Lessons from Syria

Jade Salhab

There are two parts to this brilliant article by Beesaan el Shaikh in Al Hayat (Arabic) which I believe is an imperative read for anyone interested in the Arab uprising.

The first part of the article uses the tragedies generated by the revolution as a very compelling argument NOT to support it. The second part, near the end, turns the argument around making a simple but slam-dunk case for the revolution.

I want to use the first part to rephrase a position I expressed in the very beginning of this revolution, days before the first Assad speech and the subsequent violent turn of the uprising: I expressed then my hope that Assad would do the wise thing and grab the opportunity to reform the regime by himself, because that was the only transition that would avoid destroying Syria, or handing it to Islamic extremists.

I was naïve in my hopes, obviously. But I believe that hope is a moral imperative. I knew then, like all those who lived through Lebanon's civil war, that no matter where it happens on this earth, or why, or how legitimate, when an uprising turns into an armed rebellion, there is absolutely no controlling of the damage it can make to the structure of society and its ability to recuperate post conflict (think Iraq, Lebanon, but also Salvador, Tchetchnia, or Sri Lanka more globally).

The unspeakable price of civil violence in terms of social dismantling (even more so than the toll on human life and heritage), is why I still believe that any people who has regime change in progress (i.e Tunisia, Egypt) - or in perspective (i.e Jordan, Morocco, or the Gulf in the coming 5 to 15 years) - must bend itself backwards twice, maybe thrice, before engaging in violent struggle, or violent ‘defense of the achieved revolution’ – as opposed to radically peaceful rebellion or political compromise.

One of the reasons I respect Moaz el Khatib so deeply is his awareness of this fact, and his courage to remain constantly open to compromise with the regime for the sake of ending violence – because he knows that no matter how high the price of such compromise is, it will always be lower than the one of sustained violence.

Don’t get me wrong, just like Beesaan el Sheikh says in her article, I believe that there is no choice BUT to support the Syrian revolution because it is the only legitimate and humanly acceptable path forward. But I certainly hope that idealists learn the lesson and understand that wars are, under all circumstances, unwinnable: because even by winning them, we destroy the basic social infrastructure that makes that victory worth anything.

This might sound obvious to some, but the consequence is less so: only a slower transition, or a stubbornly peaceful uprising can come at a lower cost.

I want to end by drawing a relevance to Tunisia and Egypt: compromise is a high price you might need to pay to avoid the higher price of a torn society. And if compromise is impossible (and it should take a lot before you get to this conclusion), than maintain your struggle peaceful at all cost (i.e no military repression of ‘medieval forces’). The alternative is worse than you can ever imagine or calculate.

Arab Spring’s Silver Lining: A Search for the Soul of Arab Islam

Elie Elhadj

  

Posted with permission from daringopinion.com.

Non-Arab Muslims in predominantly Sunni Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey, representing two thirds of world Muslims, have a moderate and modern attitude towards Islamic dogma and Shari’a laws. They conduct democratic parliamentary elections and have had female prime ministers and presidents.

By contrast, Sunni Arab countries treat women like chattel. For decades, Arab states have been ruled by non-representative dictators. Until the Arab Spring in 2011, the Arab peoples never had a democratic election, save for those farcical presidential referendums.

 Why the difference between the Sunni way of life of Arab and non-Arab Muslims? The answer may be found in the fact that Arab rulers and their palace ulama exploit those parts of the Islamic creed that help prolong their control over their people. Arabs consider themselves as the guardians of the “true” Islam of seventh century Arabia. That the Prophet, his companions, the Quran, and the sanctuaries in Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem are all Arabic cement that belief. The Quran describes Arabs as the “best people evolved to mankind” (3:110).

The Arab Spring might reform Arab Islam

The Arab Spring has triggered big conflicts between Arab rulers and their palace ulama, on one hand, and the anti-ruler ulama and the masses, on the other. The palace ulama have been for decades actively protecting the excesses of their benefactor kings and presidents. They preach that blind obedience to the Muslim ruler is a form of Islamic piety, citing God’s word in the Quran (4:59): “Obey God and obey God’s messenger and obey those of authority among you”. The palace ulama teach that the Prophet Muhammad had reportedly said, according to canonical Hadith collection of al-Bukhari and of Muslim: “He who obeys me obeys God; he who disobeys me, disobeys God. He who obeys the ruler, obeys me; he who disobeys the ruler, disobeys me”.

The anti-ruler ulama believe rebelling against an impious or unjust Muslim ruler to be an Islamic duty. To justify their belief, anti-ruler ulama invoke the words of the Prophet, quoted in Abi Dawood, Muslim, and al-Nasai: “Whoever of you sees an evil action, let him change it with his hand; and if he is not able to do so, then with his tongue; and if he is not able to do so, then with his heart”.

