Lessons from Syria

Jade Salhab

There are two parts to this brilliant article by Beesaan el Shaikh in Al Hayat (Arabic) which I believe is an imperative read for anyone interested in the Arab uprising.

The first part of the article uses the tragedies generated by the revolution as a very compelling argument NOT to support it. The second part, near the end, turns the argument around making a simple but slam-dunk case for the revolution.

I want to use the first part to rephrase a position I expressed in the very beginning of this revolution, days before the first Assad speech and the subsequent violent turn of the uprising: I expressed then my hope that Assad would do the wise thing and grab the opportunity to reform the regime by himself, because that was the only transition that would avoid destroying Syria, or handing it to Islamic extremists.

I was naïve in my hopes, obviously. But I believe that hope is a moral imperative. I knew then, like all those who lived through Lebanon's civil war, that no matter where it happens on this earth, or why, or how legitimate, when an uprising turns into an armed rebellion, there is absolutely no controlling of the damage it can make to the structure of society and its ability to recuperate post conflict (think Iraq, Lebanon, but also Salvador, Tchetchnia, or Sri Lanka more globally).

The unspeakable price of civil violence in terms of social dismantling (even more so than the toll on human life and heritage), is why I still believe that any people who has regime change in progress (i.e Tunisia, Egypt) - or in perspective (i.e Jordan, Morocco, or the Gulf in the coming 5 to 15 years) - must bend itself backwards twice, maybe thrice, before engaging in violent struggle, or violent ‘defense of the achieved revolution’ – as opposed to radically peaceful rebellion or political compromise.

One of the reasons I respect Moaz el Khatib so deeply is his awareness of this fact, and his courage to remain constantly open to compromise with the regime for the sake of ending violence – because he knows that no matter how high the price of such compromise is, it will always be lower than the one of sustained violence.

Don’t get me wrong, just like Beesaan el Sheikh says in her article, I believe that there is no choice BUT to support the Syrian revolution because it is the only legitimate and humanly acceptable path forward. But I certainly hope that idealists learn the lesson and understand that wars are, under all circumstances, unwinnable: because even by winning them, we destroy the basic social infrastructure that makes that victory worth anything.

This might sound obvious to some, but the consequence is less so: only a slower transition, or a stubbornly peaceful uprising can come at a lower cost.

I want to end by drawing a relevance to Tunisia and Egypt: compromise is a high price you might need to pay to avoid the higher price of a torn society. And if compromise is impossible (and it should take a lot before you get to this conclusion), than maintain your struggle peaceful at all cost (i.e no military repression of ‘medieval forces’). The alternative is worse than you can ever imagine or calculate.

Difficult Conversations: Syria as seen from Lebanon

Joseph El-Khoury

Few Lebanese can pretend to be fully objective when it comes to events in Syria. The emotional baggage from the 'Pax Syriana', the infamous Status quo imposed by the Assad's regime on the country, still runs deep in the Lebanese psyche bringing significant bias to any cold-hearted analysis.

From the mid 1980s onwards the Syrian regime through its instruments of domination and deception determined the balance of power between the various religious sects; and also within these sects.  The winners and losers from this orderly distribution of musical chairs that followed the chaos of the civil war are the same principal actors of the current political stage, characterised by the confrontation between March 8th and the March 14th alliances (pro- and anti-Hezbollah respectively). Ever since that fateful day in 1976 when troops under the banner of the Arab dissuasion forces rolled across the border at Masnaa, we have had a pro-Syrian camp and an anti-Syrian one. Neutrality was not an option, and contrary to the politically correct discourse, it is that dichotomy that trumps all others, including the divergence of position vis-a-vis Israel and the Palestinians.

And Syria; from Lebanon; for all intent and purposes is Assad's Syria; with its figures, its slogans and its modus operandi.

My compatriots can pretend, on both sides of the argument, that their interest in the future of Syria is primarily motivated by a sense of justice and deep empathy for those dying in  the uprising that has raged on in March 2011. Te truth is that their position on this matter is neither selfless nor shaped by facts. For most Lebanese It is pre-established and unshakeable.

Personally, I am from that generation that was at the receiving end of that mixture of humiliation, pain and fear that simply won’t go away; and invariably I seek some form of retribution. Still, which opinion is not shaped by personal experience; and who can argue with a straight face that it is unreasonable to wish for the demise of the Baath regime or at least a radical overhaul?  My position is unashamedly based on its track record since 1970, not March 2011, in Syria and also in Lebanon. For me, it avoids the distraction of arguing over whether the demonstrators in Deraa were armed infiltrators who shot first or those in Homs are trained Jihadists with Salafi ambitions.

Even if Assad can claim support among sections of the population, including minorities and the business classes, his assessment sheet should make disappointing reading for any outsider sympathisers. With the threat of an Islamic Emirate internally and the challenge of an Arab-Western a coalition externally, after 40 years of totalitarian rule a self proclaimed secular progressive regime has failed at delivering its socialism, freedom and unity; at home and abroad.


As for us Lebanese; the neighborhood is changing and a radical adjustment is on the cards.

Why Syria’s Christians Should Not Support the Assad Regime

Elie Elhadj*

At the Dormition of Our Lady Greek Catholic cathedral in Old Damascus, Father Elias Debii raises his hands to heaven and prays for divine protection for embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Bishop Philoxenos Mattias, a spokesman for the Syriac Orthodox Church said: “We are with the government and against these movements that oppose it”.

Those among Syria's Christian clerics and civic leaders who publicly support the Asad regime are short sighted. They are courting long-term disaster for themselves and their congregations. Why? Because, the Asad regime will not remain in power forever; it is immoral to support non-representative unjust rule; the Asad clan’s exploitation of Sunni Islam has emboldened Islamism and thwarted the development of secularism in Syria; and because scaremongering for blackmail legitimacy will not work forever. The following explains each reason.

The Asad regime will not remain in power forever

Since the March 8, 1963 military coup d’état against the democratically elected parliament and government of President Nazim al-Qudsi, an unelected minority of the Alawite Asad clan has been ruling Syria with an iron fist; notwithstanding, those seven uncontested referendums for the two Asad presidents.

In addition to impoverishing Syria; despite billion of dollars in oil revenues, the regime has committed horrific atrocities—extra-judicial killings of hundreds of Muslim Brothers detainees in the Palmyra prison in 1980, mass murder in 1982 of between 3,000 citizens, according to the regime’s apologists, and 38,000 in the city of Hama, let alone the torture of residents at the slightest suspicion and the disappearance of opponents. The killing of more than 1,000 demonstrators during the seven weeks since the March 26, 2011 popular uprising adds to the regime's grim catalogue of human rights violations.

Such a system of governance is unsustainable. It cannot last forever. When the day of reckoning will come, the support that certain priests and civic leaders had given to the regime will place all Christians in danger.

It cannot be predicted when the Asad regime might fall. However, should the demonstrations become larger and spread to downtown Damascus and Aleppo, the demonstrators could overwhelm the security forces; rendering a Hama or a Palmyra type atrocity impossible. If the demonstrations get bigger, more Sunni clerics would join the uprising. Ultimately, even the Sunni palace ulama could turn against their benefactor president.

There is no love lost between Sunnis and Alawites on a religious level. Accommodation between the Asad regime and Sunni palace ulama is a matter of convenience. Orthodox Sunnis regard Alawites as heretics. Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), condemned the Alawites as being more dangerous than the Christians, and encouraged Muslims to conduct jihad against them. Likewise, Alawites despise Sunnis. To Alawites, the howls of jackals that can be heard at night are the souls of Sunni Muslims calling their misguided co-religionists to prayer.

If parts of the army, which is a conscripted institution, would refuse killing demonstrators or if the army would stand up to the republican guards and the intelligence brigades, then the regime might very well collapse.

It is immoral to support non-representative unjust rule

That leading priests of certain Syrian churches publicly support the Asad dictatorship does not reflect well on the sense of justice, morality, or benevolence of the priests. It is not very Christian for priests to abandon their duty to stand up to oppression, corruption, and injustice.

There might be an argument in favour of tolerating an illegitimate dictatorship if the dictator were benevolent. But, Mr. Asad’s dictatorship is neither legitimate nor benevolent.

For some priests and civic leaders to publicly embrace short-term convenience and abandon long-term security and defense of justice and human rights can be very expensive for the Christian community as a whole. Syria’s Sunni majority will forever remember Christians’ support of Mr. Asad’s misrule. A thousand years later, the memories of Christian and Alawite support of the Crusades are still vivid in the collective consciousness of Sunnis.

The Asad clan’s exploitation of Sunni Islam emboldened Islamism and impeded the development of secularism in Syria

Islamism has been gaining strength over the recent decades, thanks to the Asad clan’s strategy of exploiting Sunni Islam to prolong their hold on power.

