Lessons from Syria

Jade Salhab

There are two parts to this brilliant article by Beesaan el Shaikh in Al Hayat (Arabic) which I believe is an imperative read for anyone interested in the Arab uprising.

The first part of the article uses the tragedies generated by the revolution as a very compelling argument NOT to support it. The second part, near the end, turns the argument around making a simple but slam-dunk case for the revolution.

I want to use the first part to rephrase a position I expressed in the very beginning of this revolution, days before the first Assad speech and the subsequent violent turn of the uprising: I expressed then my hope that Assad would do the wise thing and grab the opportunity to reform the regime by himself, because that was the only transition that would avoid destroying Syria, or handing it to Islamic extremists.

I was naïve in my hopes, obviously. But I believe that hope is a moral imperative. I knew then, like all those who lived through Lebanon's civil war, that no matter where it happens on this earth, or why, or how legitimate, when an uprising turns into an armed rebellion, there is absolutely no controlling of the damage it can make to the structure of society and its ability to recuperate post conflict (think Iraq, Lebanon, but also Salvador, Tchetchnia, or Sri Lanka more globally).

The unspeakable price of civil violence in terms of social dismantling (even more so than the toll on human life and heritage), is why I still believe that any people who has regime change in progress (i.e Tunisia, Egypt) - or in perspective (i.e Jordan, Morocco, or the Gulf in the coming 5 to 15 years) - must bend itself backwards twice, maybe thrice, before engaging in violent struggle, or violent ‘defense of the achieved revolution’ – as opposed to radically peaceful rebellion or political compromise.

One of the reasons I respect Moaz el Khatib so deeply is his awareness of this fact, and his courage to remain constantly open to compromise with the regime for the sake of ending violence – because he knows that no matter how high the price of such compromise is, it will always be lower than the one of sustained violence.

Don’t get me wrong, just like Beesaan el Sheikh says in her article, I believe that there is no choice BUT to support the Syrian revolution because it is the only legitimate and humanly acceptable path forward. But I certainly hope that idealists learn the lesson and understand that wars are, under all circumstances, unwinnable: because even by winning them, we destroy the basic social infrastructure that makes that victory worth anything.

This might sound obvious to some, but the consequence is less so: only a slower transition, or a stubbornly peaceful uprising can come at a lower cost.

I want to end by drawing a relevance to Tunisia and Egypt: compromise is a high price you might need to pay to avoid the higher price of a torn society. And if compromise is impossible (and it should take a lot before you get to this conclusion), than maintain your struggle peaceful at all cost (i.e no military repression of ‘medieval forces’). The alternative is worse than you can ever imagine or calculate.

Difficult Conversations: Syria as seen from Lebanon

Joseph El-Khoury

Few Lebanese can pretend to be fully objective when it comes to events in Syria. The emotional baggage from the 'Pax Syriana', the infamous Status quo imposed by the Assad's regime on the country, still runs deep in the Lebanese psyche bringing significant bias to any cold-hearted analysis.

From the mid 1980s onwards the Syrian regime through its instruments of domination and deception determined the balance of power between the various religious sects; and also within these sects.  The winners and losers from this orderly distribution of musical chairs that followed the chaos of the civil war are the same principal actors of the current political stage, characterised by the confrontation between March 8th and the March 14th alliances (pro- and anti-Hezbollah respectively). Ever since that fateful day in 1976 when troops under the banner of the Arab dissuasion forces rolled across the border at Masnaa, we have had a pro-Syrian camp and an anti-Syrian one. Neutrality was not an option, and contrary to the politically correct discourse, it is that dichotomy that trumps all others, including the divergence of position vis-a-vis Israel and the Palestinians.

And Syria; from Lebanon; for all intent and purposes is Assad's Syria; with its figures, its slogans and its modus operandi.

My compatriots can pretend, on both sides of the argument, that their interest in the future of Syria is primarily motivated by a sense of justice and deep empathy for those dying in  the uprising that has raged on in March 2011. Te truth is that their position on this matter is neither selfless nor shaped by facts. For most Lebanese It is pre-established and unshakeable.

Personally, I am from that generation that was at the receiving end of that mixture of humiliation, pain and fear that simply won’t go away; and invariably I seek some form of retribution. Still, which opinion is not shaped by personal experience; and who can argue with a straight face that it is unreasonable to wish for the demise of the Baath regime or at least a radical overhaul?  My position is unashamedly based on its track record since 1970, not March 2011, in Syria and also in Lebanon. For me, it avoids the distraction of arguing over whether the demonstrators in Deraa were armed infiltrators who shot first or those in Homs are trained Jihadists with Salafi ambitions.

Even if Assad can claim support among sections of the population, including minorities and the business classes, his assessment sheet should make disappointing reading for any outsider sympathisers. With the threat of an Islamic Emirate internally and the challenge of an Arab-Western a coalition externally, after 40 years of totalitarian rule a self proclaimed secular progressive regime has failed at delivering its socialism, freedom and unity; at home and abroad.


As for us Lebanese; the neighborhood is changing and a radical adjustment is on the cards.

Murder They Wrote: The double Tragedy of Myriam Achkar

Joseph El-Khoury

The tragic murder of Myriam Achkar on 21^st November in the town of Sahel Alma generated significant turmoil in Lebanon. While the family of the victim and her loved ones cannot be blamed for the flare up of emotions and the call for retribution in rather crude words, the reaction of the more removed public is worth a pause for reflection. As the story unraveled, both mainstream and social media commentaries were awash with bigoted and racist overtones. : At its heart the interpretation of the event as yet another symbol of the persecution of Christianity in a hostile environment. This permanent kink in the psyche of Arab Christian community has resurfaced recently in the wake of the Arab Spring but stretches back to the inception of Islam and the search for an Eastern identity that is simultaneously distinct and in tune with its Islamic surrounding. 

I contrasted the social and official reaction (as distinct from the personal one) to the murder of Myriam with the aftermath of the slaughter of 62 adolescents on a Norwegian Island earlier this year. Following a meticulous and protracted process, Anders Brehing Breivik, the murderer at the heart of these events has only this week been found clinically insane by two Forensic Psychiatrists. More importantly they found that his actions could be blames on delusional beliefs emanating from a diagnosis of Paranoid Schizophrenia. Breivik is likely to spend the rest if his life in a secure psychiatric institution; an outcome that has not pleased everyone but as one bereaved parent insisted, the important point is that society will no longer be at risk from him. 

The protection of others is an important function of well-established mental health services in European countries where specialists coordinate their work with other agencies, including law enforcement agencies and social services. It is of course fanciful to expect the development of such services in the Arab world, at least in the short term.  But as shown in the Breivik case, the use of mental health expertise to help provide satisfactory answers following a crime that impact society beyond the immediate environment of the victim and the perpetrator can be a positive investment for the concerned authorities.

There is no evidence that Fathi Jaber Salateen, the Syrian who committed the gruesome murder in Sahel Alma was mentally ill in the clinical sense. In fact the event is shocking in its simplicity, in the sense that it appears to be the pure product of a criminal psychopathic mind. Myriam, a loving and loved 28 year old who happened to be at the wrong place and at the wrong time, was as such sacrificed to appease dysfunctional basic sexual instincts. What followed remains mostly speculation until details are further revealed.

But this is not the account reported by various media outlets, either for reasons of ignorance or ulterior motives. Instead the social and sectarian dimension was exploited ad nauseaum overshadowing the personal tragedy. This became a story of an innocent Christian girl killed by a Muslim Immigrant worker. The discrepancy between the real and perceived cultural and religious values of both victim and perpetrator were emphasized to explain the murder. A political solution was even sought for what is essentially a problem inherent to the human mind; the dysfunctional psyche independent of creed. Little context or analysis was provided for these types of murder, which are mostly advertised in the Christian West.  For what it’s worth another chilling parallel could be drawn between this case and the murder of 25 year old Jo Yeates last Christmas in the English city of Bristol. The convicted murderer was no other than her neighbor, Vincent Tabak, a distinctively middle class Dutch architect who led an unremarkable crime-free existence.

