Sunni Islam regardless of the Islamic sect to which they belong. The textbooks are discriminatory, divisive, and intolerant of non-Muslims.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">More mosques, bigger congregations, and more veiled women than ever before have become the order of the day in Syrian cities. To flaunt his Islamic credentials, President Bashar Asad even ordered a special rain prayer throughout Syria's mosques performed on December 10, 2010 in order for God to send rain.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Following the March 2011 violent demonstrations, Mr. Asad acted to gain support from the Sunni palace ulama and mollify the Sunni street. The popular Sunni cleric Muhammad Saiid al-Bouti praised Mr. Asad’s response to many of the requests submitted by a number of Sunni clerics. In his weekly religious program on April 5, 2011 on Syrian government television, Sheikh al-Bouti applauded Mr. Asad’s permission to allow niqab-wearing (black face cover) female teachers; transferred in July 2010 to desk duties, to return to classrooms. Sheikh al-Bouti had attributed the drought in December 2010 to the transfer from classrooms of the niqab-wearing female teachers. Sheikh al-Bouti also praised Mr. Asad for the formation of the Sham Institute for Advanced Shari’a Studies and Research, and for the establishment of an Islamic satellite television station dedicated to proclaiming the message of true Islam. Also, the first and only casino, which had enraged orthodox clerics when it opened on New Year’s Eve, was closed as well.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Why exploit Islam and fight secularism?</strong></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">To rule Sunni dominated Syria, it would be helpful to the Asad clan to uphold the influence of Sunni Islam instead of wading in the muddy waters of Shari’a reform and secularization, even if that meant throwing the Baath Party’s constitution away.</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Islam is helpful to Muslim rulers. Not only in Syria, other Arab regimes (except Lebanon and Tunisia) exploit Islam to stay in power. Islam demands obedience of Muslims to the Muslim ruler.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">The Quran, the Prophetic Sunna, and opinions of famous jurists enjoin Muslims to obey the Muslim ruler blindly. In 4:59, the Quran orders: “Obey God and obey God’s messenger and obey those of authority among you.” Answering how a Muslim should react to a ruler who does not follow the true guidance, the Prophet reportedly said, according to Sahih Muslim: “He who obeys me obeys God; he who disobeys me, disobeys God. He who obeys the ruler, obeys me; he who disobeys the ruler, disobeys me.” Abi Da’ud (d. 888) and Ibn Maja (d. 886) quote the Prophet as imploring Muslims to hear and obey the ruler, even if he were an Ethiopian slave. Al-Bukhari (d. 870) quotes similar traditions. The palace ulama invoke one thousand year old opinions of famous jurists such as Al-Ghazali (1058-1111), Ibn Jama’a (1241-1333), and Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328). These men taught that the Muslim ruler must be obeyed blindly because even an unjust ruler is better than societal unrest.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Syria’s palace ulama threaten the Muslim faithful with eternal damnation if they fail to obey Mr. Asad (waliy al-amr). In the hands of the Asad clan, Islam has become a psychological weapon supplementing a brutal security machine.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Scaremongering for Blackmail legitimacy will not work forever</strong></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">That certain priests and civic leaders subscribe to unsubstantiated scaremongering regarding future Islamist/salafi persecution of Christians is unwise. Those in the Christian community who warn of the slaughter awaiting Christians if the Asad regime collapses fall for the regime’s Machiavellian practice of blackmail legitimacy. Neither historical precedence nor credible evidence today supports such scare tactics. Blackmail legitimacy, like the crying-wolf syndrome, does not work forever.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Islamists/salafis who might harbor violent intentions against Christians are a tiny minority of Syria’s 23-million population. There are no accurate statistics or opinion polls to suggest otherwise. Syria’s Islamists/salafis are not representative of Syria’s Sunnis. The great majority of Syria’s Sunnis, around 75% of the population, are moderate Muslims who have lived rather harmoniously with their fellow Christians for centuries.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">During the first 15 years of independence and until the advent of the Asad clan, Syria’s Christians enjoyed peace and shared whatever prosperity was available at that time with the Sunni majority. The suggestion that Syria’s Sunnis would kill Syria’s Christians is malicious misinformation to divide and rule. The regime’s media, apologists, and propagandists who circulate such stories are wicked. Those who believe such tales are naive. Syria’s Christian minority’s best interest could not be separate from the interest of the Sunni majority.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">That the options to Syrians today are reduced to either accepting the current poor state of affairs or contend with an Islamist/salafi rule; even civil war, is blackmail used by the regime to perpetuate its monopoly on power and avoid genuine reform. That genuine reform is not an option does not bode well for the country. That President Asad insisted in his address to the parliament on March 30, 2011 that Syria’s protesters had been “duped” into damaging the nation on behalf of its enemies, and his infamous billionaire cousin, Rami Makhlouf, stated in an interview with The New York Times that, “Syria will fight protests till ‘the end’” spell danger to all Syrians. Like a pressure cooker, the longer a dictatorship stays in power the more violent the end will be.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Sunnis, like Christians, are threatened by Islamist/salafi ideology, violence, and seventh century way of life. While systematic long-term persecution of Christians by Sunnis will not happen in Syria, acts of revenge by extremist groups might occur during the chaotic days of a popular revolt against; not only Alawites and Christians, but also against non-Christian supporters of the Asad clan altogether.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">To spare Syria a potential catastrophe, Mr. Asad should institute a comprehensive and genuine political reforms, in particular; multi-party parliament and contested presidential elections. Scaremongering priests can help. They must desist from misinformation and hypocrisy. They ought to become honest to the teaching of their churches. They should defend legitimacy, justice, and the rule of law.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Wise men and women; Alawites, Christians, and Sunnis must council the president and his immediate family that genuine reform; not cosmetic retouches, not the use of the tank, is the only way forward.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Hafiz Asad and his son, Bashar, have saddled the Alawite community plus the regime’s supporting groups with a terrible burden, a potential disaster. The Asad family must understand that four decades of misrule are kifaya.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Bashar Asad has a rare opportunity today to become the leader who saved Syria from a frightening future. Would he? Or, indeed, can he? </div><div style="text-align: justify;"> </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><em>*Dr Elie Elhadj, born in Syria, is a veteran international banker. He was Chief Executive Officer of Arab National Bank in Saudi Arabia during most of the 1990s. Upon early retirement, he received a Ph.D. from London University's School of Oriental and African Studies. He writes on Middle Eastern and Islamic affairs. </em><a href="http://www.daringopinion.com/"><em>www.daringopinion.com</em></a> </div><div align="justify"></div><div align="justify"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">For more information follow the link to his website </div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-22443194904532621622011-05-12T20:55:00.000+01:002011-05-13T21:49:26.600+01:00Calculation Mistake<div style="text-align: center;"><strong>Dr Bassem Hassan</strong></div><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgm9nvQ-iTsqyFbCVLY4tfemoGcYsAfIKOoeLyvVgHwIWgUPE59XeHJH1_Hll5mu6l_fN33zda3RwYflSwlgKmpL0T1QqBm6VvXVdf-SkzfjF65laSLUyV0NjoiP-haoh3F6-VMTFED9xWW/s1600/Asad.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="256" j8="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgm9nvQ-iTsqyFbCVLY4tfemoGcYsAfIKOoeLyvVgHwIWgUPE59XeHJH1_Hll5mu6l_fN33zda3RwYflSwlgKmpL0T1QqBm6VvXVdf-SkzfjF65laSLUyV0NjoiP-haoh3F6-VMTFED9xWW/s400/Asad.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br />
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Picture this:<br />
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<div style="text-align: justify;">You are a 16 year-old high school student. It’s Friday morning, second period… Algebra. The teacher walks in and gives that pop quiz he’s been promising all week: a sheet of paper with a one-line question on it. You take one look at it and realize that you will solve this in 10 minutes tops. You know this. You’ve got it. You WILL ace this quiz!</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Monday morning. You get the quiz back and to your horror, you got a failing grade! You cannot believe it. What went wrong? You were absolutely convinced that you did it correctly. You followed the tried and true method. Step by step, one equation after the other. There is NOTHING wrong here. You go to the teacher and you ask what you did wrong and he points you to the second line where you made this small, but significant, calculation mistake which rendered everything that came after it a series of errors, culminating in the wrong answer.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">That is exactly what the Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad has done with his decision to violently repress the pro-democracy protests in his country. He has made a small, but significant, calculation mistake and all what will follow from it will yield all the wrong answers. The Syrian regime was in an enviable position relative to its counterparts in other Arab countries. The vast majority of the protesters on the streets of Syrian cities were not calling for the president to step down, nor even for the regime to change. Even some of the major opposition intellectuals in Syria and abroad clearly stated they were willing to work with the young president to institute much needed reforms, as long as he was willing to engage in genuine and deep reforms, and initiate the process quickly. Syrians were asking to live in a more free, transparent and responsive political system. They were asking for a clamp down on corruption and for their basic economic needs to be met. They just wanted to live in dignity and some measure of political freedom. When seen from this perspective the response of the regime is grossly exaggerated and unnecessarily violent. Such a bloody, brutal, response to such relatively modest demands - by comparison to Egypt for instance - can only mean that the regime is excessively paranoid. It also might suggest that major elements within the regime feel directly threatened by any demand for greater freedom, or perhaps more importantly, clamp down on corruption.