That the regime and its apologists and propagandists describe Mr. Asad’s rule as ”secular” is an exaggeration, if not false. The Asad regime is neither secular nor sincere in its promotion of the Sunni creed. Since their seizure of absolute power more than four decades ago, the Asad government did not secularize Syria in the slightest. Syria of 2011 is no less Islamic than Syria of 1963.

Exploiting Sunni Islam, together with the excesses of the ruling elite, corruption, abuse of human rights, poverty, and unemployment have been driving increasing numbers of young men and women to extremism. The longer this situation continues, the more fertile the ground will become for Islamism to grow.

Here is how the Asad dynasty has been impeding the development of secularism in Syria and exploiting Sunni Islam.

Article 3.1 of the Syria constitution makes Islam the necessary religion of the president. Christians are barred from the country’s highest political office. Article 3.2 makes Islam as “a main source” of legislation.

Seventh century Shari’a laws and courts are in force in personal status, family, and inheritance affairs (Christians follow their own archaic religious courts). Shari’a law is the antithesis of the liberal laws of the modern age. It denies women legal rights compared with Muslim men. It impinges on women’s human rights. Shari’a law reduces the status of women to that of chattel—a Muslim man can marry four wives, divorce any one of them without giving reason (with limited child custody rights, housing, or alimony), a Muslim woman is prohibited from marrying a non-Muslim man while the Muslim man is allowed to marry non-Muslim women, a woman cannot pass her nationality on to her foreign husband and children while the man can, “honour killing” of a woman by a male relative results in a light sentence for murder, and two women equal one man in legal testimony, witness, and inheritance. Such maltreatment of one half of Syria’s society is in spite of the regime’s energetic attempts to project an image of secularism, modernity, and equality between the genders.

The Islamic curriculum in Syria’s elementary, middle, and high schools teaches Muslim Sunni Islam regardless of the Islamic sect to which they belong. The textbooks are discriminatory, divisive, and intolerant of non-Muslims.

More mosques, bigger congregations, and more veiled women than ever before have become the order of the day in Syrian cities. To flaunt his Islamic credentials, President Bashar Asad even ordered a special rain prayer throughout Syria's mosques performed on December 10, 2010 in order for God to send rain.

Following the March 2011 violent demonstrations, Mr. Asad acted to gain support from the Sunni palace ulama and mollify the Sunni street. The popular Sunni cleric Muhammad Saiid al-Bouti praised Mr. Asad’s response to many of the requests submitted by a number of Sunni clerics. In his weekly religious program on April 5, 2011 on Syrian government television, Sheikh al-Bouti applauded Mr. Asad’s permission to allow niqab-wearing (black face cover) female teachers; transferred in July 2010 to desk duties, to return to classrooms. Sheikh al-Bouti had attributed the drought in December 2010 to the transfer from classrooms of the niqab-wearing female teachers. Sheikh al-Bouti also praised Mr. Asad for the formation of the Sham Institute for Advanced Shari’a Studies and Research, and for the establishment of an Islamic satellite television station dedicated to proclaiming the message of true Islam. Also, the first and only casino, which had enraged orthodox clerics when it opened on New Year’s Eve, was closed as well.

Why exploit Islam and fight secularism?

To rule Sunni dominated Syria, it would be helpful to the Asad clan to uphold the influence of Sunni Islam instead of wading in the muddy waters of Shari’a reform and secularization, even if that meant throwing the Baath Party’s constitution away.

Islam is helpful to Muslim rulers. Not only in Syria, other Arab regimes (except Lebanon and Tunisia) exploit Islam to stay in power. Islam demands obedience of Muslims to the Muslim ruler.

The Quran, the Prophetic Sunna, and opinions of famous jurists enjoin Muslims to obey the Muslim ruler blindly. In 4:59, the Quran orders: “Obey God and obey God’s messenger and obey those of authority among you.” Answering how a Muslim should react to a ruler who does not follow the true guidance, the Prophet reportedly said, according to Sahih Muslim: “He who obeys me obeys God; he who disobeys me, disobeys God. He who obeys the ruler, obeys me; he who disobeys the ruler, disobeys me.” Abi Da’ud (d. 888) and Ibn Maja (d. 886) quote the Prophet as imploring Muslims to hear and obey the ruler, even if he were an Ethiopian slave. Al-Bukhari (d. 870) quotes similar traditions. The palace ulama invoke one thousand year old opinions of famous jurists such as Al-Ghazali (1058-1111), Ibn Jama’a (1241-1333), and Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328). These men taught that the Muslim ruler must be obeyed blindly because even an unjust ruler is better than societal unrest.

Syria’s palace ulama threaten the Muslim faithful with eternal damnation if they fail to obey Mr. Asad (waliy al-amr). In the hands of the Asad clan, Islam has become a psychological weapon supplementing a brutal security machine.

Scaremongering for Blackmail legitimacy will not work forever

That certain priests and civic leaders subscribe to unsubstantiated scaremongering regarding future Islamist/salafi persecution of Christians is unwise. Those in the Christian community who warn of the slaughter awaiting Christians if the Asad regime collapses fall for the regime’s Machiavellian practice of blackmail legitimacy. Neither historical precedence nor credible evidence today supports such scare tactics. Blackmail legitimacy, like the crying-wolf syndrome, does not work forever.

Islamists/salafis who might harbor violent intentions against Christians are a tiny minority of Syria’s 23-million population. There are no accurate statistics or opinion polls to suggest otherwise. Syria’s Islamists/salafis are not representative of Syria’s Sunnis. The great majority of Syria’s Sunnis, around 75% of the population, are moderate Muslims who have lived rather harmoniously with their fellow Christians for centuries.

During the first 15 years of independence and until the advent of the Asad clan, Syria’s Christians enjoyed peace and shared whatever prosperity was available at that time with the Sunni majority. The suggestion that Syria’s Sunnis would kill Syria’s Christians is malicious misinformation to divide and rule. The regime’s media, apologists, and propagandists who circulate such stories are wicked. Those who believe such tales are naive. Syria’s Christian minority’s best interest could not be separate from the interest of the Sunni majority.

That the options to Syrians today are reduced to either accepting the current poor state of affairs or contend with an Islamist/salafi rule; even civil war, is blackmail used by the regime to perpetuate its monopoly on power and avoid genuine reform. That genuine reform is not an option does not bode well for the country. That President Asad insisted in his address to the parliament on March 30, 2011 that Syria’s protesters had been “duped” into damaging the nation on behalf of its enemies, and his infamous billionaire cousin, Rami Makhlouf, stated in an interview with The New York Times that, “Syria will fight protests till ‘the end’” spell danger to all Syrians. Like a pressure cooker, the longer a dictatorship stays in power the more violent the end will be.

Sunnis, like Christians, are threatened by Islamist/salafi ideology, violence, and seventh century way of life. While systematic long-term persecution of Christians by Sunnis will not happen in Syria, acts of revenge by extremist groups might occur during the chaotic days of a popular revolt against; not only Alawites and Christians, but also against non-Christian supporters of the Asad clan altogether.

To spare Syria a potential catastrophe, Mr. Asad should institute a comprehensive and genuine political reforms, in particular; multi-party parliament and contested presidential elections. Scaremongering priests can help. They must desist from misinformation and hypocrisy. They ought to become honest to the teaching of their churches. They should defend legitimacy, justice, and the rule of law.

Wise men and women; Alawites, Christians, and Sunnis must council the president and his immediate family that genuine reform; not cosmetic retouches, not the use of the tank, is the only way forward.

Hafiz Asad and his son, Bashar, have saddled the Alawite community plus the regime’s supporting groups with a terrible burden, a potential disaster. The Asad family must understand that four decades of misrule are kifaya.

Bashar Asad has a rare opportunity today to become the leader who saved Syria from a frightening future. Would he? Or, indeed, can he?

 

*Dr Elie Elhadj, born in Syria, is a veteran international banker. He was Chief Executive Officer of Arab National Bank in Saudi Arabia during most of the 1990s. Upon early retirement, he received a Ph.D. from London University's School of Oriental and African Studies. He writes on Middle Eastern and Islamic affairs. www.daringopinion.com

For more information follow the link to his website

Calculation Mistake

Dr Bassem Hassan

Picture this:

You are a 16 year-old high school student. It’s Friday morning, second period… Algebra. The teacher walks in and gives that pop quiz he’s been promising all week: a sheet of paper with a one-line question on it. You take one look at it and realize that you will solve this in 10 minutes tops. You know this. You’ve got it. You WILL ace this quiz!

Monday morning. You get the quiz back and to your horror, you got a failing grade! You cannot believe it. What went wrong? You were absolutely convinced that you did it correctly. You followed the tried and true method. Step by step, one equation after the other. There is NOTHING wrong here. You go to the teacher and you ask what you did wrong and he points you to the second line where you made this small, but significant, calculation mistake which rendered everything that came after it a series of errors, culminating in the wrong answer.

