Syria: Scenarios and Civil War

By Jihad Bitar

“Protests in Daraa-Syria”; When I read this ticker in my favorite news channel, I can’t honestly say I did not feel goose bumps. As a Lebanese, anything that happens in Syria directly affects my country and probably the entire geopolitical (dis)equilibrium that has characterised the Middle East since the last Israeli-Arab wars of 1973.

Four days after the Daraa spark, I counted twelve cities where unrest was happening. Busy with the very rare YouTube videos and the inevitable contradictory death toll, news channels forgot to analyze the essential question: what next for Syria, and what  about the impact on the region.

Syria is not Egypt and even less Tunisia. In these two North African countries, the revolts featured distinctive social demands: jobs, a future and freedom. In Syria, these three basic demands are complicated by an extra sectarian flavor. Syria’s 75% Sunni population is ruled by Bashar Al-Assad’s Alawites who make 10% of the population.

Social demands mixed with sectarian unrest ia a usual recipe for disaster: a special kind of one, civil war.

Daraa is an interesting city for the start of the revolution. It is close to Damascus, and its population is a mix of Sunni, Alawites and Druze. As anyone who has ever lived through civil war would tell you, trouble always starts within mixed areas which act as point of frictions: living side by side with the 'other' ferments jealousy, anger and hatred. Daraa exploded, Aleppo and Lattaquia followed; two other highly mixed cities. The Sunni citizens of these towns are usually more religious, and have more reasons to imitate their Egyptian and Tunisian Sunni “brothers”.

The first reaction of the regime has been to bring down to the streets the pro-Assad protesters, and contrary to Egypt’s Moubarak or Tunisia’s Ben Ali, the Syrian regime does have real supporters: the Assad’s own Alawites, but also most of Syria’s Christians and Shiite minorities. The Druze community- well advised by their cousins in Israel and Lebanon- will probably wait to see how things turn before taking a stand.

I remember long talks with my Syrian friends, telling me how many of the Alawites from Lattaquia for example, were armed by the regime, and how the roads between Sunni dominated cities and others were on purpose never fully operational: call it “trouble insurance”, but the regime has always been prepared for when that “Sunni” pride day would come. The regime and its supporters are very aware that a “simple” change of power will not – and cannot- happen peacefully. The only way out is probably war, civil war.

While that civil war scenario is – in my opinion – the most likely, three others exist.

In the first, and as the protests gain momentum, the Alawites tribal heads could decide to drop the Al-Assad family. Fearing for the future, these traditional leaders – who also lost part of their power at the hands of the ruling family- might conclude that joining the protest momentum is the best way to “protect” the community. The Christians and hesitant Druze groups would then be forced to do the same. The domino effect would then be terminal for the current regime.

In the second, the Syrian regime analyzes that most foreign countries have no interest in seeing the regime fall, and cracks down on the protest the hard way, the Hama way. In 1982, Bachar Al-Assad’s father had ended a similar revolt by killing an estimated 5,000 people. Most countries remained silent, as Syria’s stability was –and still is- a guarantee for all the countries in the region. Al-Assad will then be free to break the revolt. But in 1982, there was no Facebook, Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabiya ; information is the enemy of dictatorships.

In the third, Al-Assad decides that dropping Iran and getting close to Saudi-Arabia is his best bet to “calm” Sunnite protests. While the regime will probably try this path – as early reports of last minute meetings between Saudis and Syrian leaders show – it is doubtful that it will impact or calm the protesters. The Syrians might find this path to be a dead-end.

The rest of this article analyzes the regional impact in case the civil war scenario does unfold. Part of the proof lies in an unnoticed tweet by BBC’s correspondent in Syria – Lina Sinjab – she reported that protesters had arrested Iranian and Hezbollah operatives working alongside the Syrian security forces.