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Thus, Bashar Al-Assad chose oppression over dialogue and in that he has made his calculation mistake. He used all the right equations from the dictatorship handbook. He is applying them with all the tried and true methods. Yet, once your initial calculation is in error, the answer will be wrong. The calculation error lies in the fact that the Syrian president is neglecting two major issues. First, this is a genuine popular revolt, not an insurrection by militants. Had he responded positively and openly, he would have won the support of his people. As it stands, even if the security forces manage to oppress the uprising for now, the regime, as well as the president himself, have lost any remaining legitimacy in the eyes of the Syrian people. This means that the rest of his rule will have to rely even more heavily on oppressive measures, making him even more beholden to the old guard and security chiefs within his regime, and making another uprising that much more likely. Second, by oppressing the popular civilian uprising, he in fact strengthens, not weakens, the more fundamentalist elements within Syria and forces the moderates to go underground. Thus, even if there were to be no more popular uprisings, the regime risks dealing with an armed rebellion or even civil war in the not so distant future.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Just like the student in our metaphor, Bashar Al-Assad had a choice and had the time to carefully consider his options and revise his calculations before handing in his decision. Alas, by choosing violent oppression over dialogue, security over democracy, and oligarchy over social justice, he has made a calculation mistake… one that will ensure that whatever answer he arrives at will be the wrong one.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-12298095997967886652011-05-11T08:57:00.003+01:002011-05-11T13:55:59.991+01:00Low airfares or the piecemeal Lebanese revolution<div style="text-align: center;"><div style="border-bottom: medium none; border-left: medium none; border-right: medium none; border-top: medium none;">Charbel Gereige</div><div style="border-bottom: medium none; border-left: medium none; border-right: medium none; border-top: medium none;"><br />
</div></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgeBrTyevv03JE_fbk27tKXel0oGUl_p5_zV-nZQQogkk9NN30FNlHicqVasSCOemcg0FjZKjrPlQAZXoZud7Zo3nlgizNeEKsckjXtS51VwaO2y3Zfo7Lw-9SW3xUJrF02o6yGkd0RHFuj/s1600/5485091471_0ec73a5d33.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="266" j8="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgeBrTyevv03JE_fbk27tKXel0oGUl_p5_zV-nZQQogkk9NN30FNlHicqVasSCOemcg0FjZKjrPlQAZXoZud7Zo3nlgizNeEKsckjXtS51VwaO2y3Zfo7Lw-9SW3xUJrF02o6yGkd0RHFuj/s400/5485091471_0ec73a5d33.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><div style="border-bottom: medium none; border-left: medium none; border-right: medium none; border-top: medium none; text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It is such an exciting time to watch the news in the Arab world. When the news of the toppling of Ben Ali and his regime in Tunisia came through, my first reaction was: Bringing down a bad politician is the easy part, replacing him with a good politician is the hard part. Initially, the news failed to excite me. I couldn’t feel the wind of freedom and was too sceptical it could spread. I only started getting excited when the Egyptian people rose to topple their president, and with the signs that movements in Libya, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen were following their example.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Yet my excitement was still tinged with a slight sense of envy. I wished something could be done in my own country, Lebanon. Around that time, a shy movement appeared in Lebanon consisting of youth that wanted to argued for a change of the confessional political system. A few vocal demonstrations took place, and still continue at a slower pace. Although I doubt they will be able to change anything in that direction. The number of those who oppose such reform is overwhelming.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Of course Lebanon is different. Compared to the thousands of secularists who took to the streets, the million citizen marches took place in a different context, the notorious year 2005 and the so called Beirut Spring. Over a million came to commemorate the assassination of Hariri and another million came to support his opponents. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">There is a Lebanese exception in that we do not have a dictator at the top of the political system. For all their sins, our presidents are elected and leave at the end of their term. Despite the backdoor deals, our prime ministers still need to seek the approval of the majority of parliament members.We do have a democratic system, but our system is far from perfect. So when it comes to reform, we cannot revolt against one person that would embody the anger of the nation. It was relatively easy to get a vast majority of Egyptians to agree that they want Mubarak to go away. It’s not easy to get a majority of Lebanese to agree that any political side needs to be made accountable. The Lebanese are so divided, and this means change is at first look impossible. All the Lebanese agree that there is something wrong, but cannot agree on a solution or a direction. You can bet that any suggestion will automatically be opposed by the other half under one excuse or the other. It is our dilemma: we want democracy, but so far it has proven on balance to be bad for us<br />
.</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Faced with this, a possible strategy would be to find common ground between the overwhelming majority of Lebanese on single issues, and get them to rally for it. Something that touches the day-to-day life of people, a simple issue, not abstract values.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">For example: A group of concerned citizen is now working to try open up the Lebanese airspace to fair competition, which could benefit us all. This is one amongst many more issues that can be improved, like cheaper mobile phone fares, and better internet connection.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">I think the originality of the idea, consists in normal citizens, who do not have political aspirations, lobby for cheaper airfare to and from Beirut. If we can’t have our Arab revolution in one go, why not go for it piecemeal. An issue like this does have political ramification, but in the right direction. It is not a secret that many politicians have direct or indirect interests in MEA. So it is not unconceivable that they are keeping the monopoly in their own interest. In a more competitive market, the margins are smaller, and MEA would have to bring down their tickets price, and improve their service quality. And to survive, they might in the process get rid of the huge bulge of politically backed employees, who are poor value for money.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Why would this unite all the Lebanese, because even those who do not personally travel will have a relative abroad. So this would save them a nice sum yearly. I see no reason why a ticket from London to Beirut is £600 while it can be as low as £100 to Cyprus. This is an issue that would unite all the Lebanese no matter what is their social class, or political affiliation, or religious affiliation. Besides, for people living not far from Lebanon, this means it becomes affordable to go back home for the weekend and contribute further to the local economy.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">On the other hand, this is an issue that might unite most of the politicians from all camps...against it. You can see now how this is edging nearer to the Arab Revolution? We manage to unite all the people against all the politicians on a single issue. But once this issue is resolved, others can follow with an established mechanism in place. Think mobile phone fares (highest in the world) or slow internet (slowest in the world) etc. As a consequence our life as Lebanese is improved. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">And by fighting a corrupt system, we would be encouraging our politicians to change or perish.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Going back to the practical aspect...</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">As a first step, a meeting is taking place in London with a few young professional Lebanese people to discuss a suitable strategy. Hopefully we will be able to announce the launch of a campaign and get the ball rolling. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">We will have our own revolution, without having to answer questions on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon or on Hezbollah’s arms. We don’t have to debate the things that divide us to bring the changes that unite us.</div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-55873727616795671092011-05-03T08:27:00.001+01:002011-05-03T08:28:46.508+01:00"الشعب السوري واحد "<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; text-align: center;"><span dir="rtl" lang="AR-LB" style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: large; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-bidi-language: AR-LB; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">داليا عبيد_باحثة</span><span lang="FR" style="mso-bidi-language: AR-LB;"></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhKbEcIu-nOpxm6uSalhix_XXDJ-rBJdsiA_KFWXxVG0LZ9h-hEWsHB1CIBDlqj5Nrg5KWVRPlsrVzQSGVFI8ikLCxraDuJpCiPgn0TYg5Z84uK3o2wymuZ8t_qGxQ-OReSuF5r-KG7duFq/s1600/midsyria.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="225" j8="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhKbEcIu-nOpxm6uSalhix_XXDJ-rBJdsiA_KFWXxVG0LZ9h-hEWsHB1CIBDlqj5Nrg5KWVRPlsrVzQSGVFI8ikLCxraDuJpCiPgn0TYg5Z84uK3o2wymuZ8t_qGxQ-OReSuF5r-KG7duFq/s400/midsyria.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><div style="text-align: center;"><br />
</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">لم يشأ الشعب السوري البقاء بعيداً عما أصاب أو يصيب المنطقة من تحولات ولم يَرْضَ أن يبقى مكتوف الأيدي عن إعادة رسم تاريخ جديد للعالم العربي. فانتفض هذا الشعب مثلما انتفض قبله الشعب التونسي، مطلق الشرارة الأولى في عام 2011 ومن بعده الشعب المصري والليبي واليمني والبحريني. دمر السوريون الشجعان مملكة الصمت بعد عقود من الإذلال والخوف والبطش والحرمان وإتباع نظام البعث سياسة التدجين ، سياسة أسفرت عن تجذر الرعب في أنفس السوريين مقيمين في الداخل أو مغتربين في الخارج لدرجة السكوت التام أمام استشراء الفساد والتمييز بين المواطنين واستخدام السلطة القمعية واستمرار الأحكام العرفية وارتكاب المجازر في المدن السورية ومثابرة النظام الجاهدة على الاعتقالات السياسية وإلغاء لكل الحريات العامة والخاصة والسعي الى ترسيخ كل أساليب انتهاك حقوق الشعب السوري المخالف لشرعة حقوق الإنسان خلال أكثر من نصف قرن.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">لكن سوريا اليوم ليست كما سوريا الأمس، فقد تحولت طرقاتها وشوارعها وحاراتها وأزقتها وبيوتها إلى مساحات نابضة بدماء التحرر من آداب العبودية . وقد أراد هذا الشعب الذي يعيش حالياً في صلب الحرية الحمراء أن يخرج سوريا من باب الاستثناء وينشلها من غياهب التاريخ ليعيدها إلى داخل السياق العالمي الحالي.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">لم يهدأ "نبض" درعا الصامد الذي فتح الجرح على مصراعيه انطلاقا من جنوب الوطن إلى قلبه المنتفض في وجه طغيان البعث. ولم ينبض الشارع السوري وحده في الداخل بل نبضت معه شوارع أجنبية تحتضن مغتربين سوريين هاجروا قسراً أو اختياراً طلباً لعيشة كريمة ضمن إطار ديمقراطيات تعترف تطبيقاً بشرعة حقوق الإنسان. إلى القارتين الأوروبية والأميركية هاجروا، منهم من أتوا للدراسة وبقوا حيث هم ومنهم من هربوا كلاجئين سياسيين بسبب معارضتهم للنظام الحاكم منذ عام 1963 ومنهم من قدموا بطريقة غير شرعية. واعرف الكثير من الذين وصلوا إلى لندن عبر البواخر من "ضيع" اللاذقية وعملوا في العتمة من اجل إرسال الأموال إلى الأهل في ضيعهم الموءودة بأياد قاتلة.