That is exactly what the Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad has done with his decision to violently repress the pro-democracy protests in his country. He has made a small, but significant, calculation mistake and all what will follow from it will yield all the wrong answers. The Syrian regime was in an enviable position relative to its counterparts in other Arab countries. The vast majority of the protesters on the streets of Syrian cities were not calling for the president to step down, nor even for the regime to change. Even some of the major opposition intellectuals in Syria and abroad clearly stated they were willing to work with the young president to institute much needed reforms, as long as he was willing to engage in genuine and deep reforms, and initiate the process quickly. Syrians were asking to live in a more free, transparent and responsive political system. They were asking for a clamp down on corruption and for their basic economic needs to be met. They just wanted to live in dignity and some measure of political freedom. When seen from this perspective the response of the regime is grossly exaggerated and unnecessarily violent. Such a bloody, brutal, response to such relatively modest demands - by comparison to Egypt for instance - can only mean that the regime is excessively paranoid. It also might suggest that major elements within the regime feel directly threatened by any demand for greater freedom, or perhaps more importantly, clamp down on corruption.

Thus, Bashar Al-Assad chose oppression over dialogue and in that he has made his calculation mistake. He used all the right equations from the dictatorship handbook. He is applying them with all the tried and true methods. Yet, once your initial calculation is in error, the answer will be wrong. The calculation error lies in the fact that the Syrian president is neglecting two major issues. First, this is a genuine popular revolt, not an insurrection by militants. Had he responded positively and openly, he would have won the support of his people. As it stands, even if the security forces manage to oppress the uprising for now, the regime, as well as the president himself, have lost any remaining legitimacy in the eyes of the Syrian people. This means that the rest of his rule will have to rely even more heavily on oppressive measures, making him even more beholden to the old guard and security chiefs within his regime, and making another uprising that much more likely. Second, by oppressing the popular civilian uprising, he in fact strengthens, not weakens, the more fundamentalist elements within Syria and forces the moderates to go underground. Thus, even if there were to be no more popular uprisings, the regime risks dealing with an armed rebellion or even civil war in the not so distant future.

Just like the student in our metaphor, Bashar Al-Assad had a choice and had the time to carefully consider his options and revise his calculations before handing in his decision. Alas, by choosing violent oppression over dialogue, security over democracy, and oligarchy over social justice, he has made a calculation mistake… one that will ensure that whatever answer he arrives at will be the wrong one.

"الشعب السوري واحد "

داليا عبيد_باحثة

لم يشأ الشعب السوري البقاء بعيداً عما أصاب أو يصيب المنطقة من تحولات ولم يَرْضَ أن يبقى مكتوف الأيدي عن إعادة رسم تاريخ جديد للعالم العربي. فانتفض هذا الشعب مثلما انتفض قبله الشعب التونسي، مطلق الشرارة الأولى في عام 2011 ومن بعده الشعب المصري والليبي واليمني والبحريني. دمر السوريون الشجعان مملكة الصمت بعد عقود من الإذلال والخوف والبطش والحرمان وإتباع نظام البعث سياسة التدجين ، سياسة أسفرت عن تجذر الرعب في أنفس السوريين مقيمين في الداخل أو مغتربين في الخارج لدرجة السكوت التام أمام استشراء الفساد والتمييز بين المواطنين واستخدام السلطة القمعية واستمرار الأحكام العرفية وارتكاب المجازر في المدن السورية ومثابرة النظام الجاهدة على الاعتقالات السياسية وإلغاء لكل الحريات العامة والخاصة والسعي الى ترسيخ كل أساليب انتهاك حقوق الشعب السوري المخالف لشرعة حقوق الإنسان خلال أكثر من نصف قرن.

لكن سوريا اليوم ليست كما سوريا الأمس، فقد تحولت طرقاتها وشوارعها وحاراتها وأزقتها وبيوتها إلى مساحات نابضة بدماء التحرر من آداب العبودية . وقد أراد هذا الشعب الذي يعيش حالياً في صلب الحرية الحمراء أن يخرج سوريا من باب الاستثناء وينشلها من غياهب التاريخ ليعيدها إلى داخل السياق العالمي الحالي.

لم يهدأ "نبض" درعا الصامد الذي فتح الجرح على مصراعيه انطلاقا من جنوب الوطن إلى قلبه المنتفض في وجه طغيان البعث. ولم ينبض الشارع السوري وحده في الداخل بل نبضت معه شوارع أجنبية تحتضن مغتربين سوريين هاجروا قسراً أو اختياراً طلباً لعيشة كريمة ضمن إطار ديمقراطيات تعترف تطبيقاً بشرعة حقوق الإنسان. إلى القارتين الأوروبية والأميركية هاجروا، منهم من أتوا للدراسة وبقوا حيث هم ومنهم من هربوا كلاجئين سياسيين بسبب معارضتهم للنظام الحاكم منذ عام 1963 ومنهم من قدموا بطريقة غير شرعية. واعرف الكثير من الذين وصلوا إلى لندن عبر البواخر من "ضيع" اللاذقية وعملوا في العتمة من اجل إرسال الأموال إلى الأهل في ضيعهم الموءودة بأياد قاتلة.

في شوارع باريس شهدت على مظاهرات الجالية السورية التي قررت مع الداخل السوري بأن العودة إلى الوراء مستحيلة.، فنزلوا إلى الشارع نصرة لقضيتهم، نصرة للأمل بالعودة نهائياً إلى أرض وطن لم يولدوا فيه أحراراً ولم يهاجروا منه أحراراً.

لمظاهرات باريس نكهة خاصة ووقفة تأمل استثنائية، ففي السنوات الماضية لطالما دعت المعارضة السورية في العاصمة الفرنسية إلى اعتصامات من اجل إطلاق سراح معتقلي الرأي ومن اجل وقف انتهاك حقوق الإنسان ومن اجل كل الظروف التي تم ذكرها أعلاه والتي لم تتغير , ولكن لم تكن تقتصر هذه النشاطات إلا على حفنة من "يساريين لبنانيين" وعدد قليل من المعارضين السوريين المنفيين حيث تخطى معظمهم عمر الكهولة بالإضافة إلى عدد اكبر من رجال المخابرات المدسوسين وسط الجالية السورية في فرنسا. مما دفع المناضلين السوريين إلى الشعور بعزلة كبرت مع الزمن وهم يصرخون من المهجر ومن داخل ثنايا غرف التعذيب السورية. أما وقد تغيرت المعطيات في المنطقة وفي العالم، فلم يرد السوريون ان تهزمهم العزلة وسط رياح التغيير في العالم العربي، ليتحول صمت الجالية السورية القاسي إلى صيحة غضب مطالبة برحيل السجان. فقد لاحت لمكوناتها تباشير الأمان حين سقط جدار الخوف إلى غير رجعة.

إلى فناء حقوق الإنسان في التروكاديرو الباريسية، وصلت الأعلام السورية وصور الديكتاتور ولافتات تطالب برحيله وبرحيل حاشيته وبالخلاص من المخابرات ولافتات أخرى تريد فتح صفحة جديدة للشعب السوري بكافة طوائفه ومكوناته وبناء دولة حق وقانون. لافتات حملها صبايا وشباب جامعات لم ينقطعوا يوماً عن زيارة سوريا. أتوا ليصرخوا ملأ حناجرهم بأنهم يريدون إسقاط الصمت وفاء للوطن المطعون في عنفوانه. وقد ازدادت أعداد المتظاهرين على مراحل (مع تقدم الوقت) فكلما انتفض بيت جديد في سوريا، ينتفض صوت جديد في باريس ليزيل الغبار عن أوتار حنجرته المتهدجة أمام صرير الزنازين.

لم تكن رؤيتي لتواجد الشباب الكثيف والمتصاعد بالمفاجأة المفرحة الوحيدة بل استمديت سعادتي أيضا من عيون المعارضين السوريين الذين كانوا يستعيدون أحلامهم المسروقة. فلطالما تظاهرت معهم وسط وحدتهم وفي لحظات حزن كانت تجعل مشاركتي فولكلورية لتسجيل موقف في الصبر وانتظار المجهول. في فناء حقوق الإنسان، كان عميد المعارضين السوريين يطير مثل الفراشة موزعاً بيانات الحرية بيديه، يتنقل مزهوا حاضناً عيوننا السعيدة ومثبتاً نظره على هواتفنا التي كانت تنقل الصورة الحية مباشرة من ساحة التروكاديرو إلى الفايسبوك واليوتيوب وعبرهما إلى الداخل السوري والى العالم اجمع.