The anti-ruler ulama helped to remove from office in 2011 the rulers of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Anti-ruler Islamic groups performed impressively in all of the democratically held parliamentary elections during the last quarter of the year. In Tunisia, al-Nahda Party achieved 41% of the vote. In Morocco, the Justice and Development Party achieved 27% of the votes, more than any other party. In Tunisia and Morocco, the leaders of the winning parties became prime ministers. In Egypt, Islamic politicians will undoubtedly form the next cabinet when parliamentary elections are completed in early 2012. Already, in the first round, the Freedom and Justice Party, a reincarnation of the Muslim Brothers organization, achieved 37% of the votes and the fundamentalist al-Nour party achieved 24%. Likewise, anti-ruler ulama and Islamic parties are most likely to perform well in the forthcoming parliamentary elections in Yemen and Libya, and in Syria, too, whenever the Asad family finally falls.

The victorious anti-ruler ulama in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen will undoubtedly provide the intellectual vigor and inspiration to the anti-ruler ulama in other Arab republics and monarchies to rise against their own unjust and corrupt presidents and kings.

Within the ranks of the winning Islamic groups there are shades of moderation and extremism. The moderates; like Morocco’s Justice and Development, Tunisia’s al-Nahda, and Egypt’s Freedom and Justice might prove to be akin to Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, if they translate their electioneering pledges into action—time will tell. Fundamentalist parties like Egypt’s al-Nour, are Islamist salafis who find their guidance in Wahhabi extremism. Their members aspire to emulate the Prophet’s seventh century way of life in the Arabian Desert. Some salafis, for example, refrain from using spoons or forks because such implements did not exist during the Prophet’s life. Islamist salafis choose to focus on the intolerant and the violent parts of the Quran and the Sunna, to the exclusion of the tolerant and peaceful parts on the same issues.

Wahhabism is influenced by the teaching of Ahmad Bin Hanbal (d. 855), founder of the most orthodox among the four surviving Sunni Schools of Jurisprudence. Less than 5% of world’s Sunnis today follow Wahhabi tenets, mainly in Saudi Arabia plus those among the millions of expatriate workers who became indoctrinated in the Wahhabi creed as a result of working in Saudi Arabia over the past 35 years.

The search for the soul of Arab Islam

During the struggle against their tormentors, Islamic and Islamist parties were united. However, now that the dictators are gone from a few Arab capitals and leaders of moderate Islamic political parties took their place the next confrontation will be between the new religiously moderate rulers and the Islamist salafis. The Islamist salafis will attack the policies and laws of the new rulers as insufficiently Islamic, even heretical (kuffar) deserving death. The new rulers will defend their policies and laws as perfectly Islamic, supported by legitimating reasoning drawn from the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet.

The coming battle will engulf the moderates and the Islamists over the soul of Islam. The battle will be fought over whether Islam is going to be the intolerant violent religion of the Bin Laden Wahhabi type; or, the enlightened moderate and modern Islam of the Recep Tayyip Erdogan Turkish type?

In the ensuing fight, the Islamist salafis will most likely be sidelined. The results of the recent parliamentary elections in Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt point in the direction of a victory for the moderates.

Most importantly, however, this battle might finally give birth to a reformation movement in Islam after a thousand years of suppression of innovation and persecution of whoever dares to think outside ancient and rigid religious constructions and dogma. The battle might very well produce an Islamic reformation movement similar to Martin Luther’s sixteenth century reformation of Christianity. If that happens, the world will become a safer place.

Policy implications

Should Washington and the West fear moderate Arab Islamic regimes? The answer is no. Why? Because to be Islamic need not be anti-America or anti-West. Wahhabi Saudi Arabia, the world’s most Islamist regime has been obsequious to U.S. policies and interests.

Islamic rule will not necessarily be more Islamic than the current Arab regimes. Already, in all Arab countries, Islam is the religion of the state (in Syria, Islam is the religion of the president) and Shari’a is either the source of law or a main source of law.

Consider, for example, the so-called “secular” regime in Damascus. Although the Asad clan, apologists, and propagandists constantly propagate that theirs is a “secular” regime, evidence shows otherwise. In fact, the Syria of 2011 is more Islamic than the Syria of 1963, when Hafiz Asad and his five compatriots put an end to the rule of Syria’s last legitimate parliament and President Nazem al-Qudsi’s cabinet.