The death of Myriam could not come at a worse time for the Lebanese authorities. For months, public paranoia has been at its peak fuelled by heightened local and regional political tension but also a genuine lack of security. In a desperate attempt to minimize public outcry, many in positions of responsibility made populist statements lumping together unrelated events and reaching erroneous conclusions. The measures suggested might reassure a traumatized community, but do little to prevent another Salateen from striking in Sahel Alma, or elsewhere when we least expect it.

Zeid Hamdan and General Suleiman: The Authoritarianism of Fragile Egos (or vice versa)

Karl Sharro

Republished with permission from Karlremarks. Follow him also on twitter @Karlremarks.

Message from Zeid Hamdan in prison: 'Dear friends, I am now in the prison of the police station of the palace of justice in Beirut because of my song "General Soleiman". They are prosecuting me for defammation of President Soleiman. I dont know, until when I am staying in prison. Please mobilize!'

The Lebanese musician Zeid Hamdan, recently back from participating in the Shubbak Festival in London, sent this message from his detention cell in Beirut earlier today. Shubbak was intended as a 'window on contemporary Arab culture', the bitter irony is that this incident has now given an all too realistic view of the contemporary culture of repression and arbitrary use of power in Lebanon. The song in question, General Suleiman, is a light-hearted reggae number that has has provoked the humourless authorities to go after Zeid Hamdan, in all likelihood for the 'offence' of demeaning the position of the President of the Republic. This archaic residue of the French mandate period has often been used by the authorities to clamp down on the freedom of expression.

Last year I reviewed General Suleiman, and I may have been too harsh on the borrowed imagery in the video clip and the soft satire it employed. Zeid explained at the time that the idea for the song came out of the political frustrations of the power vacuum that the country experienced, and how he saw the election of General Suleiman as a positive step. The song is in fact is a plea for change, for stability, for normalcy. As a result of the authorities' incompetence, lack of humour and heavy-handedness, perhaps it will now spark a genuine drive for change. The reaction to the detention has been swift, the news travelled very quickly and protest will hopefully follow very soon.

While it's tempting to defend Zeid on the basis that the song isn't actually offensive, I think this is the wrong approach. What we need to defend here is the freedom of expression, without qualifications, and push for abolishing the archaic laws that provide the legal basis for such arrests. No politician or public figure should be beyond critique, and they shouldn't be allowed to use those laws in a desperate bid to gain the respect that their political record hasn't gained them. The role of art and music isn't to flatter the fragile egos of insecure public figures. Let's say a resolute no to these forms of intellectual intimidation and fight for our freedom to offend the clique of fools that is ruling us.

Join the Free Zeid page on facebook.

A Premier League Guide to Lebanese Politics.

Karl Sharro

Republished with permission from Karlremarks. Follow him  also on twitter @Karlremarks.

Lebanese politics can appear confusing to the outside observer. Indeed, most of the time, it appears confusing to the inside observer. However, Lebanese politics has inherent logic and rules and, once those are grasped, following it can offer hours of entertainment for the whole family. In an effort to demystify some of the conceptual and technical aspects of Lebanese politics, I offer you the Premier League Guide to Lebanese Politics. It’s a handy metaphorical guide that will help you tell the difference between a Jumblatt and a Aoun, and answer questions like why they can never be on the same side.

But what do Lebanese politics and the English Premier League have in common, I hear you ask? Simple, it’s all about the relaxed rules about foreign ownership and player transfers. Like the Premier League, most parties in Lebanon are financed by foreign owners who are mostly connoisseurs that invest heavily in their hobby. Lebanese politicians are very pragmatic about their affiliations, and can often be convinced to switch sides. Lebanese politics is also divided into competition seasons and periods of rest during players assess their performance and the tourists are allowed to come for the summer.

So let’s find who’s who in Lebanese politics:

Hezbollah: Hezbollah are the Manchester United of Lebanese politics. They were around for a while, but didn’t become really successful until they found the right manager, their own Alex Ferguson. Under his leadership, they acquired a winning touch and they’ve done very well since he took the helm. Many others are jealous of their successes and want to end their dominance. Like Man U, their fans don’t like Americans.

The Future Movement: Future are the ‘blues’ of Lebanese politics. They also are bankrolled by a tycoon and have had some success in recent years, but not enough to meet their expectations. They’ve managed to lure players from other teams often, but they haven’t all been good signings. They also experimented with young and inexperienced managers.

The Lebanese Forces: The Lebanese Forces are the Liverpool of Lebanese politics. They were successful in the 80s, but then they spent years in the shadows. Like Liverpool, they brought back their manager from the 80s in hope of finding the winning formula. He spent years away from the game for personal reasons.

The Free Patriotic Movement: Had Blackpool not been relegated, it would have been the perfect equivalent of the FPM. Both like the colour orange and both are led by loud-mouthed, hot-headed individuals who seem to speak their own language. Both Blackpool and the FPM have bigger ambitions than their resources and skills merit. However, since Blackpool were relegated last season, this analogy doesn’t actually work.

Walid Jumblatt: Walid Jumblatt is the ‘libero’ of Lebanese politics. He has a classic sweeper’s ability to ‘read the game’ and anticipate the opponent’s movements. His own movements are impossible to predict. Like Ashly Cole, he has switched sides between red and blue teams, but he doesn’t have Cole’s commitment and sense of loyalty.

The National Bloc: Arsenal. Both are led by men who are more comfortable when speaking French and nobody takes either seriously.

A Second part will follow soon. Help complete the guide and send your own suggestions.

Low airfares or the piecemeal Lebanese revolution

Charbel Gereige

It is such an exciting time to watch the news in the Arab world. When the news of the toppling of Ben Ali and his regime in Tunisia came through, my first reaction was: Bringing down a bad politician is the easy part, replacing him with a good politician is the hard part. Initially, the news failed to excite me. I couldn’t feel the wind of freedom and was too sceptical it could spread. I only started getting excited when the Egyptian people rose to topple their president, and with the signs that movements in Libya, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen were following their example.

Yet my excitement was still tinged with a slight sense of envy. I wished something could be done in my own country, Lebanon. Around that time, a shy movement appeared in Lebanon consisting of youth that wanted to argued for a change of the confessional political system. A few vocal demonstrations took place, and still continue at a slower pace. Although I doubt they will be able to change anything in that direction. The number of those who oppose such reform is overwhelming.

Of course Lebanon is different. Compared to the thousands of secularists who took to the streets, the million citizen marches took place in a different context, the notorious year 2005 and the so called Beirut Spring. Over a million came to commemorate the assassination of Hariri and another million came to support his opponents.

There is a Lebanese exception in that we do not have a dictator at the top of the political system. For all their sins, our presidents are elected and leave at the end of their term. Despite the backdoor deals, our prime ministers still need to seek the approval of the majority of parliament members.We do have a democratic system, but our system is far from perfect. So when it comes to reform, we cannot revolt against one person that would embody the anger of the nation. It was relatively easy to get a vast majority of Egyptians to agree that they want Mubarak to go away. It’s not easy to get a majority of Lebanese to agree that any political side needs to be made accountable. The Lebanese are so divided, and this means change is at first look impossible. All the Lebanese agree that there is something wrong, but cannot agree on a solution or a direction. You can bet that any suggestion will automatically be opposed by the other half under one excuse or the other. It is our dilemma: we want democracy, but so far it has proven on balance to be bad for us
.

Faced with this, a possible strategy would be to find common ground between the overwhelming majority of Lebanese on single issues, and get them to rally for it. Something that touches the day-to-day life of people, a simple issue, not abstract values.

For example: A group of concerned citizen is now working to try open up the Lebanese airspace to fair competition, which could benefit us all. This is one amongst many more issues that can be improved, like cheaper mobile phone fares, and better internet connection.

I think the originality of the idea, consists in normal citizens, who do not have political aspirations, lobby for cheaper airfare to and from Beirut. If we can’t have our Arab revolution in one go, why not go for it piecemeal. An issue like this does have political ramification, but in the right direction. It is not a secret that many politicians have direct or indirect interests in MEA. So it is not unconceivable that they are keeping the monopoly in their own interest. In a more competitive market, the margins are smaller, and MEA would have to bring down their tickets price, and improve their service quality. And to survive, they might in the process get rid of the huge bulge of politically backed employees, who are poor value for money.