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">في شوارع باريس شهدت على مظاهرات الجالية السورية التي قررت مع الداخل السوري بأن العودة إلى الوراء مستحيلة.، فنزلوا إلى الشارع نصرة لقضيتهم، نصرة للأمل بالعودة نهائياً إلى أرض وطن لم يولدوا فيه أحراراً ولم يهاجروا منه أحراراً. </span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">لمظاهرات باريس نكهة خاصة ووقفة تأمل استثنائية، ففي السنوات الماضية لطالما دعت المعارضة السورية في العاصمة الفرنسية إلى اعتصامات من اجل إطلاق سراح معتقلي الرأي ومن اجل وقف انتهاك حقوق الإنسان ومن اجل كل الظروف التي تم ذكرها أعلاه والتي لم تتغير , ولكن لم تكن تقتصر هذه النشاطات إلا على حفنة من "يساريين لبنانيين" وعدد قليل من المعارضين السوريين المنفيين حيث تخطى معظمهم عمر الكهولة بالإضافة إلى عدد اكبر من رجال المخابرات المدسوسين وسط الجالية السورية في فرنسا. مما دفع المناضلين السوريين إلى الشعور بعزلة كبرت مع الزمن وهم يصرخون من المهجر ومن داخل ثنايا غرف التعذيب السورية. أما وقد تغيرت المعطيات في المنطقة وفي العالم، فلم يرد السوريون ان تهزمهم العزلة وسط رياح التغيير في العالم العربي، ليتحول صمت الجالية السورية القاسي إلى صيحة غضب مطالبة برحيل السجان. فقد لاحت لمكوناتها تباشير الأمان حين سقط جدار الخوف إلى غير رجعة.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">إلى فناء حقوق الإنسان في التروكاديرو الباريسية، وصلت الأعلام السورية وصور الديكتاتور ولافتات تطالب برحيله وبرحيل حاشيته وبالخلاص من المخابرات ولافتات أخرى تريد فتح صفحة جديدة للشعب السوري بكافة طوائفه ومكوناته وبناء دولة حق وقانون. لافتات حملها صبايا وشباب جامعات لم ينقطعوا يوماً عن زيارة سوريا. أتوا ليصرخوا ملأ حناجرهم بأنهم يريدون إسقاط الصمت وفاء للوطن المطعون في عنفوانه. وقد ازدادت أعداد المتظاهرين على مراحل (مع تقدم الوقت) فكلما انتفض بيت جديد في سوريا، ينتفض صوت جديد في باريس ليزيل الغبار عن أوتار حنجرته المتهدجة أمام صرير الزنازين.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">لم تكن رؤيتي لتواجد الشباب الكثيف والمتصاعد بالمفاجأة المفرحة الوحيدة بل استمديت سعادتي أيضا من عيون المعارضين السوريين الذين كانوا يستعيدون أحلامهم المسروقة. فلطالما تظاهرت معهم وسط وحدتهم وفي لحظات حزن كانت تجعل مشاركتي فولكلورية لتسجيل موقف في الصبر وانتظار المجهول. في فناء حقوق الإنسان، كان عميد المعارضين السوريين يطير مثل الفراشة موزعاً بيانات الحرية بيديه، يتنقل مزهوا حاضناً عيوننا السعيدة ومثبتاً نظره على هواتفنا التي كانت تنقل الصورة الحية مباشرة من ساحة التروكاديرو إلى الفايسبوك واليوتيوب وعبرهما إلى الداخل السوري والى العالم اجمع. </span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">في فناء حقوق الإنسان، كانت عيون صديقي السوري المنفي زائغة ابتهاجاً. فهو لم يعد يتحدى عيون مدسوسين صاروا قلة وسط الحشود المتزايدة ولم يعد يبحث عنهم كما اعتاد أن يفعل حتى في أوقات تسوقه في شارع الريفولي ولن يعد يفكر أن يفتش مرتبكاً في أرجاء شققنا، كلما أتى لزيارتنا، عن احتمال وجود لأجهزة تنصت وذلك لاعتقاده بان عناصر الأمن السورية قد وصلت حتى إلى مساكن أصدقائه الباريسية. </span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">في فناء حقوق الإنسان، وقف أصدقاء سمير قصير السوريين يتابعون عبر هواتفهم الخلوية أخباراً عن بداية حراك في ساحة الأمويين في الشام. فارتبكت مشاعرهم خلال لحظات مسرعة الخطى. فتراهم يبتسمون، يحزنون، يتنهدون ويشتاقون لرائحة الحرية في عيني رفيقهم الغائب ويتطلعون بشغف إلى أوان الورد الذي حان قطافه في دمشق.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">في فناء حقوق الإنسان، ردد سوريون من كل الفئات العمرية ومن مختلف الانتماءات والمشارب صدى الداخل ورفعوا شعاراتهم. صرخوا جميعاً "سلمية سلمية"، هتفوا جميعاً " بدنا دولة مدنية" وشددوا على "واحد واحد واحد، الشعب السوري واحد" وصرخوا "خلص مخابرات" وتابعوا ب" الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام" الذي صار الشعار_الرمز للثورات العربية. </span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">من هناك، من مساحة تنوعهم، بددوا الوهم الطائفي الذي يرسمه النظام، وهم الأغلبية السنية التي تسعى إلى تقويض دعائم حكم علوي ينفي فكرة تسطيره ضمن إطار الأقليات الحاكمة.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">من هناك، طالبوا بعدم زرك قضيتهم الحالية ضمن إطار الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي فنضالهم لا يرتبط أدنى ارتباط بنصرة محور على محور بل بالسعي لتدمير قواعد أنظمة تتشابه في العالم العربي من المحيط إلى الخليج، هذه الأنظمة التي تعمل بخوف على شد حبال رأس النظام القابع في قصر المهاجرين.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">من هناك رسموا صورة لنظام مستبد ترتعد لفكرة سقوطه فرائص إسرائيل المرتاحة لوضع حدودها الشمالية مع سوريا بأيد أمينة، وأكدوا انه ليس باستطاعتهم أن يكونوا مقاومين (إن أرادوا) قبل أن يكونوا أحراراً وديمقراطيين.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">من هناك، قالوا لا للانتقائيين الجدد في لبنان وغيره الذين يرفعون انتفاضة ويسقطون انتفاضة زميلة، الذين ينددون بإراقة الدماء الشهيدة في بعض البلدان العربية ويصمتون عن دماء يبدو أنهم استرخصوها في مدن سوريا المشتعلة بنيران السلطات. </span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">من هناك، قالوا لا للسلاح (سلمية سلمية)، رفضوا الممانعة التي تعمل ضد دخول سوريا الى الحاضر ومنه الى المستقبل، وفكروا بشهداء الانتفاضة الراحلين بقلوب نازفة فرددوا صدى كلمات نزار قباني:</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">"ولو فتحتم شراييني بمديتكم </span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">سمعتم في دمي أصوات من راحوا"</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">ونظروا متأملين الى دمشق وقالوا:</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">"مزقي يا دمشق خارطة الذل </span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">وقولي للـدهر كُن فيـكون"</span></div><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
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</span></div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-16408845297334199372011-05-01T08:52:00.001+01:002011-05-01T08:52:47.092+01:00From the rise of Arab freedom to the shine of Arab democracy<div style="text-align: center;">Dr Bassem Hassan</div><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEghtfG3g79fZkFuRoTi_pixG4RrdsgsQa81lYANpKUzlFA7CPckOr_Amvorfpo9qvQGt0H2t5lYMw7reJgIg8mc6MKG__BbQFrDZRPvGUzSUPZREcB5iOFIBHfdQ_AmLaL3FMAzeVxKE7NO/s1600/Selim_tlili_Mohamed_Bouazizi7.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="400" j8="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEghtfG3g79fZkFuRoTi_pixG4RrdsgsQa81lYANpKUzlFA7CPckOr_Amvorfpo9qvQGt0H2t5lYMw7reJgIg8mc6MKG__BbQFrDZRPvGUzSUPZREcB5iOFIBHfdQ_AmLaL3FMAzeVxKE7NO/s400/Selim_tlili_Mohamed_Bouazizi7.jpg" width="276" /></a></div><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;">Two things are crystal clear. First, we are living through a truly historical and transformative moment in the Arab world today: a moment that will certainly shift the historical path of the region and consequently the world. After all, ever since a few thousand horsemen armed with a new ideology and the determination to spread it emerged from the Arabian desert to create one the largest, most enlightened and longest lasting empires the world has ever known, whatever happens in the Arab world has had deep repercussions on what happens across the globe. Second, these popular Arab revolutions are black swan events. No one predicted them and no one knows what they will lead to. Anyone who makes any prediction and ends being right, will have been right by sheer luck and pure coincidence, and not thanks to any piercing insight.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">It is difficult to curb the excitement and the “I never thought I’d live to see this day” feeling when watching the Arab people, particularly Arab youth, rise against their brutal, and sometimes even insane, dictators and oppressive regimes with such fearless determination and exemplary courage. Many of us had dreamt of these days so much and with such futility that we learned to stop dreaming. Ten years ago, a handful of Arab youth, blinded by maniacal religious extremism into thinking that liberation comes through mass murder, caused most Arabs untold shame and despair. For ten years we Arabs have had to suffer the humiliation of being branded as terrorists by the rest of the world and as cowards by our dictators. And just when it seemed like all hope was lost, Mohammed Bouazizi the young poor and humiliated fruit vendor – literally – burned down the fear barrier. Shed of their fear, the Tunisian people opened the floodgates that are now sweeping all Arab dictatorships into the dustbin of history, where they belong. However, now that it seems like the fall of all Arab authoritarian regimes is a question of when, not if, it is perhaps it is time to start asking “what next?” Not predicting, just asking!</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">A revolution is a singular event; almost a singularity. It usually transpires in a relatively short amount of time and causes a seismic shift in the direction of a nation or society. In fact, when a revolution fails to occur swiftly, it usually turns into a civil war and/or protracted chaos, as had happened in Lebanon decades ago and may be happening in Libya today. In contrast, what happens after the revolution in terms of nation building and social transformation can be a slow, arduous and difficult process. Recall for example the years of tyranny, wars and upheaval that followed the French revolution, before secular democracy finally took hold. Arab societies today are not in need of reform; they are in need of rebuilding. Each and every Arab country today has had it’s borders created by it’s former colonial rulers and it’s political and economic system built and mismanaged by brutal dictators and their corrupt regimes. Illiteracy and poverty are rampant across the Arab world. The basic rights of women and children are considered a joke across almost all Arab societies and authoritarian, submissive, superficial and extremely irrational forms of religion (both Muslim and Christian) are the norm, not the exception. This is by no means a unique property of the Arab world. The secular democratic Europe that emerged from under the burden of the unholy alliance between absolute monarchy and a Mafiosi church was no different, and this should give us hope.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">The new systems that will emerge in the Arab world will need not only to be responsive to the temporary aspirations of their people for increased political freedoms, but much more importantly, they will need to be responsive to their long terms needs. For there to be a new Arab renaissance the emerging systems will have to set egalitarian sustainable socio-economic development, universal education, women’s rights and the de-politicization of religion as their priorities. They will also need to bury another awful legacy of the departed dictatorships: the fear and suspicion of the other Arab! By way of simple example, today, I as a Lebanese, need a visa to enter Arab countries where any westerner can enter freely. The emergence of people power in Arab countries should result in the opening of the Arab world to itself. Just like the revolution spread across the barbed wire borders from the small remote Tunisian town of Sidi Bouziz through the now legendary Tahrir Square to the streets of historical Syrian cities, so must the development of the new Arab world. For we inhabitants of this beautiful and bountiful region are many peoples who share not only a common history, culture and language but also a common destiny. We have been very good at sharing our autocracies, suspicions and social and religious fundamentalism for over half a century. Sharing our freedoms, hopes, and cultural and scientific achievements should be far less of a challenge… and a far more pleasant exercise!</div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-9032871130559596792011-04-11T21:04:00.002+01:002011-04-11T21:29:37.481+01:00في "حشرة" حزب الله: هل يمد اليد؟<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div align="center" class="MsoNormal" dir="rtl" style="direction: rtl; margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; text-align: center; unicode-bidi: embed;"><span lang="AR-LB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-LB; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;"><span style="font-size: large;">ميشال دويهي*</span></span></div><div align="center" class="MsoNormal" dir="rtl" style="direction: rtl; margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; text-align: center; unicode-bidi: embed;"><span lang="AR-LB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-LB; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgKEx5CD2EUsmoAbmP6LFqwgq0_ZZHUKgUxEE-HMjdH8_mzMUA7hEn60NdkDx6R5-pSVslt7rj8E1Z5xpLv7xnZy9Re_qkgptaodx7QPG9XC8pI7u_WzNa8OEF15i6sucOdORFJf-xI8Sp2/s1600/Hezbollah-Lebanon.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="265" r6="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgKEx5CD2EUsmoAbmP6LFqwgq0_ZZHUKgUxEE-HMjdH8_mzMUA7hEn60NdkDx6R5-pSVslt7rj8E1Z5xpLv7xnZy9Re_qkgptaodx7QPG9XC8pI7u_WzNa8OEF15i6sucOdORFJf-xI8Sp2/s400/Hezbollah-Lebanon.jpg" width="400" /></a></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br />