In Mr. Asad’s “secular” Syria today seventh century Shari’a laws and courts control personal status, family, and inheritance affairs (Christians follow their own archaic religious courts). Shari’a law is the antithesis of the liberal laws of the modern age. It denies women human and legal rights compared with Muslim men. Shari’a law reduces the status of women to that of chattel—a Muslim man can marry four wives, divorce any one of them without giving reason, with limited child custody rights, housing, or alimony; a Muslim woman is prohibited from marrying a non-Muslim man while the Muslim man is allowed to marry non-Muslim women; a woman cannot pass her nationality on to her foreign husband and children while the man can; “honour killing” of a woman by a male relative results in a light sentence for murder; and two women equal one man in legal testimony, witness, and inheritance. Such maltreatment of one half of society is in spite of the regime’s energetic attempts to project an image of secularism, modernity, and equality between the genders.

The Islamic curriculum in Syria’s elementary, middle, and high schools teaches Muslim Sunni Islam regardless of the Islamic sect to which they belong. The textbooks are discriminatory, divisive, and intolerant of non-Muslims.

More mosques, bigger congregations, and more veiled women than ever before have become the order of the day in Syrian cities. To flaunt his Islamic credentials, Mr. Asad even ordered a special rain prayer throughout Syria's mosques performed on December 10, 2010 to ask God to send rain.

With such credentials, it is difficult to see how a moderate Muslim Brothers rule in Syria would be more Islamic than the Asad regime.

Murder They Wrote: The double Tragedy of Myriam Achkar

Joseph El-Khoury

The tragic murder of Myriam Achkar on 21^st November in the town of Sahel Alma generated significant turmoil in Lebanon. While the family of the victim and her loved ones cannot be blamed for the flare up of emotions and the call for retribution in rather crude words, the reaction of the more removed public is worth a pause for reflection. As the story unraveled, both mainstream and social media commentaries were awash with bigoted and racist overtones. : At its heart the interpretation of the event as yet another symbol of the persecution of Christianity in a hostile environment. This permanent kink in the psyche of Arab Christian community has resurfaced recently in the wake of the Arab Spring but stretches back to the inception of Islam and the search for an Eastern identity that is simultaneously distinct and in tune with its Islamic surrounding. 

I contrasted the social and official reaction (as distinct from the personal one) to the murder of Myriam with the aftermath of the slaughter of 62 adolescents on a Norwegian Island earlier this year. Following a meticulous and protracted process, Anders Brehing Breivik, the murderer at the heart of these events has only this week been found clinically insane by two Forensic Psychiatrists. More importantly they found that his actions could be blames on delusional beliefs emanating from a diagnosis of Paranoid Schizophrenia. Breivik is likely to spend the rest if his life in a secure psychiatric institution; an outcome that has not pleased everyone but as one bereaved parent insisted, the important point is that society will no longer be at risk from him. 

The protection of others is an important function of well-established mental health services in European countries where specialists coordinate their work with other agencies, including law enforcement agencies and social services. It is of course fanciful to expect the development of such services in the Arab world, at least in the short term.  But as shown in the Breivik case, the use of mental health expertise to help provide satisfactory answers following a crime that impact society beyond the immediate environment of the victim and the perpetrator can be a positive investment for the concerned authorities.

There is no evidence that Fathi Jaber Salateen, the Syrian who committed the gruesome murder in Sahel Alma was mentally ill in the clinical sense. In fact the event is shocking in its simplicity, in the sense that it appears to be the pure product of a criminal psychopathic mind. Myriam, a loving and loved 28 year old who happened to be at the wrong place and at the wrong time, was as such sacrificed to appease dysfunctional basic sexual instincts. What followed remains mostly speculation until details are further revealed.

But this is not the account reported by various media outlets, either for reasons of ignorance or ulterior motives. Instead the social and sectarian dimension was exploited ad nauseaum overshadowing the personal tragedy. This became a story of an innocent Christian girl killed by a Muslim Immigrant worker. The discrepancy between the real and perceived cultural and religious values of both victim and perpetrator were emphasized to explain the murder. A political solution was even sought for what is essentially a problem inherent to the human mind; the dysfunctional psyche independent of creed. Little context or analysis was provided for these types of murder, which are mostly advertised in the Christian West.  For what it’s worth another chilling parallel could be drawn between this case and the murder of 25 year old Jo Yeates last Christmas in the English city of Bristol. The convicted murderer was no other than her neighbor, Vincent Tabak, a distinctively middle class Dutch architect who led an unremarkable crime-free existence.

The death of Myriam could not come at a worse time for the Lebanese authorities. For months, public paranoia has been at its peak fuelled by heightened local and regional political tension but also a genuine lack of security. In a desperate attempt to minimize public outcry, many in positions of responsibility made populist statements lumping together unrelated events and reaching erroneous conclusions. The measures suggested might reassure a traumatized community, but do little to prevent another Salateen from striking in Sahel Alma, or elsewhere when we least expect it.

2011: The rise of the Arab Ego

Joseph El-Khoury

A healthy ego is essential for the sound functioning of any individual. Societies and groups also require the healthy equivalent of an ego, which can be defined as a set of guiding principles in how they perceive themselves and their relationship with others.
 