Why would this unite all the Lebanese, because even those who do not personally travel will have a relative abroad. So this would save them a nice sum yearly. I see no reason why a ticket from London to Beirut is £600 while it can be as low as £100 to Cyprus. This is an issue that would unite all the Lebanese no matter what is their social class, or political affiliation, or religious affiliation. Besides, for people living not far from Lebanon, this means it becomes affordable to go back home for the weekend and contribute further to the local economy.

On the other hand, this is an issue that might unite most of the politicians from all camps...against it. You can see now how this is edging nearer to the Arab Revolution? We manage to unite all the people against all the politicians on a single issue. But once this issue is resolved, others can follow with an established mechanism in place. Think mobile phone fares (highest in the world) or slow internet (slowest in the world) etc. As a consequence our life as Lebanese is improved.

And by fighting a corrupt system, we would be encouraging our politicians to change or perish.

Going back to the practical aspect...

As a first step, a meeting is taking place in London with a few young professional Lebanese people to discuss a suitable strategy. Hopefully we will be able to announce the launch of a campaign and get the ball rolling.

We will have our own revolution, without having to answer questions on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon or on Hezbollah’s arms. We don’t have to debate the things that divide us to bring the changes that unite us.

في "حشرة" حزب الله: هل يمد اليد؟

ميشال دويهي*

إلى جانب المحكمة الدولية التي يتعامل معها حزب الله على أنها مفبركة لاتهامه باغتياله للرئيس رفيق الحريري ورفاقه، بدأت منذ مطلع هذا العام أحداث في العالم العربي، لم يحسن الحزب استخلاصه العبر منها. فتكاثرت "مشاكله" إلى جانب أزمته مع المحكمة الدولية مما يؤدى مع الوقت إلى ضمور هامش تحركه. ويهمنا هنا أن نسلط الضوء على هذه المشاكل المتسعة:

تنبع أولى هذه المشاكل من تنقل الثورات في العالم العربي التي هي نتيجة لانفجار قنبلتين موقوتتين وهما "الشباب والانترنت". بعكس ما قيل ويقال، لم تأتي هذه الثورات على ذكر فلسطين ولا الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي، بل هي ثورات جوع وكرامة ورفض للديكتاتوريات المتسمرة في العالم العربي منذ عقود.

ثانياً، الوضع الداخلي الإيراني: يعرف حزب الله أن الشعارات التي رفعت، من الداخل الإيراني، ضد تمويله هو وحركة حماس في العامين 2009 و 2010 على حساب الوضع الاقتصادي الإيراني الصعب تعبر تعبيرا دقيقا على التناقضات بين أركان النظام من جهة وبين الشباب الإيراني الثائر على هذا النظام الجائر من جهة أخرى. فبالتأكيد لن يصمد هذا الأخير كثيراً أمام حمى التغيير التي تصيب حالياً منطقة الشرق الأوسط وسوف يصل إلى الجمهورية الإسلامية مفعول "الدومينو" الذي يجتاح العالم العربي، آجلاً أم عاجلاً . مما لا شك فيه، إن أي تغيير في النظام الإيراني سوف يؤدي إلى إضعاف حزب الله وتأثيره في الداخل اللبناني.

ثالثاً، الوضع الداخلي السوري: فحزب الله يراقب بحذر فوران الشعب السوري الذي يريد الخلاص من نظام حزب البعث. فمخاوف حزب الله في محلها لأنه يعرف جيدا أن سوريا غداً لن تكون كما كانت من قبل، صمد النظام أم لم يصمد.فبالأساس يتعامل حزب الله بكثير من الحذر والبراغماتية مع النظام السوري وتجربته على الأقل في العشرين السنة الماضية تدل على ذلك. و ما حصل مؤخرا مع عماد مغنية في الشام يؤكد على تخلخل عامل الثقة في العلاقة بين الاثنين.

رابعاً، وضع اللبنانيين في الخليج: فقد بدا واضحا أن تطور الأحداث في البحرين قد دفع بالمملكة العربية السعودية وبمجلس التعاون الخليجي باتخاذ القرار بالمواجهة المباشرة مع الجمهورية الإسلامية الإيرانية وهذا من شأنه أن يضع اللبنانيين الشيعة الموالين والمعارضين لحزب الله والعاملين في دول الخليج العربي في موقع صعب ودقيق. وموجة الترحيل الأخيرة للبنانيين الشيعة من بعض هذه الدول هو خير دليل على ذلك.

خامساً، علاقة سلاح حزب الله بالداخل اللبناني: فحزب الله كان شديد الارتياح عندما لم يكن سلاحه في موقع نقاش شديد بين اللبنانيين جميعاً وعندما لم يكن دور هذا السلاح ذاته مطروحاً على طاولة الحوار. بعد العام 2006 وخاصة بعد أيار 2008، انتفض أغلبية اللبنانيين على دور هذا السلاح وعلى استخدامه في الداخل مما أربك حزب الله الذي بات مطالبا بالدفاع عن سلاحه يومياً أمام علامات استفهام اللبنانيين الخائفة من دوامة هذا السلاح.

سادساً، أزمة تشكيل الحكومة: وذلك مع عدم تمكن حزب الله من تشكيل الحكومة اللبنانية بالرغم من تمتعه بأغلبية برلمانية (وهنا لن ادخل بتفاصيل تشكل هذه الأغلبية). فالوقت ليس لصالحه مع غليان المنطقة واقتراب موعد المحكمة الدولية.

سابعاً، علاقة نبيه بري بحزب الله: فما كشفته بعض الصحف عن العلاقة بين زعيم الشيعة من 1978 الى 2000 وبين حزب الله الذي خطف هذا الدور اجبر بري على مواكبته مكرهاً لزعامة حزب الله للطائفة الشيعية، لم يكن سراً.

ثامناً، وضع أبناء الطائفة الشيعية العائدين من ساحل العاج: فالممولون السابقون لحزب الله تحولوا في الوقت الحالي بعد تشردهم من هذه الدولة الإفريقية إلى مشاريع عاطلين عن العمل يبحثون عن مورد رزق جديد.

بالرغم مما ورد، لا أنكر على حزب الله أن مزاج وقلب أغلبية الطائفة الشيعية معه، فهو عرف بذكاء كيف يستحوذ على ولاء أبناء هذه الطائفة من الملتزمين بعقيدته الدينية ومن غير الملتزمين. فباعتماده للغات عدة في خطابه السياسي منها الحرمان ومنها المقاومة ومنها حصة الطائفة الشيعية في النظام السياسي اللبناني ساعده على لم شمل الطائفة بأغلبيتها تحت جناحه. ولكن كما كانت الطائفة مع غيره، فهي مهيأة لان تنتقل تدريجيا إلى مقلب آخر. فللمشاكل التي تم عرضها أعلاه قدرة على التفاعل في اتجاه وضع دور حزب الله وعلاقته بالطائفة الشيعية اللبنانية تحت المجهر.

فهل يتعامل عقلاء الحزب مع هذه المشاكل بجدية وهل يقتنعوا ببراغماتيتهم التي يتمتعون بها بأنهم في صلب أزمة مفتوحة؟ وهل يمدوا اليد إلى الداخل اللبناني؟ وهل حركة 14 آذار مستعدة لملاقاة الحزب في منتصف الطريق بعيدا عن المكابرة والشماتة على أن يكون الشرط طبعا لبننة الحل وتسليم السلاح للدولة اللبنانية؟

وهل سوف تسمح إيران للحزب بإنقاذ الشيعة اللبنانيين من سياسة المحاور أم ستذهب بهم إلى المزيد من المواجهة؟ هذه المواجهة المحكومة بواقع الديموغرافيا السنية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط حيث لا إمكانية لإيران بالفوز بها. من هنا حزب الله مطالب بإنقاذ شيعة لبنان ودفعهم للانخراط بمسيرة بناء دولة لبنانية عوضاً عن الانخراط في مشاريع سياسية إقليمية ممكن أن تكون فادحة الخسارة على الطائفة الشيعية في لبنان وفي كل الأقطار العربية.