</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">إلى جانب المحكمة الدولية التي يتعامل معها حزب الله على أنها مفبركة لاتهامه باغتياله للرئيس رفيق الحريري ورفاقه، بدأت منذ مطلع هذا العام أحداث في العالم العربي، لم يحسن الحزب استخلاصه العبر منها. فتكاثرت "مشاكله" إلى جانب أزمته مع المحكمة الدولية مما يؤدى مع الوقت إلى ضمور هامش تحركه. ويهمنا هنا أن نسلط الضوء على هذه المشاكل المتسعة:</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">تنبع أولى هذه المشاكل من تنقل الثورات في العالم العربي التي هي نتيجة لانفجار قنبلتين موقوتتين وهما "الشباب والانترنت". بعكس ما قيل ويقال، لم تأتي هذه الثورات على ذكر فلسطين ولا الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي، بل هي ثورات جوع وكرامة ورفض للديكتاتوريات المتسمرة في العالم العربي منذ عقود. </span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">ثانياً، الوضع الداخلي الإيراني: يعرف حزب الله أن الشعارات التي رفعت، من الداخل الإيراني، ضد تمويله هو وحركة حماس في العامين 2009 و 2010 على حساب الوضع الاقتصادي الإيراني الصعب تعبر تعبيرا دقيقا على التناقضات بين أركان النظام من جهة وبين الشباب الإيراني الثائر على هذا النظام الجائر من جهة أخرى. فبالتأكيد لن يصمد هذا الأخير كثيراً أمام حمى التغيير التي تصيب حالياً منطقة الشرق الأوسط وسوف يصل إلى الجمهورية الإسلامية مفعول "الدومينو" الذي يجتاح العالم العربي، آجلاً أم عاجلاً . مما لا شك فيه، إن أي تغيير في النظام الإيراني سوف يؤدي إلى إضعاف حزب الله وتأثيره في الداخل اللبناني.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">ثالثاً، الوضع الداخلي السوري: فحزب الله يراقب بحذر فوران الشعب السوري الذي يريد الخلاص من نظام حزب البعث. فمخاوف حزب الله في محلها لأنه يعرف جيدا أن سوريا غداً لن تكون كما كانت من قبل، صمد النظام أم لم يصمد.فبالأساس يتعامل حزب الله بكثير من الحذر والبراغماتية مع النظام السوري وتجربته على الأقل في العشرين السنة الماضية تدل على ذلك. و ما حصل مؤخرا مع عماد مغنية في الشام يؤكد على تخلخل عامل الثقة في العلاقة بين الاثنين.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">رابعاً، وضع اللبنانيين في الخليج: فقد بدا واضحا أن تطور الأحداث في البحرين قد دفع بالمملكة العربية السعودية وبمجلس التعاون الخليجي باتخاذ القرار بالمواجهة المباشرة مع الجمهورية الإسلامية الإيرانية وهذا من شأنه أن يضع اللبنانيين الشيعة الموالين والمعارضين لحزب الله والعاملين في دول الخليج العربي في موقع صعب ودقيق. وموجة الترحيل الأخيرة للبنانيين الشيعة من بعض هذه الدول هو خير دليل على ذلك.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">خامساً، علاقة سلاح حزب الله بالداخل اللبناني: فحزب الله كان شديد الارتياح عندما لم يكن سلاحه في موقع نقاش شديد بين اللبنانيين جميعاً وعندما لم يكن دور هذا السلاح ذاته مطروحاً على طاولة الحوار. بعد العام 2006 وخاصة بعد أيار 2008، انتفض أغلبية اللبنانيين على دور هذا السلاح وعلى استخدامه في الداخل مما أربك حزب الله الذي بات مطالبا بالدفاع عن سلاحه يومياً أمام علامات استفهام اللبنانيين الخائفة من دوامة هذا السلاح.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">سادساً، أزمة تشكيل الحكومة: وذلك مع عدم تمكن حزب الله من تشكيل الحكومة اللبنانية بالرغم من تمتعه بأغلبية برلمانية (وهنا لن ادخل بتفاصيل تشكل هذه الأغلبية). فالوقت ليس لصالحه مع غليان المنطقة واقتراب موعد المحكمة الدولية.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">سابعاً، علاقة نبيه بري بحزب الله: فما كشفته بعض الصحف عن العلاقة بين زعيم الشيعة من 1978 الى 2000 وبين حزب الله الذي خطف هذا الدور اجبر بري على مواكبته مكرهاً لزعامة حزب الله للطائفة الشيعية، لم يكن سراً.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">ثامناً، وضع أبناء الطائفة الشيعية العائدين من ساحل العاج: فالممولون السابقون لحزب الله تحولوا في الوقت الحالي بعد تشردهم من هذه الدولة الإفريقية إلى مشاريع عاطلين عن العمل يبحثون عن مورد رزق جديد.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">بالرغم مما ورد، لا أنكر على حزب الله أن مزاج وقلب أغلبية الطائفة الشيعية معه، فهو عرف بذكاء كيف يستحوذ على ولاء أبناء هذه الطائفة من الملتزمين بعقيدته الدينية ومن غير الملتزمين. فباعتماده للغات عدة في خطابه السياسي منها الحرمان ومنها المقاومة ومنها حصة الطائفة الشيعية في النظام السياسي اللبناني ساعده على لم شمل الطائفة بأغلبيتها تحت جناحه. ولكن كما كانت الطائفة مع غيره، فهي مهيأة لان تنتقل تدريجيا إلى مقلب آخر. فللمشاكل التي تم عرضها أعلاه قدرة على التفاعل في اتجاه وضع دور حزب الله وعلاقته بالطائفة الشيعية اللبنانية تحت المجهر.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">فهل يتعامل عقلاء الحزب مع هذه المشاكل بجدية وهل يقتنعوا ببراغماتيتهم التي يتمتعون بها بأنهم في صلب أزمة مفتوحة؟ وهل يمدوا اليد إلى الداخل اللبناني؟ وهل حركة 14 آذار مستعدة لملاقاة الحزب في منتصف الطريق بعيدا عن المكابرة والشماتة على أن يكون الشرط طبعا لبننة الحل وتسليم السلاح للدولة اللبنانية؟</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">وهل سوف تسمح إيران للحزب بإنقاذ الشيعة اللبنانيين من سياسة المحاور أم ستذهب بهم إلى المزيد من المواجهة؟ هذه المواجهة المحكومة بواقع الديموغرافيا السنية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط حيث لا إمكانية لإيران بالفوز بها. من هنا حزب الله مطالب بإنقاذ شيعة لبنان ودفعهم للانخراط بمسيرة بناء دولة لبنانية عوضاً عن الانخراط في مشاريع سياسية إقليمية ممكن أن تكون فادحة الخسارة على الطائفة الشيعية في لبنان وفي كل الأقطار العربية.</span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><br />
</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><span style="font-size: large;">*أستاذ جامعي</span></div><span style="font-size: large;"></span><br />
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</span></div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com11tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-58097079517457700442011-03-29T22:27:00.002+01:002011-03-29T22:32:02.635+01:00Syria: from keystone to cornerstone<div style="text-align: center;"><span id="fullpost"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">By Jade Salhab</span></span></div><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg0sQmFR7BU94_GcA4F7tcLSatCzRyCcbLJMykona2a-jAmJSWeuzgOnf5E0zwd_mCcAfmuyiCR-QaQDlqvmb-8BnzEgJ9JL33zFqyABTVt62g9N8Y5sqhTJFNFcQYyfuJ4rUctZoZNeREC/s1600/bashar460x276.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" r6="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg0sQmFR7BU94_GcA4F7tcLSatCzRyCcbLJMykona2a-jAmJSWeuzgOnf5E0zwd_mCcAfmuyiCR-QaQDlqvmb-8BnzEgJ9JL33zFqyABTVt62g9N8Y5sqhTJFNFcQYyfuJ4rUctZoZNeREC/s400/bashar460x276.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">You might dislike President Bachar el Assad but he is ironically the best-positioned person to steer a non-sectarian transition to democracy in Syria and the Arab world. </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span></div><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">If there is anything we learned from the incredible cataclysm in the Middle East, it’s the following: the quest for freedom and dignity is a) universal and b) inevitable. Democracy - the natural offspring of this quest - can be postponed by oppression but it eventually strikes back… sometimes with a vengeance.</span></div><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">And this is precisely the problem. </span></div><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">As a young Lebanese political activist, I have seen first-hand how brutal the Syrian regime can get. It has managed to survive for twenty-five years by oppressing its people with an efficiency that the Stasi would have envied. </span></div><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Among other techniques, being a member of the Alawite minority ruling over a Sunni majority, Assad’s father used the imposition of a secular state to protect his rule. In 1982, he went as far as bombarding Hamah – much like Gadhafi indented to do – killing 10,000 people in order to repress a conservative Sunni rebellion. </span></div><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">There is a real risk that today’s uprising against the Syrian regime converges into a vengeance against the secular state altogether. Much of the revolts taking place in Syria now are not lead by Tahrir Square-like modern youth, but by orthodox Sunni activists who are pursuing an embedded sectarian agenda. Will the young Assad use comparable violence to repress today’s Sunni rebels? </span></div><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I doubt he will: he too learned from Egypt and Libya. But this puts us in a dilemma: </span></div><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">What if the success of these protesters leads to the breakout of a radicalized sectarian discourse in Syria? Will this favor true Arab democracy?</span></div><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Let me be clear, I do not discount the legitimacy of the protester’s action, nor do I plead for the continuation of repression in any shape or form. But I do think that there is a real need, and a real chance, for a third way in Syria. </span></div><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">This third way lies in the hands of President Assad alone. </span></div><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Bachar El Assad is a young potential reformer who has not (yet) been able to overcome the established authoritarian apparatus he inherited from his father. Despite early attempts, he was first forced to concede to the ways of a rigid and powerful establishment, with which he eventually became too comfortable. But the uprising in Tunisia and Egypt was a game-changer that made the Syrian regime face its unsustainability and provided the reformist instincts of the president with the tangible arguments he needed to counter his own establishment - and hesitation. </span></div><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The young president has enough political capital with the majority of the Syrian people to propose a third way and stand up to both extremes – authoritarian apparatchiks and regressive Sunni conservatives. Indeed, the Syrian people need their President to lead them towards democracy without having to endure the havoc they are dreadfully observing around them.</span></div><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">As he attempts to find his way to democracy, however, the increased internal and external pressure might put president Assad on the defense again, preventing any ‘orderly transition’.</span></div><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Two things need to happen for such a transition to still strive:</span></div><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">First, President Assad has to resolutely decide to implement radical democratic reforms without further delays or excuses. This carries a significant but inescapable risk: democracy would give a platform to both divisive sectarian movements and the separatist Kurdish one, which may complicate the building of a truly secular democratic state by undermining his agenda. Still, the president has to take this risk.