في فناء حقوق الإنسان، كانت عيون صديقي السوري المنفي زائغة ابتهاجاً. فهو لم يعد يتحدى عيون مدسوسين صاروا قلة وسط الحشود المتزايدة ولم يعد يبحث عنهم كما اعتاد أن يفعل حتى في أوقات تسوقه في شارع الريفولي ولن يعد يفكر أن يفتش مرتبكاً في أرجاء شققنا، كلما أتى لزيارتنا، عن احتمال وجود لأجهزة تنصت وذلك لاعتقاده بان عناصر الأمن السورية قد وصلت حتى إلى مساكن أصدقائه الباريسية.

في فناء حقوق الإنسان، وقف أصدقاء سمير قصير السوريين يتابعون عبر هواتفهم الخلوية أخباراً عن بداية حراك في ساحة الأمويين في الشام. فارتبكت مشاعرهم خلال لحظات مسرعة الخطى. فتراهم يبتسمون، يحزنون، يتنهدون ويشتاقون لرائحة الحرية في عيني رفيقهم الغائب ويتطلعون بشغف إلى أوان الورد الذي حان قطافه في دمشق.

في فناء حقوق الإنسان، ردد سوريون من كل الفئات العمرية ومن مختلف الانتماءات والمشارب صدى الداخل ورفعوا شعاراتهم. صرخوا جميعاً "سلمية سلمية"، هتفوا جميعاً " بدنا دولة مدنية" وشددوا على "واحد واحد واحد، الشعب السوري واحد" وصرخوا "خلص مخابرات" وتابعوا ب" الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام" الذي صار الشعار_الرمز للثورات العربية.

من هناك، من مساحة تنوعهم، بددوا الوهم الطائفي الذي يرسمه النظام، وهم الأغلبية السنية التي تسعى إلى تقويض دعائم حكم علوي ينفي فكرة تسطيره ضمن إطار الأقليات الحاكمة.

من هناك، طالبوا بعدم زرك قضيتهم الحالية ضمن إطار الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي فنضالهم لا يرتبط أدنى ارتباط بنصرة محور على محور بل بالسعي لتدمير قواعد أنظمة تتشابه في العالم العربي من المحيط إلى الخليج، هذه الأنظمة التي تعمل بخوف على شد حبال رأس النظام القابع في قصر المهاجرين.

من هناك رسموا صورة لنظام مستبد ترتعد لفكرة سقوطه فرائص إسرائيل المرتاحة لوضع حدودها الشمالية مع سوريا بأيد أمينة، وأكدوا انه ليس باستطاعتهم أن يكونوا مقاومين (إن أرادوا) قبل أن يكونوا أحراراً وديمقراطيين.

من هناك، قالوا لا للانتقائيين الجدد في لبنان وغيره الذين يرفعون انتفاضة ويسقطون انتفاضة زميلة، الذين ينددون بإراقة الدماء الشهيدة في بعض البلدان العربية ويصمتون عن دماء يبدو أنهم استرخصوها في مدن سوريا المشتعلة بنيران السلطات.

من هناك، قالوا لا للسلاح (سلمية سلمية)، رفضوا الممانعة التي تعمل ضد دخول سوريا الى الحاضر ومنه الى المستقبل، وفكروا بشهداء الانتفاضة الراحلين بقلوب نازفة فرددوا صدى كلمات نزار قباني:

"ولو فتحتم شراييني بمديتكم

سمعتم في دمي أصوات من راحوا"

ونظروا متأملين الى دمشق وقالوا:

"مزقي يا دمشق خارطة الذل

وقولي للـدهر كُن فيـكون"

Syria: from keystone to cornerstone

By Jade Salhab

You might dislike President Bachar el Assad but he is ironically the best-positioned person to steer a non-sectarian transition to democracy in Syria and the Arab world.

If there is anything we learned from the incredible cataclysm in the Middle East, it’s the following: the quest for freedom and dignity is a) universal and b) inevitable. Democracy - the natural offspring of this quest - can be postponed by oppression but it eventually strikes back… sometimes with a vengeance.

And this is precisely the problem.

As a young Lebanese political activist, I have seen first-hand how brutal the Syrian regime can get. It has managed to survive for twenty-five years by oppressing its people with an efficiency that the Stasi would have envied.

Among other techniques, being a member of the Alawite minority ruling over a Sunni majority, Assad’s father used the imposition of a secular state to protect his rule. In 1982, he went as far as bombarding Hamah – much like Gadhafi indented to do – killing 10,000 people in order to repress a conservative Sunni rebellion.

There is a real risk that today’s uprising against the Syrian regime converges into a vengeance against the secular state altogether. Much of the revolts taking place in Syria now are not lead by Tahrir Square-like modern youth, but by orthodox Sunni activists who are pursuing an embedded sectarian agenda. Will the young Assad use comparable violence to repress today’s Sunni rebels?

I doubt he will: he too learned from Egypt and Libya. But this puts us in a dilemma:

What if the success of these protesters leads to the breakout of a radicalized sectarian discourse in Syria? Will this favor true Arab democracy?

Let me be clear, I do not discount the legitimacy of the protester’s action, nor do I plead for the continuation of repression in any shape or form. But I do think that there is a real need, and a real chance, for a third way in Syria.

This third way lies in the hands of President Assad alone.

Bachar El Assad is a young potential reformer who has not (yet) been able to overcome the established authoritarian apparatus he inherited from his father. Despite early attempts, he was first forced to concede to the ways of a rigid and powerful establishment, with which he eventually became too comfortable. But the uprising in Tunisia and Egypt was a game-changer that made the Syrian regime face its unsustainability and provided the reformist instincts of the president with the tangible arguments he needed to counter his own establishment - and hesitation.

The young president has enough political capital with the majority of the Syrian people to propose a third way and stand up to both extremes – authoritarian apparatchiks and regressive Sunni conservatives. Indeed, the Syrian people need their President to lead them towards democracy without having to endure the havoc they are dreadfully observing around them.

As he attempts to find his way to democracy, however, the increased internal and external pressure might put president Assad on the defense again, preventing any ‘orderly transition’.

Two things need to happen for such a transition to still strive:

First, President Assad has to resolutely decide to implement radical democratic reforms without further delays or excuses. This carries a significant but inescapable risk: democracy would give a platform to both divisive sectarian movements and the separatist Kurdish one, which may complicate the building of a truly secular democratic state by undermining his agenda. Still, the president has to take this risk.

Second Assad needs to be accommodated by the international community who will have to choose to stand by him, not against him. To this extent, western policymakers will have to understand that a modern and democratizing Syria does not necessarily mean a pro-western, anti-Iranian Syria. Indeed, the west often confuses long-term interests with short-term politics: a democratic Syria is highly contagious to its neighborhood and could pretty quickly favor similar evolutions in Iran – let alone depriving it from a crucial ally. A democratic Syria, however, will not change it’s stance on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and should not be required to do so in return of western support of democratization. The west has to learn to accept democracies with which it disagrees: Syria is a good place to start.

If we dare to hope that the concerned leaders will act wisely, President Assad could reform his own pivotal autocratic regime, therefore removing a keystone from a shaking Middle Eastern order. He would, instead, turn Syria into the cornerstone of a new emancipated, sovereign and democratic Arab world.

Syria: Scenarios and Civil War

By Jihad Bitar

“Protests in Daraa-Syria”; When I read this ticker in my favorite news channel, I can’t honestly say I did not feel goose bumps. As a Lebanese, anything that happens in Syria directly affects my country and probably the entire geopolitical (dis)equilibrium that has characterised the Middle East since the last Israeli-Arab wars of 1973.

Four days after the Daraa spark, I counted twelve cities where unrest was happening. Busy with the very rare YouTube videos and the inevitable contradictory death toll, news channels forgot to analyze the essential question: what next for Syria, and what  about the impact on the region.

Syria is not Egypt and even less Tunisia. In these two North African countries, the revolts featured distinctive social demands: jobs, a future and freedom. In Syria, these three basic demands are complicated by an extra sectarian flavor. Syria’s 75% Sunni population is ruled by Bashar Al-Assad’s Alawites who make 10% of the population.

Social demands mixed with sectarian unrest ia a usual recipe for disaster: a special kind of one, civil war.

Daraa is an interesting city for the start of the revolution. It is close to Damascus, and its population is a mix of Sunni, Alawites and Druze. As anyone who has ever lived through civil war would tell you, trouble always starts within mixed areas which act as point of frictions: living side by side with the 'other' ferments jealousy, anger and hatred. Daraa exploded, Aleppo and Lattaquia followed; two other highly mixed cities. The Sunni citizens of these towns are usually more religious, and have more reasons to imitate their Egyptian and Tunisian Sunni “brothers”.

The first reaction of the regime has been to bring down to the streets the pro-Assad protesters, and contrary to Egypt’s Moubarak or Tunisia’s Ben Ali, the Syrian regime does have real supporters: the Assad’s own Alawites, but also most of Syria’s Christians and Shiite minorities. The Druze community- well advised by their cousins in Israel and Lebanon- will probably wait to see how things turn before taking a stand.