*أستاذ جامعي

Syria: Scenarios and Civil War

By Jihad Bitar

“Protests in Daraa-Syria”; When I read this ticker in my favorite news channel, I can’t honestly say I did not feel goose bumps. As a Lebanese, anything that happens in Syria directly affects my country and probably the entire geopolitical (dis)equilibrium that has characterised the Middle East since the last Israeli-Arab wars of 1973.

Four days after the Daraa spark, I counted twelve cities where unrest was happening. Busy with the very rare YouTube videos and the inevitable contradictory death toll, news channels forgot to analyze the essential question: what next for Syria, and what  about the impact on the region.

Syria is not Egypt and even less Tunisia. In these two North African countries, the revolts featured distinctive social demands: jobs, a future and freedom. In Syria, these three basic demands are complicated by an extra sectarian flavor. Syria’s 75% Sunni population is ruled by Bashar Al-Assad’s Alawites who make 10% of the population.

Social demands mixed with sectarian unrest ia a usual recipe for disaster: a special kind of one, civil war.

Daraa is an interesting city for the start of the revolution. It is close to Damascus, and its population is a mix of Sunni, Alawites and Druze. As anyone who has ever lived through civil war would tell you, trouble always starts within mixed areas which act as point of frictions: living side by side with the 'other' ferments jealousy, anger and hatred. Daraa exploded, Aleppo and Lattaquia followed; two other highly mixed cities. The Sunni citizens of these towns are usually more religious, and have more reasons to imitate their Egyptian and Tunisian Sunni “brothers”.

The first reaction of the regime has been to bring down to the streets the pro-Assad protesters, and contrary to Egypt’s Moubarak or Tunisia’s Ben Ali, the Syrian regime does have real supporters: the Assad’s own Alawites, but also most of Syria’s Christians and Shiite minorities. The Druze community- well advised by their cousins in Israel and Lebanon- will probably wait to see how things turn before taking a stand.

I remember long talks with my Syrian friends, telling me how many of the Alawites from Lattaquia for example, were armed by the regime, and how the roads between Sunni dominated cities and others were on purpose never fully operational: call it “trouble insurance”, but the regime has always been prepared for when that “Sunni” pride day would come. The regime and its supporters are very aware that a “simple” change of power will not – and cannot- happen peacefully. The only way out is probably war, civil war.

While that civil war scenario is – in my opinion – the most likely, three others exist.

In the first, and as the protests gain momentum, the Alawites tribal heads could decide to drop the Al-Assad family. Fearing for the future, these traditional leaders – who also lost part of their power at the hands of the ruling family- might conclude that joining the protest momentum is the best way to “protect” the community. The Christians and hesitant Druze groups would then be forced to do the same. The domino effect would then be terminal for the current regime.

In the second, the Syrian regime analyzes that most foreign countries have no interest in seeing the regime fall, and cracks down on the protest the hard way, the Hama way. In 1982, Bachar Al-Assad’s father had ended a similar revolt by killing an estimated 5,000 people. Most countries remained silent, as Syria’s stability was –and still is- a guarantee for all the countries in the region. Al-Assad will then be free to break the revolt. But in 1982, there was no Facebook, Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabiya ; information is the enemy of dictatorships.

In the third, Al-Assad decides that dropping Iran and getting close to Saudi-Arabia is his best bet to “calm” Sunnite protests. While the regime will probably try this path – as early reports of last minute meetings between Saudis and Syrian leaders show – it is doubtful that it will impact or calm the protesters. The Syrians might find this path to be a dead-end.

The rest of this article analyzes the regional impact in case the civil war scenario does unfold. Part of the proof lies in an unnoticed tweet by BBC’s correspondent in Syria – Lina Sinjab – she reported that protesters had arrested Iranian and Hezbollah operatives working alongside the Syrian security forces.

Syria is Iran’s best friend in the region and the main conduct for Iranian weapons to Hezbollah. Iran can simply not afford to lose the Al-Assad regime. As the BBC Tweet showed, Iran will spend the right amount of money, effort and men to keep the Syrian regime alive. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia will not accept to sit down and watch its arch-enemy Iran take over Syria. The Saudis will probably send weapons and support to the protesters. Syria would then – ironically- become a new Lebanon (not the other way around) and fall into civil war.

If the current Syrian regime falls, one can expect the following impact on the region:

- Reconciliation between Hamas and PLO in Palestine: the changes in the region will weaken both their sponsors, and drive the Palestinian people to request more from their leaders. Both Hamas and PLO leaders might have no choice but coordinate.

- Depending on how things turn out in Syria, Iran will have to choose between either 1) negotiating with the Saudis and Americans, or 2) going full speed with a destabilization of the region: and eventually a regional war.

- Iran’s repositioning will impact Hezbollah’s choices: 1) Use its weapons to negotiate a constitutional settlement that favors it, or 2) Decide that taking over Lebanon is its best long term choice, before losing its vital Syrian weapons conduct. Lebanon’s civil war could then get re-ignited, and the country  heading towards a de-facto federation.

- Saudi Arabia’s Shiite community will be pushed by Iran to stand-up to the Monarchy. Expect more trouble in the oil rich – and Shiite dominated- eastern region of Saudi Arabia.

- Israel’s best interest would be to wait and see how the events turn out. But as Lebanon’s civil war history has shown, anarchy at Israel’s borders increases the possibility of “independent” groups firing rockets at Israel. The Israeli reaction might further put pressure on the Israeli government to “act”.

In all the scenarios, the region is bound for some tough times: nothing new in the book’s cover, but all new in its content.

حملة إسقاط النظام الطائفي: التحدِيات

خالد برّاج

حسناً فعل الشبّان و الشابات بإطلاق حملة إسقاط النظام الطائفي في لبنان و جميلة تلك اليافطات التي رفعت في التحركات مطالبة بنظامٍ علماني بديلاً عن نظامنا الطائفي العفن, الصورة بحدِ ذاتها جميلة و معبِرة في بلد يُراد فيه الطائفي كأساس و العلماني كإستثناء.

و بغض النظر عن إختلافنا الفكري أو السياسي مع بعض المشاركين في التظاهرات من أحزابٍ أو جمعياتٍ شبه حزبية فإنّه من الممكن التأسيس على هذه الحملة كوسيلة ضغط بوجه النظام و عملائه ( و أقصد هنا نظام 1943 و تعديلاته أمّا العملاء فهم السياسيين من "موالٍ مستجد/معارض سابق" إلى "معارضٍ مستجد/موالٍ سابق") إلاّ أنّ الحملة في مرحلة إختبار مفصلي و الطريق معبّد بالأشواك و لعلّ بوادر تلك الأشواك ظهرت إلى العلن للمرّة الأولى في مظاهرة يوم الأحد 20/03/2011 علماً أنّ في الخفايا ما يدلّ على أكثر من إشكالية و منها ما ينسف جوهر هذا التحرُك من أساسه و يجعل عنوانه جميل و برّاق لكن محتواه فارغ أو على نقيض مع عنوانه.

و هنا تبرز الإشكاليات الحقيقية التي على القيميين و المشاركين في الحملة و المظاهرات العمل سريعاً على إزالتها و تخطِيها و يمكن تلخيص تلك الإشكاليات بالنقاط التالية:

أ‌- شعور البعض أنّ الحملة ليست بعيدة عن التجاذب و الإنقسام السياسي الحاصل في البلد بالرغم من تأكيد القيِيمين على الحملة و المتظاهرين أنّ الحملة لا تستهدف سياسي معيّن أو طرف سياسي واحد بل أنّ الحملة هي بوجه جميع السياسيين من فريقي 8 و 14 أذار و من خلفهما النظام الطائفي المهترىء (الأفضل هنا إستعمال عبارة الزعماء السياسيين لما تحتوي تلك العبارة على مدلول طائفي/مذهبي/إقطاعي/زبائني)

ب‌- محاولة الزعماء السياسيين (لا جدوى من إعادة تكرار عبارة الطائفيين فهي من المسلّمات) سرقة التحرّك عبر تأييده أو إرسال بعض أعضاء المكاتب السياسية للمشاركة في التحرّك/المظاهرة و قد ظهرت في وسائل الإعلام منذ بدأ التحركات عبارة جديدة يمكن إضافتها إلى قاموس العبارات السياسية اللبنانية و هي "عضو المكتب السياسي الأستاذ أو السيِد أو الحج فلان الفلاني شارك في صورة مستقِلة" و ذلك بالرغم من وجود الضادين في تلك العباراة (عضو مكتب سياسي و صورة مستقلة).