</span></div><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Second Assad needs to be accommodated by the international community who will have to choose to stand by him, not against him. To this extent, western policymakers will have to understand that a modern and democratizing Syria does not necessarily mean a pro-western, anti-Iranian Syria. Indeed, the west often confuses long-term interests with short-term politics: a democratic Syria is highly contagious to its neighborhood and could pretty quickly favor similar evolutions in Iran – let alone depriving it from a crucial ally. A democratic Syria, however, will not change it’s stance on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and should not be required to do so in return of western support of democratization. The west has to learn to accept democracies with which it disagrees: Syria is a good place to start.</span></div><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">If we dare to hope that the concerned leaders will act wisely, President Assad could reform his own pivotal autocratic regime, therefore removing a keystone from a shaking Middle Eastern order. He would, instead, turn Syria into the cornerstone of a new emancipated, sovereign and democratic Arab world. </span></div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-38550724390923898502011-03-28T20:07:00.001+01:002011-03-28T20:47:59.467+01:00Syria: Scenarios and Civil War<div style="text-align: center;">By Jihad Bitar</div><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj_SJ3pG76HxMVLDE7b-Gx09GzbCwT1kdnDHI5GsXCyCKI5C-t_ozlWghtgWCATqQ8IaX2_JR5ppzrdOhwyMX1F6sjPqoIdhVdTxxc9srYEvmKZ-R0Fft0YufIeyj6tQyJecJpqA_aHohwe/s1600/thousands-protest-in-syria-where-clashes-killed-5-2011-03-20_l.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="267" r6="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj_SJ3pG76HxMVLDE7b-Gx09GzbCwT1kdnDHI5GsXCyCKI5C-t_ozlWghtgWCATqQ8IaX2_JR5ppzrdOhwyMX1F6sjPqoIdhVdTxxc9srYEvmKZ-R0Fft0YufIeyj6tQyJecJpqA_aHohwe/s400/thousands-protest-in-syria-where-clashes-killed-5-2011-03-20_l.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;">“<em>Protests in Daraa-Syria</em>”; When I read this ticker in my favorite news channel, I can’t honestly say I did not feel goose bumps. As a Lebanese, anything that happens in Syria directly affects my country and probably the entire geopolitical (dis)equilibrium that has characterised the Middle East since the last Israeli-Arab wars of 1973.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Four days after the Daraa spark, I counted twelve cities where unrest was happening. Busy with the very rare YouTube videos and the inevitable contradictory death toll, news channels forgot to analyze the essential question: what next for Syria, and what about the impact on the region.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Syria is not Egypt and even less Tunisia. In these two North African countries, the revolts featured distinctive social demands: jobs, a future and freedom. In Syria, these three basic demands are complicated by an extra sectarian flavor. Syria’s 75% Sunni population is ruled by Bashar Al-Assad’s Alawites who make 10% of the population. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Social demands mixed with sectarian unrest ia a usual recipe for disaster: a special kind of one, civil war.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Daraa is an interesting city for the start of the revolution. It is close to Damascus, and its population is a mix of Sunni, Alawites and Druze. As anyone who has ever lived through civil war would tell you, trouble always starts within mixed areas which act as point of frictions: living side by side with the 'other' ferments jealousy, anger and hatred. Daraa exploded, Aleppo and Lattaquia followed; two other highly mixed cities. The Sunni citizens of these towns are usually more religious, and have more reasons to imitate their Egyptian and Tunisian Sunni “brothers”.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">The first reaction of the regime has been to bring down to the streets the pro-Assad protesters, and contrary to Egypt’s Moubarak or Tunisia’s Ben Ali, the Syrian regime does have real supporters: the Assad’s own Alawites, but also most of Syria’s Christians and Shiite minorities. The Druze community- well advised by their cousins in Israel and Lebanon- will probably wait to see how things turn before taking a stand.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">I remember long talks with my Syrian friends, telling me how many of the Alawites from Lattaquia for example, were armed by the regime, and how the roads between Sunni dominated cities and others were on purpose never fully operational: call it “trouble insurance”, but the regime has always been prepared for when that “Sunni” pride day would come. The regime and its supporters are very aware that a “simple” change of power will not – and cannot- happen peacefully. The only way out is probably war, civil war.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">While that civil war scenario is – in my opinion – the most likely, three others exist.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">In the first, and as the protests gain momentum, the Alawites tribal heads could decide to drop the Al-Assad family. Fearing for the future, these traditional leaders – who also lost part of their power at the hands of the ruling family- might conclude that joining the protest momentum is the best way to “protect” the community. The Christians and hesitant Druze groups would then be forced to do the same. The domino effect would then be terminal for the current regime.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">In the second, the Syrian regime analyzes that most foreign countries have no interest in seeing the regime fall, and cracks down on the protest the hard way, the Hama way. In 1982, Bachar Al-Assad’s father had ended a similar revolt by killing an estimated 5,000 people. Most countries remained silent, as Syria’s stability was –and still is- a guarantee for all the countries in the region. Al-Assad will then be free to break the revolt. But in 1982, there was no Facebook, Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabiya ; information is the enemy of dictatorships.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">In the third, Al-Assad decides that dropping Iran and getting close to Saudi-Arabia is his best bet to “calm” Sunnite protests. While the regime will probably try this path – as early reports of last minute meetings between Saudis and Syrian leaders show – it is doubtful that it will impact or calm the protesters. The Syrians might find this path to be a dead-end.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">The rest of this article analyzes the regional impact in case the civil war scenario does unfold. Part of the proof lies in an unnoticed tweet by BBC’s correspondent in Syria – Lina Sinjab – she reported that protesters had arrested Iranian and Hezbollah operatives working alongside the Syrian security forces.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Syria is Iran’s best friend in the region and the main conduct for Iranian weapons to Hezbollah. Iran can simply not afford to lose the Al-Assad regime. As the BBC Tweet showed, Iran will spend the right amount of money, effort and men to keep the Syrian regime alive. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia will not accept to sit down and watch its arch-enemy Iran take over Syria. The Saudis will probably send weapons and support to the protesters. Syria would then – ironically- become a new Lebanon (not the other way around) and fall into civil war.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">If the current Syrian regime falls, one can expect the following impact on the region:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">- Reconciliation between Hamas and PLO in Palestine: the changes in the region will weaken both their sponsors, and drive the Palestinian people to request more from their leaders. Both Hamas and PLO leaders might have no choice but coordinate.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">- Depending on how things turn out in Syria, Iran will have to choose between either 1) negotiating with the Saudis and Americans, or 2) going full speed with a destabilization of the region: and eventually a regional war.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">- Iran’s repositioning will impact Hezbollah’s choices: 1) Use its weapons to negotiate a constitutional settlement that favors it, or 2) Decide that taking over Lebanon is its best long term choice, before losing its vital Syrian weapons conduct. Lebanon’s civil war could then get re-ignited, and the country heading towards a de-facto federation.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">- Saudi Arabia’s Shiite community will be pushed by Iran to stand-up to the Monarchy. Expect more trouble in the oil rich – and Shiite dominated- eastern region of Saudi Arabia.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">- Israel’s best interest would be to wait and see how the events turn out. But as Lebanon’s civil war history has shown, anarchy at Israel’s borders increases the possibility of “independent” groups firing rockets at Israel. The Israeli reaction might further put pressure on the Israeli government to “act”.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">In all the scenarios, the region is bound for some tough times: nothing new in the book’s cover, but all new in its content.</div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-56335096896607604852011-03-21T09:48:00.000+00:002011-03-21T09:48:28.493+00:00حملة إسقاط النظام الطائفي: التحدِيات<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: center;"><span dir="rtl" lang="AR-SA" style="font-family: "Traditional Arabic"; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;"><strong>خالد برّاج</strong></span></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><br />
</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjbJjGn6tJOlAPJ4mRlhusBMdV81kmhPL0JduDMrj54fpioYCH-n5fi60VqFHXZSM4DuGHaPXegOVaREy6H8_v5qoz2AgULXNyV5JcuWrnGjSDPTAdGXyBeaiWv4VU9rhCErO1TpBXqp3TV/s1600/001%25281%2529.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="300" r6="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjbJjGn6tJOlAPJ4mRlhusBMdV81kmhPL0JduDMrj54fpioYCH-n5fi60VqFHXZSM4DuGHaPXegOVaREy6H8_v5qoz2AgULXNyV5JcuWrnGjSDPTAdGXyBeaiWv4VU9rhCErO1TpBXqp3TV/s400/001%25281%2529.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><br />
</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;">حسناً فعل الشبّان و الشابات بإطلاق حملة إسقاط النظام الطائفي في لبنان و جميلة تلك اليافطات التي رفعت في التحركات مطالبة بنظامٍ علماني بديلاً عن نظامنا الطائفي العفن, الصورة بحدِ ذاتها جميلة و معبِرة في بلد يُراد فيه الطائفي كأساس و العلماني كإستثناء. </div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"></div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><br />
</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;">و بغض النظر عن إختلافنا الفكري أو السياسي مع بعض المشاركين في التظاهرات من أحزابٍ أو جمعياتٍ شبه حزبية فإنّه من الممكن التأسيس على هذه الحملة كوسيلة ضغط بوجه النظام و عملائه ( و أقصد هنا نظام 1943 و تعديلاته أمّا العملاء فهم السياسيين من "موالٍ مستجد/معارض سابق" إلى "معارضٍ مستجد/موالٍ سابق") إلاّ أنّ الحملة في مرحلة إختبار مفصلي و الطريق معبّد بالأشواك و لعلّ بوادر تلك الأشواك ظهرت إلى العلن للمرّة الأولى في مظاهرة يوم الأحد 20/03/2011 علماً أنّ في الخفايا ما يدلّ على أكثر من إشكالية و منها ما ينسف جوهر هذا التحرُك من أساسه و يجعل عنوانه جميل و برّاق لكن محتواه فارغ أو على نقيض مع عنوانه.</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><br />
</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;">و هنا تبرز الإشكاليات الحقيقية التي على القيميين و المشاركين في الحملة و المظاهرات العمل سريعاً على إزالتها و تخطِيها و يمكن تلخيص تلك الإشكاليات بالنقاط التالية:</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><br />