I remember long talks with my Syrian friends, telling me how many of the Alawites from Lattaquia for example, were armed by the regime, and how the roads between Sunni dominated cities and others were on purpose never fully operational: call it “trouble insurance”, but the regime has always been prepared for when that “Sunni” pride day would come. The regime and its supporters are very aware that a “simple” change of power will not – and cannot- happen peacefully. The only way out is probably war, civil war.

While that civil war scenario is – in my opinion – the most likely, three others exist.

In the first, and as the protests gain momentum, the Alawites tribal heads could decide to drop the Al-Assad family. Fearing for the future, these traditional leaders – who also lost part of their power at the hands of the ruling family- might conclude that joining the protest momentum is the best way to “protect” the community. The Christians and hesitant Druze groups would then be forced to do the same. The domino effect would then be terminal for the current regime.

In the second, the Syrian regime analyzes that most foreign countries have no interest in seeing the regime fall, and cracks down on the protest the hard way, the Hama way. In 1982, Bachar Al-Assad’s father had ended a similar revolt by killing an estimated 5,000 people. Most countries remained silent, as Syria’s stability was –and still is- a guarantee for all the countries in the region. Al-Assad will then be free to break the revolt. But in 1982, there was no Facebook, Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabiya ; information is the enemy of dictatorships.

In the third, Al-Assad decides that dropping Iran and getting close to Saudi-Arabia is his best bet to “calm” Sunnite protests. While the regime will probably try this path – as early reports of last minute meetings between Saudis and Syrian leaders show – it is doubtful that it will impact or calm the protesters. The Syrians might find this path to be a dead-end.

The rest of this article analyzes the regional impact in case the civil war scenario does unfold. Part of the proof lies in an unnoticed tweet by BBC’s correspondent in Syria – Lina Sinjab – she reported that protesters had arrested Iranian and Hezbollah operatives working alongside the Syrian security forces.

Syria is Iran’s best friend in the region and the main conduct for Iranian weapons to Hezbollah. Iran can simply not afford to lose the Al-Assad regime. As the BBC Tweet showed, Iran will spend the right amount of money, effort and men to keep the Syrian regime alive. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia will not accept to sit down and watch its arch-enemy Iran take over Syria. The Saudis will probably send weapons and support to the protesters. Syria would then – ironically- become a new Lebanon (not the other way around) and fall into civil war.

If the current Syrian regime falls, one can expect the following impact on the region:

- Reconciliation between Hamas and PLO in Palestine: the changes in the region will weaken both their sponsors, and drive the Palestinian people to request more from their leaders. Both Hamas and PLO leaders might have no choice but coordinate.

- Depending on how things turn out in Syria, Iran will have to choose between either 1) negotiating with the Saudis and Americans, or 2) going full speed with a destabilization of the region: and eventually a regional war.

- Iran’s repositioning will impact Hezbollah’s choices: 1) Use its weapons to negotiate a constitutional settlement that favors it, or 2) Decide that taking over Lebanon is its best long term choice, before losing its vital Syrian weapons conduct. Lebanon’s civil war could then get re-ignited, and the country  heading towards a de-facto federation.

- Saudi Arabia’s Shiite community will be pushed by Iran to stand-up to the Monarchy. Expect more trouble in the oil rich – and Shiite dominated- eastern region of Saudi Arabia.

- Israel’s best interest would be to wait and see how the events turn out. But as Lebanon’s civil war history has shown, anarchy at Israel’s borders increases the possibility of “independent” groups firing rockets at Israel. The Israeli reaction might further put pressure on the Israeli government to “act”.

In all the scenarios, the region is bound for some tough times: nothing new in the book’s cover, but all new in its content.

Syria and Lebanon: The secret plan unveiled

Jihad Bitar*

  

Let me start by saying that I do not really have access to any secret plans. Working in communications, I understand the importance of a teasing title in attracting readers. After all, yet another article about Syria and Lebanon can be as exciting as a report on our president Michel Suleiman weekly visitors.

That said, this article does compile some secret information: and by secret, I mean information you probably had no time to assess, even though it was all readily available. My job as a media analyst and “dissector” has taught me how to read between the lines of any political event: analyze semantics and cross information. My team and I use tools developed by social and media scientists, and these tools do unveil some secrets:

Syria’s approach to gaining more influence in Lebanon involves a constitutional change. Any political analysis of Lebanon and Syria’s regional role must take this into account.

Prior to the June 2009 legislative elections, Michel Aoun visited Syria. A few weeks later, billboards – orange billboards (Aoun’s FPM party’s color)- appeared in all of Lebanon with the slogan “The Third Republic”. Lebanon currently lives under the Saudi sponsored Taef agreement – that “ended” Lebanon’s 1975 war- the 2nd Republic. Any communication expert would tell you that no advertiser would put such a “pivotal” political statement without a direct recommendation from the client. The message- such a few weeks after the visit to Syria- was very clear: the March 8th alliance (pro-Syrian and Hezbollah, of which Aoun is part) was promoting a change in the constitution.

Lebanon’s Head of Parliament, Nabih Berri, is a Shiite political figure very closely aligned with Hezbollah’s politics. But Berri is more Syria’s ally than Iran’s. If Hezbollah represents the Iranian influence, Amal (Berri’s party) is Syria’s main ally. A shrewd politician, Berri is known for his double language. What he says is not always what he aims for. Semantic analysis of his speeches has shown quite a few references to the “need to change the way things are structured in Lebanon”. Berri’s repetitive calls for the end of the sectarian system – even though he is one of its main figures- further highlights his ultimate objective for changing the constitution. The frequency of these “system” speeches are actually correlated with visits by Berri’s main political advisor to Syria.

On the 13th of March 2011, the March 14th coalition (pro-Saudi Arabia and USA) held a major anti-Hezbollah rally in Beirut’s central square. Pro-March 8th media attacked the event and tried to portray it as a failure. Orange TV (Aoun’s television) estimated participants at 25,000, while Mustakbal TV (owned by Saad Hariri) at 800,000. My own estimate ranges between 250,000 and 350,000. Walid Joumblatt, the Druze leader that recently switched from March 14th to March 8th (and close to Syria), criticized the event as promoting sectarianism. Interestingly enough, his party’s website ran an op-ed that same evening, describing the rally as “highly successful”, and “showing that the weapons should never be used internally” (a direct reference to Hezbollah’s usage of its weapons in the local political conflict, the main point March 14th leaders were addressing). The ambiguity of Joumblatt’s position actually reflects Syria’s own little secret game: attack March 14th openly and severely, but without destroying them completely. This attitude highlights Syria’s real intentions to weaken March 14th while keeping them powerful enough to stand-up to Hezbollah (another Syrian ally, but under Iranian supervision).

Syria wants the conflict between the two sides to always require it’s intervention to calm things down (as reflected by the self proclaimed role of two close Syrian allies, President Michel Suleiman and Prime Minsiter Nagib Mikati), but for many reasons the current constitutional structure does not guarantee Syria’s long term control: Taef was built as a system dealing with Christian/Muslim equilibrium – with Syria’s military presence as referee. A new constitution will mainly tackle the current Sunnite/Shiite rift that is shaking Lebanon and the whole region, and Syria wants to continue playing the referee – even without the presence of its 30,000 troops.

This Syrian attitude is also reflected in its regional policies. Syria is the Iran’s closest ally (the Shiites’ main sponsor), but is trying very hard to get close to Saudi Arabia (the Sunnites’ main sponsor) and to the United States and the European Union. This attitude provides Syria with three key benefits:

- Regain control of Lebanon (by playing the ultimate referee between Sunnites and Shiites)

- Shield itself from any potential regional conflict (between Iran and Saudi Arabia – directly or through proxies)

- Make itself – and its regime- indispensable as a power broker in the region

To achieve this referee role, Syria needs to continue doing what it has always done best: let the left hand light the fire, so the right hand can intervene and turn it off. This is exactly what it is currently doing in Lebanon. The next fire will probably be a sharp rise in tensions between Hezbollah and Mustakbal (the main Sunnite party), and the constitutional change will be the water that extinguishes it. A Hezbollah war with Israel could be the sparkle.

The success of this strategy depends on another key factor: Hezbollah and Iran’s own ambitions. For the Iranians, Lebanon is just another fighting ground between them and the Saudis. Iran’s influence is reaching Yemen, Kuwait and even the Saudi oil rich regions (populated by Shiites). Saudi Arabia has answered by “invading” Bahrain (in a civil war status between Shiites and Sunnites). Syria’s next move will also depend on how Iran will play its Hezbollah card.

While this chess game unfolds, Syria is facing its own internal problems. Some protests (even though small) have been reported. Syria is not Tunisia, but then again who said Tunisia would ever fall that fast.