ت‌- إشكالية سلاح حزب الله لما يشكِل هذا السلاح من معوقات فعلية من الناحية العملية (بغض النظر عن الإنقسام الحالي حوله بين طرفي النزاع في لبنان و الأطماع الإسرائيلية الدائمة من إجتياح أو عدوان) و ذلك للأسباب التالية:

1. أولاً: للتعارض مع مفهوم القوة العامة (من شرطة و جيش إلخ...) التي تختصر الأمن و تمتلك حصرية السلاح في الأنظمة الحديثة و أي بناء لدولة أو نظام سياسي يجب أن يلحظ بشكل أساسي مبدأ حصرية السلاح بيد القوة العامة التي هي ركن مركزي في بناء السلطة العامة.

2. ثانياً: لكون السلاح أساساً هو بيدِ حزب ديني على خلاف جزري و عقائدي مع مفهوم الدولة العلمانية (و ليس من باب المصالح كعيِنة كبيرة من الأحزاب و السياسيين اللبنانيين), هذا لا يعني أنّ الحزب يؤيِد النظام الطائفي الحالي و لكن نظرته للنظام تختلف بل تكاد تكون نقيضة للدولة العلمانية و هي تلتقي إلى حد كبير مع نظرة التيارات الإسلامية "السنِية" لشكل و مفهوم الدولة (الرجاء مراجعة أدبيات الحزب منذ نشوءه إلى يومنا هذا فيما يخصّ الطائفية و نظام الحكم في لبنان).

3. ثالثاً: لإرتباط هذا السلاح بالصراع في المنطقة.

4. رابعاً: لإرتباط الحزب العضوي بالجمهورية الإسلامية في إيران و تأكيده مراراً على أهمية هذا الإرتباط من الناحية الدينية و الفقهية و الفكرية و السياسية.

ث- إشكالية الإستثناءات في التعبير عن رفض النظام الطائفي و الزعماء الطائفيين و هنا يلاحظ أنّ بعض المتظاهرين يفضِلون التصويب على زعماء معيّنين و إستثناء آخرين علماً أنّ طائفية كل الزعماء هي واضحة إلى العلن و لعلّ الإشكال الذي حصل يوم الأحد 20/03/2011 أثناء رفع يافطة تنتقد فيها أحد الزعماء و الأسلوب الميلشيوي الذي أقدم عليه بعض "اللاطائفيين" لإنتزاع تلك اليافطة خير دليل على ذلك.

الحملة تواجها تحدِيات كبيرة و منزلقات وعرة و لعلّ حجم المشاركة في تظاهرة الأمس هي خير دليل على وجود وعي عند مجموعة كبيرة من اللبنانيين (و منهم من الأصدقاء و الرفاق الذين نعتز بصداقتهم و نضالهم) بأنّ الخلل يكمن في نظامنا الحالي و إنّه قد آن الأوان للإنتهاء من مقولة " النظام يعيد إنتاج نفسه بوسائل أخرى" كما حصل في محطات 1958, 1969, 1973, 1990, 2000 و إنتخابات 2005 و إتفاق الدوحة 2009.

Syria and Lebanon: The secret plan unveiled

Jihad Bitar*

  

Let me start by saying that I do not really have access to any secret plans. Working in communications, I understand the importance of a teasing title in attracting readers. After all, yet another article about Syria and Lebanon can be as exciting as a report on our president Michel Suleiman weekly visitors.

That said, this article does compile some secret information: and by secret, I mean information you probably had no time to assess, even though it was all readily available. My job as a media analyst and “dissector” has taught me how to read between the lines of any political event: analyze semantics and cross information. My team and I use tools developed by social and media scientists, and these tools do unveil some secrets:

Syria’s approach to gaining more influence in Lebanon involves a constitutional change. Any political analysis of Lebanon and Syria’s regional role must take this into account.

Prior to the June 2009 legislative elections, Michel Aoun visited Syria. A few weeks later, billboards – orange billboards (Aoun’s FPM party’s color)- appeared in all of Lebanon with the slogan “The Third Republic”. Lebanon currently lives under the Saudi sponsored Taef agreement – that “ended” Lebanon’s 1975 war- the 2nd Republic. Any communication expert would tell you that no advertiser would put such a “pivotal” political statement without a direct recommendation from the client. The message- such a few weeks after the visit to Syria- was very clear: the March 8th alliance (pro-Syrian and Hezbollah, of which Aoun is part) was promoting a change in the constitution.

Lebanon’s Head of Parliament, Nabih Berri, is a Shiite political figure very closely aligned with Hezbollah’s politics. But Berri is more Syria’s ally than Iran’s. If Hezbollah represents the Iranian influence, Amal (Berri’s party) is Syria’s main ally. A shrewd politician, Berri is known for his double language. What he says is not always what he aims for. Semantic analysis of his speeches has shown quite a few references to the “need to change the way things are structured in Lebanon”. Berri’s repetitive calls for the end of the sectarian system – even though he is one of its main figures- further highlights his ultimate objective for changing the constitution. The frequency of these “system” speeches are actually correlated with visits by Berri’s main political advisor to Syria.

On the 13th of March 2011, the March 14th coalition (pro-Saudi Arabia and USA) held a major anti-Hezbollah rally in Beirut’s central square. Pro-March 8th media attacked the event and tried to portray it as a failure. Orange TV (Aoun’s television) estimated participants at 25,000, while Mustakbal TV (owned by Saad Hariri) at 800,000. My own estimate ranges between 250,000 and 350,000. Walid Joumblatt, the Druze leader that recently switched from March 14th to March 8th (and close to Syria), criticized the event as promoting sectarianism. Interestingly enough, his party’s website ran an op-ed that same evening, describing the rally as “highly successful”, and “showing that the weapons should never be used internally” (a direct reference to Hezbollah’s usage of its weapons in the local political conflict, the main point March 14th leaders were addressing). The ambiguity of Joumblatt’s position actually reflects Syria’s own little secret game: attack March 14th openly and severely, but without destroying them completely. This attitude highlights Syria’s real intentions to weaken March 14th while keeping them powerful enough to stand-up to Hezbollah (another Syrian ally, but under Iranian supervision).

Syria wants the conflict between the two sides to always require it’s intervention to calm things down (as reflected by the self proclaimed role of two close Syrian allies, President Michel Suleiman and Prime Minsiter Nagib Mikati), but for many reasons the current constitutional structure does not guarantee Syria’s long term control: Taef was built as a system dealing with Christian/Muslim equilibrium – with Syria’s military presence as referee. A new constitution will mainly tackle the current Sunnite/Shiite rift that is shaking Lebanon and the whole region, and Syria wants to continue playing the referee – even without the presence of its 30,000 troops.

This Syrian attitude is also reflected in its regional policies. Syria is the Iran’s closest ally (the Shiites’ main sponsor), but is trying very hard to get close to Saudi Arabia (the Sunnites’ main sponsor) and to the United States and the European Union. This attitude provides Syria with three key benefits:

- Regain control of Lebanon (by playing the ultimate referee between Sunnites and Shiites)

- Shield itself from any potential regional conflict (between Iran and Saudi Arabia – directly or through proxies)

- Make itself – and its regime- indispensable as a power broker in the region

To achieve this referee role, Syria needs to continue doing what it has always done best: let the left hand light the fire, so the right hand can intervene and turn it off. This is exactly what it is currently doing in Lebanon. The next fire will probably be a sharp rise in tensions between Hezbollah and Mustakbal (the main Sunnite party), and the constitutional change will be the water that extinguishes it. A Hezbollah war with Israel could be the sparkle.