</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;">أ- شعور البعض أنّ الحملة ليست بعيدة عن التجاذب و الإنقسام السياسي الحاصل في البلد بالرغم من تأكيد القيِيمين على الحملة و المتظاهرين أنّ الحملة لا تستهدف سياسي معيّن أو طرف سياسي واحد بل أنّ الحملة هي بوجه جميع السياسيين من فريقي 8 و 14 أذار و من خلفهما النظام الطائفي المهترىء (الأفضل هنا إستعمال عبارة الزعماء السياسيين لما تحتوي تلك العبارة على مدلول طائفي/مذهبي/إقطاعي/زبائني) </div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><br />
</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;">ب- محاولة الزعماء السياسيين (لا جدوى من إعادة تكرار عبارة الطائفيين فهي من المسلّمات) سرقة التحرّك عبر تأييده أو إرسال بعض أعضاء المكاتب السياسية للمشاركة في التحرّك/المظاهرة و قد ظهرت في وسائل الإعلام منذ بدأ التحركات عبارة جديدة يمكن إضافتها إلى قاموس العبارات السياسية اللبنانية و هي "عضو المكتب السياسي الأستاذ أو السيِد أو الحج فلان الفلاني شارك في صورة مستقِلة" و ذلك بالرغم من وجود الضادين في تلك العباراة (عضو مكتب سياسي و صورة مستقلة).</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><br />
</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;">ت- إشكالية سلاح حزب الله لما يشكِل هذا السلاح من معوقات فعلية من الناحية العملية (بغض النظر عن الإنقسام الحالي حوله بين طرفي النزاع في لبنان و الأطماع الإسرائيلية الدائمة من إجتياح أو عدوان) و ذلك للأسباب التالية:</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><br />
</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;">1. أولاً: للتعارض مع مفهوم القوة العامة (من شرطة و جيش إلخ...) التي تختصر الأمن و تمتلك حصرية السلاح في الأنظمة الحديثة و أي بناء لدولة أو نظام سياسي يجب أن يلحظ بشكل أساسي مبدأ حصرية السلاح بيد القوة العامة التي هي ركن مركزي في بناء السلطة العامة.</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><br />
</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;">2. ثانياً: لكون السلاح أساساً هو بيدِ حزب ديني على خلاف جزري و عقائدي مع مفهوم الدولة العلمانية (و ليس من باب المصالح كعيِنة كبيرة من الأحزاب و السياسيين اللبنانيين), هذا لا يعني أنّ الحزب يؤيِد النظام الطائفي الحالي و لكن نظرته للنظام تختلف بل تكاد تكون نقيضة للدولة العلمانية و هي تلتقي إلى حد كبير مع نظرة التيارات الإسلامية "السنِية" لشكل و مفهوم الدولة (الرجاء مراجعة أدبيات الحزب منذ نشوءه إلى يومنا هذا فيما يخصّ الطائفية و نظام الحكم في لبنان).</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><br />
</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;">3. ثالثاً: لإرتباط هذا السلاح بالصراع في المنطقة.</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><br />
</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;">4. رابعاً: لإرتباط الحزب العضوي بالجمهورية الإسلامية في إيران و تأكيده مراراً على أهمية هذا الإرتباط من الناحية الدينية و الفقهية و الفكرية و السياسية.</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><br />
</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;">ث- إشكالية الإستثناءات في التعبير عن رفض النظام الطائفي و الزعماء الطائفيين و هنا يلاحظ أنّ بعض المتظاهرين يفضِلون التصويب على زعماء معيّنين و إستثناء آخرين علماً أنّ طائفية كل الزعماء هي واضحة إلى العلن و لعلّ الإشكال الذي حصل يوم الأحد 20/03/2011 أثناء رفع يافطة تنتقد فيها أحد الزعماء و الأسلوب الميلشيوي الذي أقدم عليه بعض "اللاطائفيين" لإنتزاع تلك اليافطة خير دليل على ذلك.</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><br />
</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;">الحملة تواجها تحدِيات كبيرة و منزلقات وعرة و لعلّ حجم المشاركة في تظاهرة الأمس هي خير دليل على وجود وعي عند مجموعة كبيرة من اللبنانيين (و منهم من الأصدقاء و الرفاق الذين نعتز بصداقتهم و نضالهم) بأنّ الخلل يكمن في نظامنا الحالي و إنّه قد آن الأوان للإنتهاء من مقولة " النظام يعيد إنتاج نفسه بوسائل أخرى" كما حصل في محطات 1958, 1969, 1973, 1990, 2000 و إنتخابات 2005 و إتفاق الدوحة 2009.</div><div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right;"><br />
</div></div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-18848843793206976792011-03-20T09:39:00.002+00:002011-03-20T09:49:41.473+00:00The No-Fly Zone in Libya: Hijacking the Arab Uprisings<h3 class="post-title entry-title" style="color: black; font: normal normal bold 20px/normal Calibri; line-height: 16px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px; position: relative; text-align: center;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-weight: normal;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">Karl Sharro</span></span></span></h3><div class="post-header" style="font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; line-height: 1.6; margin-bottom: 1.5em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;"><div class="post-header-line-1"></div></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi0DP6E6Lmpfbzhjq3LiDl1BJW9xb5zYux19Rd-EsWH9Tb4bp4AjD4KnT39gJ_Zr2p9Xa-9Ete6g5tR7uLrRkxbKXasecCk-y2m82JvmlmkhXYJkIGWGTlExJMkvziOcB5I09iRjQJqo8g/s1600/Libya-Rebels-007.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="color: #3d85c6; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-decoration: none;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi0DP6E6Lmpfbzhjq3LiDl1BJW9xb5zYux19Rd-EsWH9Tb4bp4AjD4KnT39gJ_Zr2p9Xa-9Ete6g5tR7uLrRkxbKXasecCk-y2m82JvmlmkhXYJkIGWGTlExJMkvziOcB5I09iRjQJqo8g/s400/Libya-Rebels-007.jpg" style="border-bottom-style: none; border-color: initial; border-left-style: none; border-right-style: none; border-top-style: none; border-width: initial; padding-bottom: 8px; padding-left: 8px; padding-right: 8px; padding-top: 8px; position: relative;" width="400" /></a></div><div class="post-body entry-content" style="font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; line-height: 1.4; width: 490px;"><br />
</div><div class="post-body entry-content" style="font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; line-height: 1.4; width: 490px;"><b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;">Republished with permission from </span><a href="http://www.karlremarks.blogspot.com/"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;">KarlRemarks</span></a></b></div><div class="post-body entry-content" style="font-size: 12px; line-height: 1.4; width: 490px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;"><br />
</span></div><div class="post-body entry-content" style="font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; line-height: 1.4; width: 490px;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><div style="text-align: justify;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;"> <!--StartFragment--> </span></div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 14.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="font-family: Times; mso-bidi-font-family: Times;">Last night’s UN Security Council’s decision to authorise military action in Libya was greeted with almost universal jubilation revealing how confused the anti-imperialist camp has become. The very same people who had been opposed to the US invasion and continuing presence in Iraq and Afghanistan cheered the decision that will supposedly prevent Qaddafi from massacring his people. This also revealed the left’s lack of faith in revolutionary politics: overnight the Libyans were turned from subjects attempting to take control of their destiny into victims in need of protection. The most troubling aspect of this is the willingness to recognise the West’s moral superiority, failing to acknowledge that Western intervention has been actively propping up authoritarian Arab regimes for decades. The no-fly zone is nothing to celebrate, on the contrary it signals a major turning point that will hand the West the initiative allowing it to ensure its interests are maintained in the region. It will also undermine the legitimacy of the autonomous Arab uprisings as they begin to be associated with Western sponsorship. We have entered a new phase with direct Western intervention that will pose serious threats to the pursuit of freedom in Arab countries.</span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><o:p></o:p></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 14.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 14.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="font-family: Times; mso-bidi-font-family: Times;">There is no doubt that many people who support the no-fly zone are driven by good intentions, and it’s tough to watch Gaddafi’s forces regain ground and advance towards Benghazi without feeling the need to ‘do something’. This is particularly understandable given the early success of the Libyan uprising and the sense of expectation it created, contrasted with the current frustration of seeing Gaddafi about to crush the democracy movement. Yet, it is very important to resist the temptation to intervene at any cost. Let’s not forget what the uprisings are about: people attempting to shape their destiny. In other words, they are about autonomy, self-determination and the manifestation of popular will. No matter how well-intentioned outside intervention is, and Western intervention in the region has proved to be far from well-intentioned, it contradicts those principles. </span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><o:p></o:p></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 14.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 14.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="font-family: Times; mso-bidi-font-family: Times;">The celebrations that erupted on the streets of Benghazi following the announcement of UNSC resolution 1973 were seen by many as legitimising this intervention, since the people of Libya are asking for intervention then the UN decision becomes credible, so the argument goes. Again it’s understandable that the rebels when facing the prospect of defeat would reach out for any form of help, but this does not justify military intervention, whether sanctioned by the UN or not. The UN and Western governments are deciding for themselves which voices to listen to in Libya in a clear contradiction of the principles of sovereignty and self-determination. The dubious nature of the decision to override Libya’s sovereignty is only amplified by the near-silence over the crackdown on the protests in Bahrain, which has hardly moved Western governments to act. Of course intervention in Bahrain would be equally illegitimate and ill-advised, but it reveals the West’s hypocrisy and opportunism in taking the moral high ground over Libya while ignoring the situation in Bahrain, where the West’s regional allies are actively participating in putting down the uprising. </span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><o:p></o:p></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 14.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 14.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="font-family: Times; mso-bidi-font-family: Times;">The astounding aspect of the West’s rush to intervene in Libya, led in particular by David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy, is how quickly the lessons of the Iraq invasion and its catastrophic aftermath have been forgotten. The UN and Western governments have sought to make distinctions between the two Libya and Iraq by sanctioning all military action but ruling out an invasion, in an attempt to portray this as a humanitarian intervention rather than regime change. But the utter folly of this distinction is remarkable. The most that a no-fly zone would achieve is a stalemate. Gaddafi’s forces would be prevented from making any advance and attacks on civilians would be stopped, but given the meagre military capabilities of the opposition, they will not be able to achieve victory either. How long would be after that when the calls for further intervention would be intensified, in a situation that we have witnessed several times before from Bosnia to Iraq? The West having already committed itself would be unable to withdraw from the situation, eventually making an invasion a very likely prospect. Not that there is a distinction anyway, the UN resolution is a declaration of war on Libya that can only escalate in magnitude. </span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><o:p></o:p></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 14.