*Jihad Bitar is a communications, media and political analyst based in Beirut. Follow him on twitter @JihadTweet

Mabrouk El Safara!*

By Joseph El-Khoury

The Lebanese flag floats over Damascus as Lebanon officially inaugurates an embassy in the Syrian Capital. This highly symbolic step 65 years after both countries gained independence from French colonial rule has clearly been forced down the throat of Syrian officials who did not bother attending the ceremony. While the official propaganda tells us that the split of Greater Syria was a treacherous act by Western powers against the will of the indigenous population, any serious scrutiny would reveal a much more complex picture. I find it unhelpful to indulge in wishful thinking on what could have been and believe that it distracts from the real issues facing the relation between Lebanese and Syrians. Whoever is interested in bridging the gap has to accept the fact that a sense of separate national identity, shaped by diverging political, social and economical paths, is firmly established in both countries. Expressions of it on the Lebanese side of the border take various shapes and fashions but are increasingly cross partisan: Whether you are a ‘resistant’ Lebanese or a ‘patriotic’ one you integrate your national identity to your political views.

It is harder to gage the Syrians attitudes because of the restrictions imposed on their freedom of expressions. Nonetheless they do appear to have developed a genuine sense of Syria-Centric pride separate from the broader Arabo-islamic culture they contributed to for centuries. This was very apparent in the few weeks that followed the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005 and the show of sympathy in public and private for the regime. Bashar El Assad, posing as a defender of the nation against Zionist attacks, successfully capitalised on this sentiment at home and evaded internal criticism of the Syrian legacy in Lebanon. But it is this legacy that essentially shapes the opinion of millions of young Lebanese who lived through 30 years of Syrian military presence.

This presence was not an amicable arrangement but a heavy-handed occupation that the Lebanese experienced on a daily basis and which pervaded every aspect of their life. Many who had only known the war could hardly see past the roadblocks, tanks and uniforms to discern the real Syria with its hospitable cities and enchanting scenery. We were taught early on that ‘The Syrian is your enemy’. This slogan was ubiquitous in the Eastern (Christian) Region and made sense to us as we sheltered from Heavy artillery, loosing life and limb in the name of an independent 10452 Km2. On the other hand, the allies of Syria did little to help its image, as they helped the Baath Big Brother extend its tentacles across the border. For years the moukhabarat would run Beirut the way they run Damascus and Aleppo... ruthlessly.

As the lid was lifted following the assassination of Rafik Hariri, resentment gave way to some ugly manifestations of generalised abuse against innocent Syrian nationals. The signs of anger had been there for years waiting for an opportunity. I still vividly remember a soccer game held in 1998 between the Lebanese and Syrian national teams in the then newly refurbished ‘Cite Sportive’. A hardcore group of Lebanese fans started hurling verbal abuse and bottles of water at anyone suspected of being Syrian. In selecting their targets they relied on a strange formula of racial and social stereotyping: dark-skinned men dressed in colourful shirts and sandals. One of their victims, a middle aged man screamed that his was a case for mistaken identity. He held his Lebanese passport begging for the projectile shower to stop. Following a dismal performance on the pitch which resulted in a 2-1 victory for the visiting team, the previously bellicose crowd left the stadium in a sheepish orderly manner under the watchful eye of the Tank crews. Inside, the Syrian spectators who had kept a low profile throughout the game took their revenge on the stadium by vandalising the stands.

The mutual mistrust remains and the embassy is a necessary step which will hopefully be mirrored by the Syrian regime. Late Hafez El-Assad once remarked that Lebanon and Syria were ‘eternally linked by History and Geography’ while his actions did much harm to these links. I am hopeful that they will recover one day but can hardly see any of the prominent Lebanese factions providing us with a road map to this partnership for the future.

*Congratulations on the Embassy

The fight is no more one

By Wael Abdelraheem

In October 2008, Syrian Foreign minister Waleed Moallem visited London where he held meetings with the British officials and voiced certain opinions on the Israeli Syrian negotiations. In an interview on one of the satellite stations he announced that the indirect negotiations between the two countries had reached a crucial point, and that Syria had received a commitment from Israel to retreat to the 4th of June 1967 borders. A commitment similar to Rabin’s promise in a previous round of negotiations. Moallem also noted that the Israelis had been informed by the Turkish mediator of the UN documents which specify the borders of the 4th of June line; an essential point according to him.
More intriguing was his answer to a question about the possibility of an agreement between the two countries, regardless of a comprehensive regional peace that would resolve the Palestinian issue. He literarily said that this was a possibility in the event of a successful outcome for the ongoing negotiations.
How does that translate politically for the Syrian regime? It simply means that it is backtracking on its previous commitment to the principles emerging from the 1991 Conference in Madrid but also the foundations of Syrian diplomacy for the past 40 years, in accordance with the Baath party ideological speech and the statements of the National Progressive Front. These same foundations, which consider a fair and comprehensive peace the only satisfactory option, were used in the criticism of past Bilateral agreements between Israel and Egypt at Camp David, and the ones that followed at Oslo and Wadi Araba with the Palestinians and Jordanians.
In practice, Moallem’s statement means Syria could sign a peace treaty with Israel in return for the Golan Heights even if the independent Palestinian state remains a fantasy, if the Palestinian refugees never return, and if East Jerusalem is engulfed in a Greater Jewish Capital.
Hence who follows the developments of the Syrian position finds that they have been consistent in their demand to recover the whole of the Golan Heights, but have reneged the basis of the negotiation techniques that Damascus adopted for decades. There is no ambiguity about this speech, and I will not speculate on whether the Syrians are stating their true intentions. But it is no doubt a curious complexity in the position of the Iranian and Syrian axis and their allies. It seems that the resistance speech heard in Beirut, Damascus and Tehran aims essentially at the return of the Golan, occupied in the war to free Palestine. The Baathists relied on that same speech to reach power in Syria. There is also possibly a hidden contradiction between Teheran and Damascus on the best way to approach the Arab-Israeli conflict including the negotiations.
If there is no contradiction but cooperation and complementation, then a number of important questions require consideration: what do the protestors want from Palestine, since they do not mind signing a peace agreement with Israel regardless of whether the Palestinian issue is resolved or not? Why do they insist on keeping an active front in Lebanon? Why not reopen the old fronts with Israel if they sincerely wish to continue the struggle? And finally why do they consider that the missiles are the optimal method of resistance but never use their own rocket batteries that are more efficient than the Kassams, the Grads and other Katiushas?
But if the Syrians and Iranians disagree on the outlook for the conflict with Israel, and if Iran has broader targets than only reaching a just solution for the Palestinians, then what are they? It is to eliminate Israel from existence, in the name of a fight against imperialism? It has so far refrained from engaging foreign troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, with which it shares common borders? In fact, it barely resisted the occupation of these two countries in the first place, while foreign presence is likely to threaten Iranian security.
Perhaps these are simple and naïve questions but the answers are in the hands of the Palestinians who have to think twice about the call for a united fight against a mutual enemy launched by the protesting regimes … The fight is not one, and neither are the rules of engagement. Over the past 25 years we have only seen the blood of the Palestinians and the Lebanese being shed in the name of this common. So enough lies.

Miliband in Old Damascus : Ice Cream and Orientalist Themes

By Joseph El-Khoury

I have always found David Miliband irritating and patronising. But I have found him even more so ever since, when asked on British TV on the type of music to be found on his IPOD, he responded by ‘Classical’. This was a few days after his boss Gordon Brown had surprised the media by claiming his admiration for the Arctic Monkeys, an edgy Rock band from Sheffield. The contrast between the two answers in that time frame should give you an idea about the man’s psychology. So watching him eat Ice Cream in Damascus’ s Old Quarter reminded me more of the ‘Englishman abroad syndrome’ than of a comfortable cultural exchange; A striking departure from the laid back Tony Blair.
But this piece is not about Miliband, although he is likely to continue making the headlines in the future, possibly as a British Prime Minister one day. This piece is about Syria and its eternal potential as a ‘force of stability’ in the Middle East. Never mind the appearances, Western powers have always favoured working in partnership with the Assad(father and son)regime in Damascus, hoping secretly that they could turn him one day into the Hosni Mubarak pseudo-republic : authoritarian at home, moderate abroad and unquestionably serving their interest in the region. But again and again, the mutually beneficial relationship has failed to take off, with the guilty party being the Syrians. This is not out of some ideological principle, as they like to bang on about, specifically when taunting their ex-Lebanese allies now turned hardened Atlancisits.
Syria has shown throughout the decades that its position as arch-enemy to the Zionist project is less permanent than it might appear to readers of the Baath, Teshrine and Al-Thawra (All official publications of the regime). Whether failing to support the Fedayeen in Jordan, fighting a half-hearted battle in Lebanon (1982,1996), joining the anti-Iraqi coalition in 1991 or defending its own borders against repeated airborne aggressions (2007,2008), the Syrians have always a White Flag in reserve. At the first hint of interest from anyone in a suit and a foreign accent the Syrian Nomenklatura is seen welcoming, wining and dining or feeding Ice Cream. And for some strange reason what is acceptable in Damascus is certainly anathema in Beirut. The reason has less to do with the credentials of the current Syrian Leaders. After all none of them lost limb fighting the Americans or a son resisting the Israelis.
The credentials used are those of Damascus as a well established centre of power with historical significance in the Arab and Muslim World. A seat of the Khilafa and (adopted) home of Salahuddin, to be reckoned with in war and peace. In contrast Beirut seems a hybrid rebellious cousin, to be tamed rather than be reasoned with. On that point Assad, Sarkozy and the Anglo-American axis agree.
The problem remains that Syria is unable to offer the veneer of democracy required by public opinion in Europe and is still hoping to obtain more than Israel is willing to give up in the occupied Golan Heights. With the Israeli Skiing season starting shortly, the Europeans know that. This visit might have more to do with Anglo-French rivalry than Middle Eastern hopes for Peace. Where Sarkozy treads Albion will follow!