The success of this strategy depends on another key factor: Hezbollah and Iran’s own ambitions. For the Iranians, Lebanon is just another fighting ground between them and the Saudis. Iran’s influence is reaching Yemen, Kuwait and even the Saudi oil rich regions (populated by Shiites). Saudi Arabia has answered by “invading” Bahrain (in a civil war status between Shiites and Sunnites). Syria’s next move will also depend on how Iran will play its Hezbollah card.

While this chess game unfolds, Syria is facing its own internal problems. Some protests (even though small) have been reported. Syria is not Tunisia, but then again who said Tunisia would ever fall that fast.

*Jihad Bitar is a communications, media and political analyst based in Beirut. Follow him on twitter @JihadTweet

The Lebanese Vicious Cycle

Bassem Hassan and Joseph El-Khoury

On the 6th anniversary of the March 14th 2005 demonstration that led to the formation of the eponymous movement, a range of speakers reminded the crowds of the apparent threat that Hezbollah poses to the Lebanese entity. It is clear that a well organized, grassroots supported, religiously based quasi-fascist militia is incompatible with the concept of a secular democratic state, to which all claim to aspire. The trouble is that, far from being merely an Iranian import, Hezbollah is just another natural product of the Lebanese system to which these speakers belong. Hezbollah today is no different from what the Christian Lebanese Forces and the Druze PSP were during the civil war (i.e. well organized, grassroots supported, religiously based quasi-fascist militias). In fact the Shiaa Islamist movement today is the "highest" form of self-sufficient structure that all sects aspire to. Hariri’s Future Movement itself clumsily and rather unsuccessfully attempted to emulate that model between 2006 and that fateful day in May 2008. For decades now and the sectarian system engenders and nurtures these structures because effectively it its message to the people is: "look, you belong to sect X, so go agree on a leader among your own people, then our leaders will talk to your leaders and sort it out"!

Ironically, is that the propagandists in the March 14 camp are playing precisely into Hizbollah's hands with their new ad campaign and their rolled up sleeves attitude. This could be for one of three reasons:

1) They only care about reinforcing their own support base, which has been slowly eroding. So, they want to preach to the converted whom they fear may have lost faith or simply got tired and scared.

2) They are an incompetent bunch who don't understand the current prevailing political psychology of the Shia community.

3) They are actively seeking a confrontation as part of a yet unclear strategy.

Obviously a combination of the above is not to be ruled out.

The bottom line is, as we have repeated in the past, the current confrontation is part of a positive feedback loop that the sects use to essentially regenerate the system that serves them as political entities in the first place. The one thing that may be a game changer this time around is that the balance of power (and we don't just mean military) has shifted so far in one direction that dramatic events may be on the horizon. At this stage all what Hezbollah seems to be successfully capable of engineering is Shia political autonomy. The ‘La Ayre’ counter-campaign, which politely translates as “Couldn’t give a toss” typically exemplifies that state of mind.

The questions now are: How far is the day when the temptation of a full blown take-over is simply too great to resist, and what would be the consequences?

The Liberal illusions of March 14th

Joseph El-Khoury

In preparation for their planned show of force on their birthday, or at least the day before, the 14th March camp in Lebanon ( self-defined as liberal, pro-western and patriotic) have launched an all guns blazing online campaign heavily reliant on social media.This is mostly done through the blog page  ayyawatan (what type of homeland?) which prominently feature posters allegedly comparing a Hezbollah dominated state to the one of the Hariri led alliance.

http://www.ayyawattan.com/


http://www.facebook.com/ayyawatan#!/ayyawatan?closeTheater=1

So far so good! ...until further scrutiny reveals that the latter vision is strongly inspired by the perspective of the traditional Chrsitian Right. (To be understood the one that fought the civil under the banner of the now defunct Lebanese Front). This is not particularly surpising as the communication team at the heart of this campaign is likely to include Kataeb or Lebanese Forces affiliated individuals. But portraying 'their Lebanon' as a fully westernised Middle Class paradise where blue eyed children spend their weekend skiing just smacks of complete lack of sensitivity. How is it not a PR disaster after a 15 years civil war was fought over the country's identity and affiliation with the Arab world. This approach is also a major rebuff to recent calls from within the movement to appeal directly to the Shiite power base.

One particular poster that has mysteriously disappeared showed side to side a distressed elderly veiled lady hugging a crying child and another younger casually dressed model hugging her similing progeny. It caused outcry from a number of circles, which might explain its withdrawal.

Still, some of the ones in use are only slightly less offensive in my opinion. I wonder at what point the Hariri communication machine will understand that playing the dichotomy card (Good vs.Evil, Life vs. Death, Ugly vs.Beautiful, Poor vs.Prosperous) can only alienate a substantive section of the population across the sectrarian divide, that  have neither experienced nor aspire to the 'Switzerland of the Middle East'.

Everyone wants a piece of the revolution

Lama Bashour

Re-published with permission from Lama's Scrapbook

Before we get into this, I'd like to clarify two things:

I am fully aware that the situation we are in is most likely the result of years and years of bad government policies and opportunistic behaviour by a select few.

I am even more aware that I will probably never make an impact in the real world, because my ideals are too extreme and frustratingly impractical.

Fortunately for me, and maybe unfortunately for you, technology has given me this platform to let my voice be heard, if only by a small number of people. I know that a lot of us are still high on the domino effect of democracy that started with Mohamed Bouazizi's desperate act of giving up on his country. Yet, we are struggling to find our own path, some of us asking for reform, others for a secular government. I am not quite sure, however, if we are just riding the wave of revolution or if there is a genuine desire (I had argued in an earlier post that I don't believe there is a real need) for change. Are we certain that we don't just want the desire to change, instead of change itself?

I look around me and all I see are individuals who are part of the system they want to change, benefiting from it and sometimes bending the rules when it suits their purpose. I see people demanding of their government economic reform, and asking it for more jobs for their followers. I see people lobbying for a secular government, claiming it's the other sect that is preventing it. I see people insisting on anti-corruption laws, and requesting a relative to make sure that their government application is processed quickly. And of course, time and time again, I see people ignoring others - in a queue, crossing the street, driving a car - as if they were not members of the same community they are seeking a better future with. I see you, because I am you.

The thing is, we can't ask for change, if we are unwilling to make it ourselves. So if any of us are serious about this revolution or whatever you want to call it, let's all take a long look at ourselves, and if we can't find anything worth improving, then we're not looking hard enough. And if what needs to be improved requires too much of a sacrifice, then we're not ready for it. And if we don't look at every single mistake, not just the ones that inconvenience us, as unacceptable, then we may never be.

You can join all the Facebook groups you want and retweet every piece of news you read, but the barrier of fear that was broken in Tunisia and Egypt is not the same as ours. Ours is much more difficult to overcome, because the enemy we fear is in us.

!فليتوحد اللبنانيين في ثورتهم جميعاُ

داليا عبيد

دفعت أحداث تونس اللبنانيين إلى التسلح بالحماس الشديد وقد لمست ذلك عن قرب عبر الشعارات التي رفعت على المواقع والمدونات الالكترونية حيث عكست المتابعة الدقيقة للشباب والنخب اللبنانيين خاصة الذين ليسوا على ارتباط مباشر بأطراف الحكم.

أثناء سقوط بن علي، كانت تسقط حكومة ائتلاف وطني في بيروت ولكن ليس عبر ثورة شعبية داخلية أتت نتيجة احتراق جسد مناضل للقمة العيش يدعى محمد بو العزيزي، بل نتيجة أزمة مستمرة تتفاعل منذ احتراق جسد رفيق الحريري في بيروت في شباط 2005. هذا الجسد الذي أدى بدوره إلى إشعال ثورة شعبية دفعت الناس بالزحف إلى وسط مدينة بيروت.