Syria is Iran’s best friend in the region and the main conduct for Iranian weapons to Hezbollah. Iran can simply not afford to lose the Al-Assad regime. As the BBC Tweet showed, Iran will spend the right amount of money, effort and men to keep the Syrian regime alive. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia will not accept to sit down and watch its arch-enemy Iran take over Syria. The Saudis will probably send weapons and support to the protesters. Syria would then – ironically- become a new Lebanon (not the other way around) and fall into civil war.

If the current Syrian regime falls, one can expect the following impact on the region:

- Reconciliation between Hamas and PLO in Palestine: the changes in the region will weaken both their sponsors, and drive the Palestinian people to request more from their leaders. Both Hamas and PLO leaders might have no choice but coordinate.

- Depending on how things turn out in Syria, Iran will have to choose between either 1) negotiating with the Saudis and Americans, or 2) going full speed with a destabilization of the region: and eventually a regional war.

- Iran’s repositioning will impact Hezbollah’s choices: 1) Use its weapons to negotiate a constitutional settlement that favors it, or 2) Decide that taking over Lebanon is its best long term choice, before losing its vital Syrian weapons conduct. Lebanon’s civil war could then get re-ignited, and the country  heading towards a de-facto federation.

- Saudi Arabia’s Shiite community will be pushed by Iran to stand-up to the Monarchy. Expect more trouble in the oil rich – and Shiite dominated- eastern region of Saudi Arabia.

- Israel’s best interest would be to wait and see how the events turn out. But as Lebanon’s civil war history has shown, anarchy at Israel’s borders increases the possibility of “independent” groups firing rockets at Israel. The Israeli reaction might further put pressure on the Israeli government to “act”.

In all the scenarios, the region is bound for some tough times: nothing new in the book’s cover, but all new in its content.

Syria and Lebanon: The secret plan unveiled

Jihad Bitar*

  

Let me start by saying that I do not really have access to any secret plans. Working in communications, I understand the importance of a teasing title in attracting readers. After all, yet another article about Syria and Lebanon can be as exciting as a report on our president Michel Suleiman weekly visitors.

That said, this article does compile some secret information: and by secret, I mean information you probably had no time to assess, even though it was all readily available. My job as a media analyst and “dissector” has taught me how to read between the lines of any political event: analyze semantics and cross information. My team and I use tools developed by social and media scientists, and these tools do unveil some secrets:

Syria’s approach to gaining more influence in Lebanon involves a constitutional change. Any political analysis of Lebanon and Syria’s regional role must take this into account.

Prior to the June 2009 legislative elections, Michel Aoun visited Syria. A few weeks later, billboards – orange billboards (Aoun’s FPM party’s color)- appeared in all of Lebanon with the slogan “The Third Republic”. Lebanon currently lives under the Saudi sponsored Taef agreement – that “ended” Lebanon’s 1975 war- the 2nd Republic. Any communication expert would tell you that no advertiser would put such a “pivotal” political statement without a direct recommendation from the client. The message- such a few weeks after the visit to Syria- was very clear: the March 8th alliance (pro-Syrian and Hezbollah, of which Aoun is part) was promoting a change in the constitution.

Lebanon’s Head of Parliament, Nabih Berri, is a Shiite political figure very closely aligned with Hezbollah’s politics. But Berri is more Syria’s ally than Iran’s. If Hezbollah represents the Iranian influence, Amal (Berri’s party) is Syria’s main ally. A shrewd politician, Berri is known for his double language. What he says is not always what he aims for. Semantic analysis of his speeches has shown quite a few references to the “need to change the way things are structured in Lebanon”. Berri’s repetitive calls for the end of the sectarian system – even though he is one of its main figures- further highlights his ultimate objective for changing the constitution. The frequency of these “system” speeches are actually correlated with visits by Berri’s main political advisor to Syria.