القطاع العام وأيديولوجيا الحمير

وائل عبد الرحيم

منذ انقلاب حسني الزعيم (1) في سورية اواخر الأربعينيات، وما تلاه من حقبة الانقلابات العسكرية في المشرق العربي ومصر، ارتبطت حركة التحرر الوطني العربية بأمثلة عسكريتارية فجّة!
تجارب 5 عقود انتجت مدارس حكم رديئة لا يزال بعضها ماثلا بقوة في حيواتنا كمجتمعات عربية.
تجارب هجينة ارتكزت على نظرية التطور اللارأسمالي (2) التي سوّقها الخبراء السوفيات لإرضاء حلفائهم "ديكتاتوريي الشرق" دون ان يرفّ لهم جفن على المذابح التي ساقها هؤلاء ضد الشيوعيين المحليين في البلدان التي يحكمونها (3).
هكذا، وبغمضة عين، تحوّل المدّ الوطني الديمقراطي الذي رافق بداية انتهاء الاستعمار القديم، إلى تمدّد قميء لعسكريتاريا ريفية استولت على الأحزاب وعلى نظم الحكم وسخّرتها لمنافعها تحت شعارات الوحدة العربية، والحرية، والاشتراكية.
خلال كل هذه الحقبة من تاريخنا أمعن هؤلاء في الاضطهاد، وفي التنكيل بالحريات، وفي زيادة الفرقة بين الدول، وفي ضرب أسس النمو الاقتصادي.
والأنكى من كل ذلك أن من جاء إلى سدّة الحكم ليقلب حكماً ملكيا أو فساداً مستشرياً، اورث أولاده، فنشأت عندنا جمهوريات الحكم الوراثي كتجربة فريدة تفتّق عنها العقل العربي.
ومن جاء إلى الحكم ليرسي وحدة عربية ما، كان بطل الانفصالات.. وليس غريبا بعد ذلك ان تكون البرجوازية السورية التي خوّنها عتاة اللجنة العسكرية البعثية (4) هي رائدة تجربة الوحدة العربية الوحيدة في مشرقنا.. وان يكون الزعيم السوري التقليدي شكري القوتلي (5) اكثر وحدوية وتقدمية من العفالقة (نسبة إلى ميشال عفلق) ومن الأرسوزيين (نسبة إلى زكي الأرسوزي)… وان يكون خالد العظم (6) رائد القومية الاقتصادية الوطنية ورائد الديمقراطية ببعدها التحرري الوطني الداخلي والخارجي متفوقاً على مدرسة الشباطيين (7) كلهّها بيسارها (صلاح جديد) ويمينها (حافظ الأسد).
أفظع ما اورثته لنا هذه الجمهوريات هو القطاع العام الذي يتغنى فيه بعض ديناصورات "الحركة الاشتراكية المؤممة" بصفته إنجازاً تاريخياً للحكومات الوطنية.
طيب، بكلمات قليلة واعترف انها ناقمة كثيراً، فلنرً ماهية هذا القطاع الذي جلب الرفاه إلى الشعوب السعيدة!.
ولنتناول تجربة البعث السورية وثورة يوليو المصرية كمثالين ما دامتا مستمرتين في البروباغندا التبريرية لحكام القاهرة ودمشق.
في دمشق الشام، بقي من القطاع العام باب سرقة كبير لقريب عائلة الأسد رامي مخلوف (8)، الذي مدّ يده ايضاً على القطاع الخاص، وصار شريكا باسم العائلة لكل مصنع صغير او كبير، ولكل شركة صغيرة ام كبيرة..
وبقي من القطاع العام نظام استشفاء بائس هو برأي بعض أنصاف مثقفي الشرق "اشتراكية" من نوع باهر حقاً، ونسوا أن حكّام الشام واولادهم عندما يمرضون يذهبون للاستشفاء في بلدان "الغرب الرأسمالي المتوحش"!
اما في القاهرة حيث لا يزال حسني مبارك يحتفل كلّ عام بذكرى ثورة يوليو "الاشتراكية" فالقطاع العام الذي بيع وُيباع بالمزاد إلى شركاء ولديه جمال وعلاء أبرز مثال على إنجازات "الاشتراكية العربية".
في دمشق والقاهرة بقي القطاع العام ليس خطّ الدفاع الاخيرعن الفقراء كما يحلو لكبار الموظفين "الاشتراكيين" تسميته، بل اداة سيطرة اقتصادية متينة للحاكمين يستخدمونه كما الجيش والأحزاب المدجّنة في سبيل إدامة سيطرتهم.
للحديث صلة، وهو مدعاة لبحث اعمق واكثر شمولاً… حتى لا "يهرينا" ماركسيو نظم الحكم المافيوزية بنظرياتهم عن الاشتراكيات الوهمية الباقية في القرن الواحد والعشرين..
فالاشتراكية يا "رفاق"، منظومة قيم إنسانية راقية قبل ان تكون إدارات عامّة وسجون وبوليس وعسكر، وشعاراً للحمير: مات الحاكم.. عاش ابنه!


1 - ضابط في الجيش السوري افتتح عهد الانقلابات العسكرية بانقلاب على الحكومة السورية المنتخبة في عام 1949.
2 - اجتهاد للينين عن التطور السياسي والاقتصادي في البلدان غير الرأسمالية جيّرها المفكرون السوفييت في عهد خروشوف وبريجينيف لإضفاء طابع التقدمية على حلفائهم من انظمة مصر وسورية والعراق وغيرها. تقول النظرية بإمكان تحقيق الاشتراكية دون المرور بمرحلة الرأسمالية، وبالتالي تلغي عملياً "الدور الطليعي" للأحزاب الشيوعية لصالح دور ممثلي "البرجوازية الصغيرة الوطنية".
3 - نفّذ عبدالناصر حملة قمع منظمة ضد الشيوعيين المصريين والسوريين في الوقت الذي كانت في علاقاته ممتازة مع السوفيات والكتلة الاشتراكية. كذلك فعل الزعيم العراقي عبدالكريم قاسم وإن كانت درجة القمع اقلّ. وفي العراق ذبح البعثيون الشيوعيين دون موقف حازم من قبل السوفيات.
4 - تكتّل ضباط بعثيين سوريين نشأ قبل استلام الحزب للسلطة وضمّ حافظ الأسد وصلاح جديد ومحمد عمران وعبدالكريم الجندي وأحمد المير.. قامت هذه العصبة بالانقلاب فيما بعد على القيادة التاريخية لحزب البعث ممثلة بميشال عفلق.
5 - الرئيس السوري المنتخب الذي طلب من عبدالناصر رسميا الوحدة مع مصر في عام 1958 وقبل بالتنحي عن الرئاسة لصالح رئيس الوحدة عبدالناصر نفسه.
6 - رئيس وزراء سوري في عهد الديمقراطية البرلمانية. اشتهر بليبراليته السياسية ومواقفه الوطنية رفضاً للسياسات الاستعمارية، وبدفاعه عن الاقتصاد السوري في مواجهة الاحتكارات الأجنبية.
7 - اللجنة العسكرية نفسها التي قامت بانقلاب على القيادة القومية العفلقية للحزب في شباط 1966. ثم اختلف الرفاق فيما بينهم فانقلب حافظ الأسد على صلاح جديد في 1970 فيما اصطلح على تسميته بـ"الحركة التصحيحية".
8 - ابن خالة بشار الأسد وصاحب شركة سورياتل للهاتف المحمول وشركات اخرى وأحد اكبر أثرياء سورية.