في ذلك الوقت، لم تتلاحم مكونات هذه الثورة وعناصرها. فلم تأخذ شكل كتلة مجتمعية واحدة موحدة تتظاهر نقمة على النظام السياسي اللبناني أو غضباً في مواجهة الأزمات الاقتصادية. إنما تشكلت من كتل طائفية ذو دعم دولي (تختلف الأسباب التي دفعت بكل منها إلى ساحة الحرية) في مواجهة كتلة طائفية أخرى ذو عمق إقليمي. وقد أتت اللحظة المليونية بثمارها ودفع رفيق الحريري ثمن تخلص اللبنانيين من شبح الخوف فخرج الجيش السوري الذي كان يحكم لبنان بقبضة بوليسية. وأمام تأملنا لهذه الأحداث، نستنتج بأن ما حصل لم يكن بالمسألة العادية بل هو حدث تاريخي كان بمثابة حلم لمعظم اللبنانيين صغاراً وكباراً.

وقد قدر لأقلية خارجة عن السياق الطائفي، شاركت في صنع الحدث، أن تتأمل في متابعة الثورة باتجاه تقويض دعائم النظام السياسي اللبناني ولكنها اصطدمت بهذا الحائط اصطداماً شديداً بعد أن خرج نظام الأسد من لبنان ولم يخرج معه رموزه اللبنانيين من دائرة الحكم. واستمر تفاؤل هذه الأقلية بالتآكل وصولاً إلى الانقراض حيث ظهر ذلك جلياً في تصاعد حماسهم تجاه ثورة الياسمين واختفاء وسائل تعبيرهم أمام ثورة تقويض الاستقرار اللبناني. وقد نتجت هذه اللامبالاة عن اليأس والملل من تكرار السيناريوهات المعهودة بعد كل أزمة: فراغ حكومي فوساطات دولية وإقليمية(بالرغم من نكهة تركية مميزة هذه المرة) فاحتقان في الشارع فدماء فاغتيالات ف ف ف ..... حيث النتيجة معلقة بانتظار تطور الأحداث في الأيام المقبلة التي من الممكن أن تكون سوداء قاتمة!

وهذا السيناريو إذ يبرهن على شيء فهو على وهن مشهد يعيد نفسه منذ الاستقلال الأول ويدل على فشل النظام السياسي اللبناني في الاستمرار وعلى قدراته الانفجارية المتجددة نتيجة احتدام تناقضاته! وقد كان زلزال الحرب الأهلية الذي اخذ معه مئات الآلاف من الأجساد المحترقة بنيران القصف العشوائي، أحد انجازات هذه التناقضات. ولم تؤدي دماء هؤلاء الشهداء ودموع الأمهات ونحيب الآباء إلى الاعتذار من اللبنانيين والاعتراف بالمجازر والمحاولة لإعادة النظر ببنية صلبة للبنان بل ذهبت الآلام هدراً واستمرينا في إنتاج الأزمات!

لقد أعاد مشهد جسد محمد بو العزيزي المحترق إليَ مشاهد الجثث المحترقة في الحرب الأهلية والتي ذهبت تضحيات أصحابها هباءً (المقارنة قائمة حول مشهد النار فقط) ولكن لم يعيد الشعب التونسي الموحد والمنتفض على الديكتاتورية إلا انبعاث أحاسيس بالانكسار وبذل الحصار. ولكنها في الوقت عينه، وأمام عجزي عن مواجهة الطرق المسدودة في لبنان وبالرغم من إدراكي لاثمان معرفة الحقيقة الباهظة، فهي جعلتني انتفض على حصاري وعلى انكساري وعلى نفسي وعلى كل اللبنانيين المتموضعين في الخنادق الطائفية والمذهبية والخارجية والداخلية لأواجه الظلم اللاحق بالشعب اللبناني ولأقول لنفسي:

ليس في لبنان ديكتاتور كبن علي ومعظم زملائه العرب (الذين لم يسقطوا بعد) ولكنه في لبنان ديكتاتوريات قادرة أن تضع الشعب اللبناني في خندق واحد في مواجهة: الفوضى والفقر والبطالة والارتهان للخارج، وفي إسقاط ديكتاتور الطوائف الأكبر الذي يتسلط على رقاب المواطنين!

فأليست هذه الأسباب بالوافية والكفيلة لتوحد اللبنانيين في ثورتهم جميعاُ؟

Lebanon: The Clash of Narratives

By Joseph El-Khoury

If the leaked New TV Hariri recordings reveal anything, it is the extent of the rift between the Lebanese. Since 2005, two narratives have evolved in parallel with no intersection points, even during periods of intense crisis or external aggression, such as in July 2006. Given any political development, half the country is almost guaranteed to reach an opposite interpretation and draw different conclusions from the other half. Concomitantly there is a dehumanising process in full motion of the other, initially the politician belonging to the other camp, but which is rapidly extending to the ordinary supporter or member of a religious sect. Lebanon is not alien to this process, which mirrors the sequence of events from the late 1960s and the growing conflict around the Palestinian resistance and culminated with the non-discriminatory sectarian killings of 1976. It is not unusual to hear in a Beirut salon the total denigration of Hariri as morally corrupt in pervasive sense of the word: financially, politically and...Sexually. In another salon, Michel Aoun, who gathers the unwavering support of a significant constituency among the Maronite Christian population, is called a ‘nutter’ with references to a supposed mental imbalance and psychiatric illness. There are very few individuals capable of escaping this narrow-minded classification of all things Lebanese into two camps: March 8th and March 14th, Pro-resistance and anti-Hezbollah, pro- Iranian and pro-American, in essence Good and Evil (not in any particular order).

Even the latest events in Tunis were adopted by both camps as a vindication of their respective struggles. Those excitable elements within the March 14th forces that still believe in a democratic offensive led by the US department of State (or the Pentagon when the former falters) twinned it with their Cedar revolution. In their enthusiasm they omitted to mention the admiration that French and American administrations held for the Ben Ali regime until he made the request to land his plane in Paris-CDG en route to exile. Their counterparts in the pro-Resistance camp saw it as an extension of their anti-imperialist struggle against all things foreign while happily gathering support from other undemocratic Middle Eastern regimes in Iran, Syria and Qatar. Many tried to draw more intelligent comparisons between the two developing stories in Beirut and Tunis with little success. Yes both countries are part of the Arab league and marred by corruption, foreign influence and underdevelopment but Tunisia is a country with a homogenous population and no minorities. Its recent involvement in the Israeli-Arab struggle has been an emotional one and its importance in the geo-strategic quagmire of the Middle East is peripheral. Lebanon is by all measures a more complicated affair. The most obvious question would be which Lebanon would have to rise up and against which heads of state?

I get asked a lot about my solutions for the Lebanese problem, given that I spent a significant amount of time lamenting the absence of a political movement able to challenge the structural flaws in the Lebanese system. I still believe that bold grass-root work motivated by clear democratic, secular and socially responsible principles would be a winning formula. Interestingly, one element that could explain the success in toppling the regime in Tunis is the presence of an active secular left-leaning opposition with influence within the middle classes. The Islamist movement, although active, did not appear to have taken a leading role in the uprising. I might be wrong and the days to come will reveal the full picture.

Lebanon's self-induced paralysis

By Karl Sharro

Published with permission from Karlremarks.

Firstly, the significance of latest ‘crisis’ to hit the Lebanese political system following the resignation of 11 cabinet ministers yesterday, and the de facto resignation of the cabinet that ensued, should be properly understood. The Lebanese confessional system appears to be exhibiting the symptoms of the law of diminishing returns: in the past this system used to function for a couple of decades in between major crises. This cycle how now been shortened to two years. By any objective measure, this system has now completely exhausted itself. Nevertheless, a viable alternative remains conspicuously absent.

Secondly, it is important to observe how both sides across the political divide have contrived to arrive at a standstill, purposefully avoiding taking decisions that would avert a crisis. It seems that both March 8 and March 14 were content to leave the country in a state of political vacuum in anticipation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s awaited indictment in the case of the assassination of late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Rather than seeing this complacency for the stark abdication of responsibility that it is, many voices assert that either side ‘must know something we don’t know.’ This twisted political logic must be confronted.