On the 13th of March 2011, the March 14th coalition (pro-Saudi Arabia and USA) held a major anti-Hezbollah rally in Beirut’s central square. Pro-March 8th media attacked the event and tried to portray it as a failure. Orange TV (Aoun’s television) estimated participants at 25,000, while Mustakbal TV (owned by Saad Hariri) at 800,000. My own estimate ranges between 250,000 and 350,000. Walid Joumblatt, the Druze leader that recently switched from March 14th to March 8th (and close to Syria), criticized the event as promoting sectarianism. Interestingly enough, his party’s website ran an op-ed that same evening, describing the rally as “highly successful”, and “showing that the weapons should never be used internally” (a direct reference to Hezbollah’s usage of its weapons in the local political conflict, the main point March 14th leaders were addressing). The ambiguity of Joumblatt’s position actually reflects Syria’s own little secret game: attack March 14th openly and severely, but without destroying them completely. This attitude highlights Syria’s real intentions to weaken March 14th while keeping them powerful enough to stand-up to Hezbollah (another Syrian ally, but under Iranian supervision).

Syria wants the conflict between the two sides to always require it’s intervention to calm things down (as reflected by the self proclaimed role of two close Syrian allies, President Michel Suleiman and Prime Minsiter Nagib Mikati), but for many reasons the current constitutional structure does not guarantee Syria’s long term control: Taef was built as a system dealing with Christian/Muslim equilibrium – with Syria’s military presence as referee. A new constitution will mainly tackle the current Sunnite/Shiite rift that is shaking Lebanon and the whole region, and Syria wants to continue playing the referee – even without the presence of its 30,000 troops.

This Syrian attitude is also reflected in its regional policies. Syria is the Iran’s closest ally (the Shiites’ main sponsor), but is trying very hard to get close to Saudi Arabia (the Sunnites’ main sponsor) and to the United States and the European Union. This attitude provides Syria with three key benefits:

- Regain control of Lebanon (by playing the ultimate referee between Sunnites and Shiites)

- Shield itself from any potential regional conflict (between Iran and Saudi Arabia – directly or through proxies)

- Make itself – and its regime- indispensable as a power broker in the region

To achieve this referee role, Syria needs to continue doing what it has always done best: let the left hand light the fire, so the right hand can intervene and turn it off. This is exactly what it is currently doing in Lebanon. The next fire will probably be a sharp rise in tensions between Hezbollah and Mustakbal (the main Sunnite party), and the constitutional change will be the water that extinguishes it. A Hezbollah war with Israel could be the sparkle.

The success of this strategy depends on another key factor: Hezbollah and Iran’s own ambitions. For the Iranians, Lebanon is just another fighting ground between them and the Saudis. Iran’s influence is reaching Yemen, Kuwait and even the Saudi oil rich regions (populated by Shiites). Saudi Arabia has answered by “invading” Bahrain (in a civil war status between Shiites and Sunnites). Syria’s next move will also depend on how Iran will play its Hezbollah card.

While this chess game unfolds, Syria is facing its own internal problems. Some protests (even though small) have been reported. Syria is not Tunisia, but then again who said Tunisia would ever fall that fast.

*Jihad Bitar is a communications, media and political analyst based in Beirut. Follow him on twitter @JihadTweet

The Peasant and the Student: Iran in the eyes of the West

By Jihad Bitar

Media Analyst

http://arabmediareview.blogspot.com

Just wondering…

“Iran’s Revolution” or “Iran’s Summer Breeze”? This debate has been going on in the western press for the last week. Is Iran heading towards a change of regime or is it just a “very unusual” event that will “eventually die down”.

I will publish later in the week a detailed report with numbers and data on how the Western and Arab media are viewing this “Revolutionary/Summer Breeze”; but first results suggest that the western press is actually divided on another matter:

Is the Iranian split between Ahmadinejad and Moussavi’s supporters, social or religious based?

It seems that US press is focusing on the religious divide between “fundamentalists” (Ahmadinejad supporters) and “reformists” (Moussavi), whereas European media prefers to talk about the clashes between “students” (Moussavi) vs. “rural” Iranians (Ahmadinejad), thus hinting at a socio/economic divide.