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 14.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="font-family: Times; mso-bidi-font-family: Times;">Already there are voices making the case for such an increased intervention. Today David Aaronovitch, one of the main cheerleaders of the Iraq war, wrote an article in The Times arguing that ‘the price of inaction in Libya is far too high’. Aaronovitch’s article clearly reveals the prism of risk through which the West now primarily regards events in the world, as he put it: ‘if we don’t bomb Gaddafi’s tanks, Europe is likely to face a wave of refugees and a new generation of jihadis’. Like the argument for the Iraq war, this reveals the precautionary approach that drives Western pre-emptive interventions. In the case of unpopular leaders like Cameron and Sarkozy, it’s also about trying to find a moral sense of purpose abroad to compensate for their lack of credibility at home. Obama was convinced to tag along after his earlier hesitation, with the attractive prospect of compensating for his incompetent handling of the Egyptian uprising and his failure to reign in his allies in the Gulf. But, in effect, this is a recipe for disaster as the intervention has neither a clear purpose nor a desirable outcome that could be achieved without further military intervention. </span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><o:p></o:p></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 14.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 31.5pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="font-family: Times; mso-bidi-font-family: Times;">The West was undoubtedly caught off-guard with the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, and the actions of Western governments over the past few weeks have revealed astonishing levels of incompetence. They also revealed the extent to which their influence in the region has deteriorated, robbing them of the ability to dictate the course of events. Enforcing the no-fly zone over Libya will allow the West to portray itself in a better light and take back the initiative, but in effect it is only likely to complicate the situation on the ground further. The legitimacy of the Libyan uprising can only be undermined through its association with Western powers, while Gaddafi will be able to deploy the anti-Western card that he is so adept at. It will also weaken the autonomous impulse of the Arab uprisings, replacing popular action as a means for political change with Western sponsorship and protection. This can only mean the return of imperial influence under a different guise. The no-fly zone represents an attempt at hijacking the Arab uprisings and opposing it should become a political priority.</span><o:p></o:p></div><!--EndFragment--> </span></div></div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-21902874530682523562011-03-18T10:29:00.000+00:002011-03-18T10:29:49.837+00:00Syria and Lebanon: The secret plan unveiled<div style="text-align: center;">Jihad Bitar*</div><div style="text-align: justify;"> </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgsD07HK_f6oyQqyVmFMRithuj2cwJ0Hgxo6bfVwhVSKyT3T9cLnz2Qsu4gqLneBBKm5vM7lkirTrUJ10ptog6VtoEz7mpWpnf-zIuhbAYhYphGhA9YwZEuuhcC9rThFf0gE-Tvb-739S5c/s1600/Bashar-al-Assad-President-001.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" r6="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgsD07HK_f6oyQqyVmFMRithuj2cwJ0Hgxo6bfVwhVSKyT3T9cLnz2Qsu4gqLneBBKm5vM7lkirTrUJ10ptog6VtoEz7mpWpnf-zIuhbAYhYphGhA9YwZEuuhcC9rThFf0gE-Tvb-739S5c/s400/Bashar-al-Assad-President-001.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Let me start by saying that I do not really have access to any secret plans. Working in communications, I understand the importance of a teasing title in attracting readers. After all, yet another article about Syria and Lebanon can be as exciting as a report on our president Michel Suleiman weekly visitors. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">That said, this article does compile some secret information: and by secret, I mean information you probably had no time to assess, even though it was all readily available. My job as a media analyst and “dissector” has taught me how to read between the lines of any political event: analyze semantics and cross information. My team and I use tools developed by social and media scientists, and these tools do unveil some secrets: </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Syria’s approach to gaining more influence in Lebanon involves a constitutional change. Any political analysis of Lebanon and Syria’s regional role must take this into account. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Prior to the June 2009 legislative elections, Michel Aoun visited Syria. A few weeks later, billboards – orange billboards (Aoun’s FPM party’s color)- appeared in all of Lebanon with the slogan “The Third Republic”. Lebanon currently lives under the Saudi sponsored Taef agreement – that “ended” Lebanon’s 1975 war- the 2nd Republic. Any communication expert would tell you that no advertiser would put such a “pivotal” political statement without a direct recommendation from the client. The message- such a few weeks after the visit to Syria- was very clear: the March 8th alliance (pro-Syrian and Hezbollah, of which Aoun is part) was promoting a change in the constitution. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Lebanon’s Head of Parliament, Nabih Berri, is a Shiite political figure very closely aligned with Hezbollah’s politics. But Berri is more Syria’s ally than Iran’s. If Hezbollah represents the Iranian influence, Amal (Berri’s party) is Syria’s main ally. A shrewd politician, Berri is known for his double language. What he says is not always what he aims for. Semantic analysis of his speeches has shown quite a few references to the “need to change the way things are structured in Lebanon”. Berri’s repetitive calls for the end of the sectarian system – even though he is one of its main figures- further highlights his ultimate objective for changing the constitution. The frequency of these “system” speeches are actually correlated with visits by Berri’s main political advisor to Syria.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">On the 13th of March 2011, the March 14th coalition (pro-Saudi Arabia and USA) held a major anti-Hezbollah rally in Beirut’s central square. Pro-March 8th media attacked the event and tried to portray it as a failure. Orange TV (Aoun’s television) estimated participants at 25,000, while Mustakbal TV (owned by Saad Hariri) at 800,000. My own estimate ranges between 250,000 and 350,000. Walid Joumblatt, the Druze leader that recently switched from March 14th to March 8th (and close to Syria), criticized the event as promoting sectarianism. Interestingly enough, his party’s website ran an op-ed that same evening, describing the rally as “highly successful”, and “showing that the weapons should never be used internally” (a direct reference to Hezbollah’s usage of its weapons in the local political conflict, the main point March 14th leaders were addressing). The ambiguity of Joumblatt’s position actually reflects Syria’s own little secret game: attack March 14th openly and severely, but without destroying them completely. This attitude highlights Syria’s real intentions to weaken March 14th while keeping them powerful enough to stand-up to Hezbollah (another Syrian ally, but under Iranian supervision). </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Syria wants the conflict between the two sides to always require it’s intervention to calm things down (as reflected by the self proclaimed role of two close Syrian allies, President Michel Suleiman and Prime Minsiter Nagib Mikati), but for many reasons the current constitutional structure does not guarantee Syria’s long term control: Taef was built as a system dealing with Christian/Muslim equilibrium – with Syria’s military presence as referee. A new constitution will mainly tackle the current Sunnite/Shiite rift that is shaking Lebanon and the whole region, and Syria wants to continue playing the referee – even without the presence of its 30,000 troops.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">This Syrian attitude is also reflected in its regional policies. Syria is the Iran’s closest ally (the Shiites’ main sponsor), but is trying very hard to get close to Saudi Arabia (the Sunnites’ main sponsor) and to the United States and the European Union. This attitude provides Syria with three key benefits:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">- Regain control of Lebanon (by playing the ultimate referee between Sunnites and Shiites)</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">- Shield itself from any potential regional conflict (between Iran and Saudi Arabia – directly or through proxies)</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">- Make itself – and its regime- indispensable as a power broker in the region</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">To achieve this referee role, Syria needs to continue doing what it has always done best: let the left hand light the fire, so the right hand can intervene and turn it off. This is exactly what it is currently doing in Lebanon. The next fire will probably be a sharp rise in tensions between Hezbollah and Mustakbal (the main Sunnite party), and the constitutional change will be the water that extinguishes it. A Hezbollah war with Israel could be the sparkle.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">The success of this strategy depends on another key factor: Hezbollah and Iran’s own ambitions. For the Iranians, Lebanon is just another fighting ground between them and the Saudis. Iran’s influence is reaching Yemen, Kuwait and even the Saudi oil rich regions (populated by Shiites). Saudi Arabia has answered by “invading” Bahrain (in a civil war status between Shiites and Sunnites). Syria’s next move will also depend on how Iran will play its Hezbollah card.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">While this chess game unfolds, Syria is facing its own internal problems. Some protests (even though small) have been reported. Syria is not Tunisia, but then again who said Tunisia would ever fall that fast.</div><br />