The evidence: Prime Minister Saad Hariri and his political allies have effectively paralysed the cabinet for months now, for fear of a confrontation with the ‘cabinet opposition’ over the ‘false witnesses’ issue. Hariri extended his stay outside Lebanon at a time of turmoil, leaving his allies and supporters in a state of confusion and disarray. His presence in the US during this week reinforced the notion that the US was behind scuppering the long-awaited Syrian-Saudi deal that was expected to absorb the impact of the STL indictment. While I remain completely opposed to any outside intervention, be it Syrian, Saudi or American, Hariri’s behaviour seemed to indicate that he is placing his confidence in the US instead of other regional powers. No matter what the explanation is, this is not strong leadership.

The opposition: the cabinet resignations were the least disruptive option they could have chosen. I don’t mean this in a good way. Hezbollah and its allies are victims of their own high-pitched rhetoric: having agitated for so long and so vocally over the STL they were forced to ‘do something’ when the Syrian-Saudi deal fell apart. As it happens, they deliberately chose a course of action that instead of forcing a resolution would now ensure a protracted process of wrangling and accompanying political paralysis. They have wisely avoided street demonstrations, for now, as these would be likely to lead to violent confrontations in the current tense climate, but they had other options they could have exercised.

The ‘big unknown’ now is where does Walid Jumblatt stand exactly. The reason of course is that his 11-memeber parliamentary block could swing the parliamentary majority from one side to the other. As it happened, Jumblatt seems to be still negotiating a space in the middle, for the time being, his ministers did not resign yesterday despite his assertions that he is now firmly back in the Syrian camp. This is not a detail: we now have a parliament that is ambiguous in its constitution. Neither camp can claim legitimacy under these circumstances. Typically, the voice of the citizens is the first thing to be suspended in a time of a crisis.

Had the opposition had more self-purpose and clarity, they should have forced Jumblatt to choose sides and speed up the resolution of this crisis. The first option they had was to force a motion of no-confidence and bring down the government in the parliament. Despite the language used yesterday, this would have been the ‘democratic and constitutional’ option, not their weak mass resignations. Furthermore, they should have then used the parliamentary majority that Jumblatt would supply to govern on their own, nominating their own Prime Minister. Instead, they will now start a protracted process of arriving at a suitable replacement for Hariri while the country remains in limbo.

Typically, most of the analysis I’ve come across has focused on the minutiae of the situation, remaining oblivious to the fact that we’re in a system that cannot guarantee stability for more than a few months at a time. This is a self-induced crisis orchestrated by the political classes for lack of any real vision or sense of purpose, action through inaction. Attempts at rationalising this behaviour through tactical justifications are entertaining but meaningless diversions. The system itself is failing, and neither camp can be trusted to propose an alternative. Can we see this abdication of responsibility for what it is?

Look at the situation again: the Lebanese confessional leaders are failing to resolve their differences through their respective chaperons, but meanwhile they are content to suspend democratic mechanism and more importantly the voice of the citizens. (The ambiguous parliament). I suppose dissolving the parliament and having new elections so we know at least where we stand would be out of the question? The self-induced paralysis it is, then.

A Scandalous Lack of Scandal: Why Wikileaks failed to impress in Lebanon

By Karl Sharro 

Republished with permission from Karlremarks

First things first: the attacks that brought down Al-Akhbar newspaper’s website today are a despicable action that is as pointless as it is stupid. Firstly, any hope of stemming the flow of information on the internet is a delusion and secondly those attacks will only reinforce the idea that the leaked information that Al-Akhbar published should be repressed. To me, freedom of speech in the Arab world is much more important than political disagreements and we should all support Al-Akhbar against those attacks.

Many people got really excited when Al-Akhbar started publishing the material it obtained from Wikileaks, predicting ‘catastrophe or even worse’ as I read somewhere. Such predictions reveal the astounding level of naivety that characterises many ‘commentators’ today, particularly the younger generation of bloggers who seem to be far more immersed in the online world that nurtured Wikileaks than in Lebanese politics. The real surprise is that some seasoned observers would make the same mistake of transferring the Hollywood world of Wikileaks to the Lebanese context.

For example, the general director of Al-Akhbar Ibarhim Al-Amin ‘wondered critically why Hezbollah has been silent regarding the scandal of Ilyas Murr in Wikileaks’, as As’ad Abu Khalil put it. If you have been living in a nuclear bunker for the past few weeks, the documents published in Al-Akhbar revealed that the Minister of Defence and Deputy PM Murr had given advice to Israel through American representatives on how to conduct an upcoming confrontation with Hezbollah, in addition to several other ‘juicy’ revelations. Al-Amin picked up on Murr hinting to the Americans that Imad Mughniyeh, a Hezbollah military leader who was assassinated in Damascus, masterminded the political assassinations of March 14 members. Al-Amin ended his article with a pertinent question about Hezbollah’s position regarding the leaks.

But what are the revelations exactly? Lebanese leaders conspire against each other with foreign powers? Big surprise! This has been going on since the country was established, and everyone knows it. In fact, given the routine accusations of treason and the usual conspiracy scenarios, some of the politicians came out looking a bit less conspiratorial than the public would have normally assumed. The suggestion that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is politicised? Did we need the leaks to figure out that it was designed as a tool for political revenge and a stick with which to beat Syria?

But the real surprise to me is that so many observers still fail to comprehend the nature and limits of sectarian politics in Lebanon. The confessional system is based on mutual mistrust, it’s predisposed a priori towards the institutionalisation of suspicion. This is expressed in all the arrangements that mediate the relationships between the large confessions and that control power-sharing. But the system can only function under a veneer of politeness that decrees that these antagonisms should never be expressed in public and should always be referred to metaphorically. Thus, we must all pretend that the May 7 events were not a blatant sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites, as you could easily find out on Youtube, but a ‘political’ conflict.

These well-nurtured relationships of mutual suspicion have always served to reinforce the power of confessional leaders, bringing them to the surface would in a curious way undermine this form of authority. Once the masks fall, there would be no way of managing those relationships through politics and the only option becomes war. Thus, when Al-Amin asks Hezbollah to recognise the leaks and act on them he’s asking for Hezbollah to wage war. Thankfully, Hezbollah’s leadership has the wisdom to avoid such a prospect.

Furthermore, those who expected the leaks to have a bigger impact have underestimated the extent to which the ‘solution’ to the STL indictment dilemma has now been handed over to the Saudis and the Syrians. The Lebanese factions have little control over this process now, aside from their ‘wish lists’ that they have left with their guardians in Damascus and Riyadh. Nothing else can explain the complicity of both political camps to maintain the current internal inertia in the face of the pressing urgency of this political impasse. We will no doubt a new distribution of roles once the dust has settled, ushering in a new era of externally-sponsored coexistence. The scandal here is not the leaks, but the miserable inability of Lebanese leaders to sort out their own problems.

But there’s a wider problem here that concerns the leaks themselves. Despite all the excited buzz we’re hearing about ‘the truth’, the leaks are not the truth. They are how American diplomats view the world. That in itself is not the truth about anything. Information on its own does not become a truth unless placed within a coherent narrative about what their meaning and significance is. Such narrative has been remarkable in its absence in this case. This is not to say that they should not be made public, but the mere fact of making them public on its own does not make them relevant without a coherent narrative.

And it’s in this last aspect that Al-Akhbar has failed to use the leaks in a meaningful way, it merely replicated what Wikileaks did on a smaller scale. Even the layout of the leaks page on Al-Akhbar resembled a shopping website instead of a newspaper: masses of data categorised for easy consumption. In its eagerness to modernise, Al-Akhbar has tended to replicate uncritically trends in the Leftist Western press at the expense of engaging with the Lebanese political context. It would do well to question its political affiliations in this scandal-resistant nation and perhaps look more critically at the events of the last few years. We have enough information to make judgements about Lebanese politics; what we lack is the principled stance not the data.

In solidarity, critically, with Al-Akhbar.