مجد سورية الأسير وعار الإعلام والإعلاميين

وائل عبد الرحيم

يُحاكم في سورية قياديو إعلان دمشق للتغيير الوطني الديمقراطي المعتقلون منذ أشهر بتهم سياسية عوّدنا نظام الحكم في سورية على تضمينها أبعاد الارتباط بالخارج والعمالة، رغم ضحالة هذه المزاعم والادعاءات.
والحال أن من يحاكم في سورية هم كوكبة من نساء ورجالات الشام الديمقراطيين الوطنيين، ونخبة من الكفاءات الشريفة التي تضرب جذورها في العمق السياسي التاريخي للشام، والتي لم تصبها لوثة السياسات الكبيرة، فاستمرت تعضّ على الجرح وتوائم خطابها الرافض للديكتاتورية والفساد مع رفضها الذوبان او الارتهان لحسابات الدول.
هذه المعارضة في 'دمشق الشام' هي معارضة مبدئية، ولعلّ مواجهة نظام حكم سليط اللسان يزخر خطابه باتهامات التخوين والخيانة ويتربع على عرش القضايا الكبرى تستدعي من مناضلي إعلان دمشق ورفاقهم من الناشطين الوطنيين في سورية تأكيد الطابع المبدئي للمواجهة.
هذا كله مفهوم، ومفهوم ايضاً ان يستشرس النظام الذي يفاوض الإسرائيلي، ويسعى لنيل رضا الأميركي، في الدفاع عن نفسه فيستعيد اساليب البطش والتنكيل الأمنية.. لا حاجة لتبيان الرابط بين الديكتاتورية والفساد، بين القمع وبين إقصاء المجتمع السياسي السوري عن نقاش القضايا الكبرى، هذه القضايا التي تكتسب هالة القدسية في خطاب التخوين، ويُمنع النقاش فيها حينما ياتي وقت التفاوض والصفقات الكبيرة منها والصغيرة.
لكن.. ما أريد ان الفت النظر إليه، هو الغياب شبه التام للإعلام العربي ولا سيما الفضائيات عن إيفاء هذه القضية حقها.
فإذا كان مفهوماً ان الإعلام الرسمي في الدول العربية يتجنب 'التدخل' في شؤون 'الأشقاء' كي لا يتدخلوا هم في شؤونه أيضاً (!)، إلا ان الإعلام 'الخاص' او المستقل لم يشذّ عن هذه القاعدة.
'الجزيرة' مرتهنة بالكامل إلى علاقتها بالنظام السوري وارتباطها بالأخوان المسلمين في الوقت نفسه، وتغيب عن التركيز على الاعتقالات إلا كجزء من تحصيل حاصل حيث تفرض أبسط قواعد المهنية ان لا يتم تجاهل الخبر.. لكن لا البرامج تتناولها ولا التغطيات الطويلة التي عوّدتنا عليها هذه المحطة. فالتغطية خجولة.
اما 'العربية' فتقترب من هذه المسألة بقدر ما تتلاقى مع نفخها المستمر لتضخيم حجم تحالف عبدالحليم خدام – صدر الدين البيانوني الموغل في حساباته الإقليمية والدولية والبعيد عن تمثيل التطلعات الحقيقية للمعارضة الوطنية السورية في الداخل.
البي بي سي التي أطلقت تلفزيونها العربي، تزاوج بين 'حياديتها' المعلنة وضعف إمكانياتها المالية لتبعد عمّا يثير غضب الأنظمة، وهي التي تفخر بانها بدأت الإرسال مبكراً ذات صباح لتغطية إطلاق الأسرى اللبنانيين من سجون إسرائيل، تتغاضى عن واقع أنها محكومة بمراعاة اضطرارية (مراعاة تهزّ ضميرها المهني!) لمتطلبات العمل في الدول العربية.. فلا تريد مشاكل ولا قطع علاقات، وفي الوقت نفسه تعزف معزوفة القومية العربية الإسلاموية البلهاء بأموال دافعي الضرائب في بريطانيا.
العار في كلّ ذلك، انه وعلى الأقل منذ اعتقال فداء حوراني ورفاقها في نهاية 2007 لم يخرج برنامج تلفزيوني واحد على الأقل على أثير هذه الفضائيات للحديث عن هذه القضية.
هو عار ليس فقط على ممولي هذه الفضائيات، بل على العاملين فيها وعلى كبار محرريها، لأننا نعرف كلنا كإعلاميين ان ثمة هامشاً من الحرية معطى لهم.
لكن ما العمل حينما يكون الإعلامي ضابط نفسه قبل ان يضبطه الاخرون؟
الم يحن الوقت للتفكير جدياً بكسر حلقة الاحتكار والحصار والنضال من اجل إعلام عربي حرّ مرتبط بقضايا مجتمعاتنا وليس بالسياسات الضيقة لبعض الدول، او بالنزعات الشخصية لبعض 'كبار' مثقفي إعلامنا في الداخل والمهجر؟

Do not Free the Lebanese in Syrian jails! An (Arab) Democratic Appeal

By Jihad Bitar

Yes, this is an open letter through Arabdemocracy.com to all Lebanese and Syrian politicians. Please do not free the Lebanese in Syrian jails, and this for many reasons:

1- They are not important (Michel Aoun during his joint interview with Hassan Nassrallah last year, said that this was not a major issue…and those in jail for fighting for Aoun – while he was hiding in a French embassy- should I think kill themselves out of shame).

2- They are guilty…Yes, they are guilty of being anti-Syrian, they should be hanged…this is how Arab Democracy should be.

3- They love torture …no doubt about that, if they did not love being tortured they wouldn’t have chosen to (Arab) democratically go to jail.

4- They are getting free diet sessions (one prisoner who was released last year recalled how he got 1 potato – rass batata – a day).

5- They are anti democratic. If in Syrian jail, that must be because they are against the Arab Syrian Democratic Republic!

6- They simply do not exist – Sayyed Hassan Nassrallah in his celebration speech for Samir Quntar, listed the Resistance’s next objectives: and Lebanese in Syrian jails did not make the list... Lebanese citizen Sayyed Hassan set the freedom of 4 Iranian diplomats in Israeli jails as an objective, rather than those Lebanese prisoners; that must be because they do not exist.

A Syrian crane made in France

By Bachir Habib

Picture: www.lefigaro.fr

What we witnessed in Paris was not a Euro Mediterranean summit. The French are not dupe, neither the Europeans; and the occasion provided a good cover. What we witnessed was simply Syria’s reintegration into the International Community. Bashar Assad’s visit to Paris is his first successful international visit since 2004.
This visit has to be placed in a context, and that context is not European, it is purely Middle Eastern and challenging after the failure of the regional American project. What happened in Paris is also a European move on the international foreign policy chessboard; a daring maneuver from French President Nicolas Sarkozy who succeeded in convincing his European counterparts that the time was right for distancing themselves from previous alignment on US policy towards the region. This is even more necessary before Washington itself operates a foreign policy shifting leaving Brussels behind. Not to forget that in the United States, it is now “Time to Change” as said by the Democratic presidential contestant Barack Obama.
Sarkozy opened wide the gates of Europe and the world to the Syrian President. Paris tried to show that Assad is received only because he responded positively to the French demands: Reducing interference in Lebanon or using positive influence to help in unlocking the Lebanese political deadlock, pushing towards a Hamas – Israel truce through pressure on his Palestinian allies, and finally proving a true will to make peace with Israel and continue visibly what started secretly between the two countries two years ago as the July 2006 war raged on Lebanese soil.
This is the tip of the iceberg, but at its base resides a more serious issue: A new balance of power is being formed in the Middle East, there’s a decline (at least temporary) of American influence after decades of direct management of the region while a new Iranian (de facto) regional super power will emerge in case Teheran’s nuclear program is not halted.
This new context is highly important to France and Europe, because it’s not only the American “Greater Middle East” that is broken, but because the post cold war American Dream of a Unipolar World that has been crushed.
Is it the new dawn of Multipolarity that we’re witnessing? It might be. But it is definitely not the Multipolarity the West was dreaming of. It is one where Europe and the US will have to deal with countries like Iran, Pakistan and Venezuela (…) as regional super powers that have a National Interest to protect, same as Washington, Brussels or Moscow.
French diplomacy reveals its conviction that reintegrating Syria in the international community is the only way to take it back from Iran’s arms. But Assad declared this week that following a request from France, Syria would hold talks with Iran to try and resolve the crisis over its nuclear programme! Nicolas Sarkozy knows that this is not how Assad can be stolen from Ali Khamenei, and it is unrealistic, at least for now, to expect Damascus to take a distance from Teheran. It is rather the Iranians who are on the verge of being recognized as a great regional power, by using a Syrian crane made in France.
By the way, was Husni Mubarak there? And even if Saudi King Abdullah was with him, Assad would have remained the only star. It is simply not a good time for US allies.