Some sources are mixing both visions, assuming that if you are a “student”, you must be a “reformist”, whereas “rural peasants” are surely fundamentalists…

If the western media is right, then if you ever meet a fundamentalist bearded student fighting it out with a clean-shaved reformist peasant; then you’d better either buy a new pair of glasses, or call your psychiatrist.

Do not Free the Lebanese in Syrian jails! An (Arab) Democratic Appeal

By Jihad Bitar

Yes, this is an open letter through Arabdemocracy.com to all Lebanese and Syrian politicians. Please do not free the Lebanese in Syrian jails, and this for many reasons:

1- They are not important (Michel Aoun during his joint interview with Hassan Nassrallah last year, said that this was not a major issue…and those in jail for fighting for Aoun – while he was hiding in a French embassy- should I think kill themselves out of shame).

2- They are guilty…Yes, they are guilty of being anti-Syrian, they should be hanged…this is how Arab Democracy should be.

3- They love torture …no doubt about that, if they did not love being tortured they wouldn’t have chosen to (Arab) democratically go to jail.

4- They are getting free diet sessions (one prisoner who was released last year recalled how he got 1 potato – rass batata – a day).

5- They are anti democratic. If in Syrian jail, that must be because they are against the Arab Syrian Democratic Republic!

6- They simply do not exist – Sayyed Hassan Nassrallah in his celebration speech for Samir Quntar, listed the Resistance’s next objectives: and Lebanese in Syrian jails did not make the list... Lebanese citizen Sayyed Hassan set the freedom of 4 Iranian diplomats in Israeli jails as an objective, rather than those Lebanese prisoners; that must be because they do not exist.

On Israel, peace and the great (!) Arab and Persian leaders

By Jihad Bitar

One year ago, over a hummus based lunch in a Beirut suburb, conversation stirred away (as usual in the ever “peaceful” Beirut) from the best Hummus places, to the current Lebanese political (if you can still call it political) situation. My hosts’ conclusion was reminiscent of the one I always heard my elders tell: “as long as there is no Israeli-Palestinian peace, there will be no peace in Lebanon”. This inherited political dogma was followed by the usual verdict: “But Israel does not want peace”

My reaction stunned the entire gathering; I had ventured into a risky zone (and I am not talking about the restaurant’s restrooms) when I wondered if after all, and for the first time in 50 years, Israel did not have a strategic advantage into making peace with the Arab nations. My point was (and still is) that warfare had significantly changed since the 1990’s: humanity (if you can call it that way) had moved from the era of the mighty air-force (as used in the Bosnia/Serbian war by the US) to an era dominated by medium and long range missiles. And this has a great impact on the geo-strategy of the Middle East; for the first time in 50 years, the heartland of Israel can be the target of any war between Israel and its neighbors. As the 2006 war on Lebanon has shown, even guerrillas like Hezbollah are able to hit towns like Haifa. If attacked, Iran and Syria can no doubt hit Tel Aviv; and the tourism and business minded new Israelis (as opposed to the early Jewish pioneers) cannot accept this. Israel cannot therefore afford not to make peace anymore. My remarks were quickly dusted away by the entire table; Israel receives yearly billions of dollars from the US and peace will only stop this financial gift. That may be true, but missiles hitting Tel Aviv could end up costing much more to the Israeli economy, and until anti-missiles technologies become mature (and the US & China have been heavily investing in this field) Israel therefore needs peace.

The Middle East is at a turning point. Which path will the Arab leaders choose to take? What choices do the Israelis still have? and what will Iran do? On the latter point, one should never forget that historically, the Persians have always looked towards the Mediterranean with gourmet eyes, and have faced the west (then represented by Alexander the great and others) many times on the Mediterranean shores. Add to this the religious aspect, and one can wonder if after 50 years of Israeli peace stalling, the Iranians won’t take over.

Jihad Bitar is a Media and Political Analyst based in Beirut. You can find his reflections on the Arab media scene on his blog.

http://arabmediareview.blogspot.com