<em>*Jihad Bitar is <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Calibri", "sans-serif"; font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">a communications, media and political analyst based in Beirut. Follow him on twitter @JihadTweet</span></em>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-74571908848520269922011-03-14T19:07:00.001+00:002011-03-14T19:08:29.079+00:00The Lebanese Vicious Cycle<div style="text-align: center;"><span id="fullpost"><em>Bassem Hassan</em> and <em>Joseph El-Khoury</em></span></div><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhscCUxLBMvxZ3epn51rrC0JwbIV79sYJwpEB4gwAqVk86M-9Moe3OxF-elKzNuseXLm4LiBLRsPUFMhNB5U0uCuOer2bVXl4PK5rPdhZPPWfTK4hiE2kqbeBotiLmv53b1QcLuPn9_001A/s1600/FD002276.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="268" q6="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhscCUxLBMvxZ3epn51rrC0JwbIV79sYJwpEB4gwAqVk86M-9Moe3OxF-elKzNuseXLm4LiBLRsPUFMhNB5U0uCuOer2bVXl4PK5rPdhZPPWfTK4hiE2kqbeBotiLmv53b1QcLuPn9_001A/s400/FD002276.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;">On the 6th anniversary of the March 14th 2005 demonstration that led to the formation of the eponymous movement, a range of speakers reminded the crowds of the apparent threat that Hezbollah poses to the Lebanese entity. It is clear that a well organized, grassroots supported, religiously based quasi-fascist militia is incompatible with the concept of a secular democratic state, to which all claim to aspire. The trouble is that, far from being merely an Iranian import, Hezbollah is just another natural product of the Lebanese system to which these speakers belong. Hezbollah today is no different from what the Christian Lebanese Forces and the Druze PSP were during the civil war (i.e. well organized, grassroots supported, religiously based quasi-fascist militias). In fact the Shiaa Islamist movement today is the "highest" form of self-sufficient structure that all sects aspire to. Hariri’s Future Movement itself clumsily and rather unsuccessfully attempted to emulate that model between 2006 and that fateful day in May 2008. For decades now and the sectarian system engenders and nurtures these structures because effectively it its message to the people is: "look, you belong to sect X, so go agree on a leader among your own people, then our leaders will talk to your leaders and sort it out"!</div><div style="text-align: justify;"></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Ironically, is that the propagandists in the March 14 camp are playing precisely into Hizbollah's hands with their new ad campaign and their rolled up sleeves attitude. This could be for one of three reasons: </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">1) They only care about reinforcing their own support base, which has been slowly eroding. So, they want to preach to the converted whom they fear may have lost faith or simply got tired and scared.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">2) They are an incompetent bunch who don't understand the current prevailing political psychology of the Shia community. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">3) They are actively seeking a confrontation as part of a yet unclear strategy.</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Obviously a combination of the above is not to be ruled out.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">The bottom line is, as we have repeated in the past, the current confrontation is part of a positive feedback loop that the sects use to essentially regenerate the system that serves them as political entities in the first place. The one thing that may be a game changer this time around is that the balance of power (and we don't just mean military) has shifted so far in one direction that dramatic events may be on the horizon. At this stage all what Hezbollah seems to be successfully capable of engineering is Shia political autonomy. The ‘La Ayre’ counter-campaign, which politely translates as “Couldn’t give a toss” typically exemplifies that state of mind. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">The questions now are: How far is the day when the temptation of a full blown take-over is simply too great to resist, and what would be the consequences?</div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-82726142024787247862011-03-09T23:38:00.004+00:002011-03-10T15:26:59.604+00:00The Liberal illusions of March 14th<div style="text-align: center;">Joseph El-Khoury</div><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiDTpYfDW6hgSMc-JixZQWw55wuxLBiyWnSk9nCRCPwvZmILTmRppdF9VsD65jiNET5guvw7ADUZk4jQ96SfbLbmTfca5yaH2f3P8Bte2qMFrrKOAqN65gJjTYNpF_IPUgFqD3DI5e93EGv/s1600/182005_135784399822591_135681763166188_228171_6820954_n.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="141" q6="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiDTpYfDW6hgSMc-JixZQWw55wuxLBiyWnSk9nCRCPwvZmILTmRppdF9VsD65jiNET5guvw7ADUZk4jQ96SfbLbmTfca5yaH2f3P8Bte2qMFrrKOAqN65gJjTYNpF_IPUgFqD3DI5e93EGv/s400/182005_135784399822591_135681763166188_228171_6820954_n.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;">In preparation for their planned show of force on their birthday, or at least the day before, the 14th March camp in Lebanon ( self-defined as liberal, pro-western and patriotic) have launched an all guns blazing online campaign heavily reliant on social media.This is mostly done through the blog page <em> ayyawatan (what type of homeland?)</em> which prominently feature posters allegedly comparing a Hezbollah dominated state to the one of the Hariri led alliance.</div><br />
<a href="http://www.ayyawattan.com/">http://www.ayyawattan.com/</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.facebook.com/ayyawatan#!/ayyawatan?closeTheater=1">http://www.facebook.com/ayyawatan#!/ayyawatan?closeTheater=1</a><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: justify;">So far so good! ...until further scrutiny reveals that the latter vision is strongly inspired by the perspective of the traditional Chrsitian Right. (To be understood the one that fought the civil under the banner of the now defunct Lebanese Front). This is not particularly surpising as the communication team at the heart of this campaign is likely to include Kataeb or Lebanese Forces affiliated individuals. But portraying 'their Lebanon' as a fully westernised Middle Class paradise where blue eyed children spend their weekend skiing just smacks of complete lack of sensitivity. How is it not a PR disaster after a 15 years civil war was fought over the country's identity and affiliation with the Arab world. This approach is also a major rebuff to recent calls from within the movement to appeal directly to the Shiite power base. </div><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj1vuhM2OHGMjzznzmDBLFG9qE40nDqM5WtZfhGvlWwgc-RhpeOPkbCqMxCCJZhJU0GnsMPQOQY0Ox8tdeb4xwM4-k2BE35XXc6VdKUvWRzQgaVST8JUBr6vHLjmxAD0k8y70-PI0EjRCI7/s1600/183504_138082326259465_135681763166188_240830_6948428_n.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="130" q6="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj1vuhM2OHGMjzznzmDBLFG9qE40nDqM5WtZfhGvlWwgc-RhpeOPkbCqMxCCJZhJU0GnsMPQOQY0Ox8tdeb4xwM4-k2BE35XXc6VdKUvWRzQgaVST8JUBr6vHLjmxAD0k8y70-PI0EjRCI7/s400/183504_138082326259465_135681763166188_240830_6948428_n.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;">One particular poster that has mysteriously disappeared showed side to side a distressed elderly veiled lady hugging a crying child and another younger casually dressed model hugging her similing progeny. It caused outcry from a number of circles, which might explain its withdrawal.</div><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjmEpgv9ribcAtKUHYwykba1vUqw1EQY9NKZ-efMKHZ6iyfqwBmSo_r35bgqjVJyvX5yVcZeVkv4D4-gBgHCG-JdILectqeH3lsZYCSWcfncSKzF0rKxU-avw28eMe4e_jXGQNYQc1DM5KW/s1600/188481_137748169626214_135681763166188_238996_4988472_n.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="130" q6="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjmEpgv9ribcAtKUHYwykba1vUqw1EQY9NKZ-efMKHZ6iyfqwBmSo_r35bgqjVJyvX5yVcZeVkv4D4-gBgHCG-JdILectqeH3lsZYCSWcfncSKzF0rKxU-avw28eMe4e_jXGQNYQc1DM5KW/s400/188481_137748169626214_135681763166188_238996_4988472_n.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;">Still, some of the ones in use are only slightly less offensive in my opinion. I wonder at what point the Hariri communication machine will understand that playing the dichotomy card (Good vs.Evil, Life vs. Death, Ugly vs.Beautiful, Poor vs.Prosperous) can only alienate a substantive section of the population across the sectrarian divide, that have neither experienced nor aspire to the 'Switzerland of the Middle East'.</div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6700183921884368962.post-14653837980520257832011-03-05T23:15:00.001+00:002011-03-05T23:18:12.614+00:00The Madness of King Muammar<div style="text-align: center;">Joseph El-Khoury</div><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjJVsHw3RVKYeZ3IPF7WUlqxcwqT7wn3XuLkZKPVxjYW62rJDxGDBT0NNkgQmiVm7VYH8v7UV-VlFSrUC8EiA3AJxNrMn_kiHxeDG-jAL4C58OIlhPJRH8DBEFae9TUbAKGaaIbpiiW6ES9/s1600/Colonel_Gaddafi_1550901c.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="250" l6="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjJVsHw3RVKYeZ3IPF7WUlqxcwqT7wn3XuLkZKPVxjYW62rJDxGDBT0NNkgQmiVm7VYH8v7UV-VlFSrUC8EiA3AJxNrMn_kiHxeDG-jAL4C58OIlhPJRH8DBEFae9TUbAKGaaIbpiiW6ES9/s400/Colonel_Gaddafi_1550901c.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;">In addition to entertaining us Arabs with his antics and word games for decades, Gaddafi can be credited with turning everyone from the milkman to the news presenter into a diagnostician of mental illness. Words such as ‘nutter’ and ‘madman’ became ‘delusional’ and ‘psychotic’ in the hands of those more sophisticated twitter crowds. The consensus being that the dictator of Libya for the past 40 years is indeed clinically insane. And there lies the problem. This ‘madman’ has been ruling a country of 6 million inhabitants with an iron grip, has managed to fund every single revolutionary movement and subversive outfit throughout the 70s and 80s (From the Abu Nidal group to the Basque ETA passing by the Irish Republican Army), has charmed 2 US presidents and challenged many more while finally turning friend of the West in the trade deal of the Century. And what does that say about us then, the rest of humanity, blessed by sanity and mental equilibrium but until 2 weeks ago bending backward to accomodate the Libyan ruling clan's outrageous behaviour. Few have actually attempted to, publicly at least, get to the bottom of Gaddafi’s modus operandi. I suspect that much more of that effort is being done behind closed doors within intelligence agencies where psychological analysis if foreign dignitaries is a routine exercise. Nonetheless, I have my doubts over how successful Western experts have been at studying human psychology outside a narrow Western context. Indeed one former UK ambassador urged analysts to view Gaddafi’s speeches from the angle of his target audience: His supporters and foes on Libyan soil, which he respectively attempts to embolden and terrorise. Using direct, unconditional street language might look strange to a Washington official but not to a militiaman in Green Square. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">On one hand Gaddafi’s eccentricity is not in contention and independent of any cultural relativism. The man is capricious and unpredictable. But these are personality traits common to many and not signs of madness, at least not the type that diminishes one’s executive functioning and ability to skilfully manipulate and lead. The difference between Gaddafi and the common man is that he is able (and enabled by others) to live his fantasies in a very public manner and on a scale that impacts on the Libyan people and on the international scene. We have to remind ourselves that this man of humble background reached absolute power aged 27, faced little opposition from the start and is granted the status of patron of an international revolutionary movement for decades Based on what I have seen and heard so far, I suspect Gaddafi is neither psychotic nor on drugs (Interesting that he uses the same accusation for the rebels opposing him). His smile to Jeremy Bowen as he unashamedly declares that the Libyan people loved him is similar tactical posturing to his son’s tongue-in-cheek comment that Libya was ‘the most democratic country in the world’ which earned him laughs and applause at the LSE.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: justify;">The way to read Gaddafi is to remember that absolute monarchs/leaders have always behaved irrationally/emotionally the way we all do sometime. In the absence of any systems of checks and balances the people find themselves at the receiving end of such behaviour. World history is littered of such figures from Alexander the Great to the Roman emperors and medieval Kings to modern day autocrats. Unfortunately for us, the Colonel is an all too common 20th century dictator with a superficial penchant for theatricality. Dismissing him as an ineffective ‘nutcase’ is simply an insult to the Libyan people shedding blood and tears to oust him from power.</div>Arab Democracyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17484561039671942435noreply@blogger.com1