It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the Arab ego had been fairly damaged over the course of the 20th century but even probably beyond that to the era of Turkish domination, from Seljuk to Ottoman.  The last century was particularly harsh as it opened on hope in a dawn of self-determination, prosperity and unity.  What follows is well documented: From the failure to establish an Arab state in the wake of the 1916 revolt to the Invasion of Iraq in 2003, passing through the Sykes-picot agreement and the creation of the state of Israel, Arab history reads as a succession of defeats, retreats, disappointments and foreign domination. For lack of better strategies, the Arabs fell back on an unhealthy introversion; the type that generates resentment, suspiciousness and misunderstanding of the other without providing viable paths for self-validation. The series of civil/sectarian/ethnic/social conflicts that have plagued the Arab hemisphere for decades with frequent overspills onto the global scene can be, in my view, directly linked to this battered and bruised ego in need of rescuing.

Enters the Arab spring… Pushing the Arab masses to the global stage as a force to be reckoned with and lifting in its wake the Arab ego. As the action unravels months later, this exercise in confidence building might actually be the only long-lasting tangible effect of the Uprisings. 

We will soon celebrate the one year of anniversary of the Tunisian spark of what later became the Arab Spring, suitably dubbed by a Western media machine until then hostile and dismissive. We have also started discovering the vulnerability of the process and how easily it could be reversed, compromised or hijacked. Any of these three scenarios are likely to lead to a fragmentation of the Arab ego; an outcome with practical implications for individual countries and for the leading nationalist ideological drives that have dominated the political scenes for in excess of 100 years.  Arab nationalism, in its secular and religious (Pan-Islamist) components is unlikely to resist another humiliating failure. The more so humiliating as it would be self-inflicted through internal divisions, the lack of direction and a naïve dichotomous outlook on the modern world. The unfortunate scenes in Maspero, Cairo a few days ago should not have come as a surprise to anyone not blinded by the myths of a united Arab society liberating itself from foreign shackles in one deep breath of freedom. 
 

The Arab uprisings are a necessary evil, akin to a painful corrective surgical procedure; and an equally painful convalescence is to be expected. It would still be wrong to delude ourselves with an inflated sense of our self importance and our achievements. But if the Arab twittersphere is anything to go by, grandiosity and stubbornness is on the agenda uniting Islamic revivalists, pro-western liberals and traditional Nationalists from Egypt to Syria. At the time of writing, a summary report would include a change of guards in Egypt, an unsettled democratic process in Tunisia, a tribal struggle in Yemen, a religious rift in Bahrain, a revolution backed by NATO in Libya and a bloodbath with sectarian undertones in Syria.  The umbrella term of ‘Arab spring’, which is essentially another Orientalist myth fails to capture the essence of these events or to predict their outcomes. Our own misguided contribution has been to dismiss the internal contradictions plaguing the Arab land and the Arab identity from long before the first Zionist settler and the first oil pipeline.

A new Arab ego based on self delusion is still an unhealthy one. Honest blunt introspection is required, but no progressive political force or intellectual circle has so far been willing to provide it while remaining effectively connected with the wave of popular anger. This is leaving the fray open for the hordes of populists and opportunists with less than shiny credentials.

Hope remains that in the coming months someone somewhere will rise to this challenge.

Autumn leaves... the promise and threat of the Arab spring

Bassem Hassan

                                          Photo Roberto Schmidt AFP/ImagesGetty

As the popular Arab revolts approach autumn, the tree of Arab dictators is shedding its leaves. One after the other they fall. Some fell when the tree was merely shaken, others after a strong wind and still others after a raging storm. The storm still rages, the tree is shaking violently and the remaining leaves will fall… yellow, crooked and dry.

Arab societies are vastly different from one another in terms of their social organization, institutions of state and history of independence and governance. Yet, they share the fact that they are governed by corrupt oligarchies often lead either by a family or a single brutal figure. As such it is perfectly understandable that the discussion over the future of post-revolutionary Arab nations centers upon the idea of democracy. Clearly, no Arab future is likely to be bright and hopeful without democracy. However, democracy is a vast and complex notion and today exists in almost as many forms as there are democratic states. The question therefore is what basic standards of democracy might we call for in the new Arab nations emerging from the settling dust of the liberation battles?

Perhaps a useful parameter against which to measure this notion is the path of democracy in modern Arab history. Today, one might speak of two democratic countries in the Arab world: Lebanon and Iraq. The former has a relatively long experience with its democratic system, while the latter has a rather new experience with its system. What the two countries share is a very troubled unstable history with their democracies. A logical assumption therefore is that the common elements of the two systems underlie the shared trouble they have with democracy. Those common elements are a system of power sharing based upon religious sects and heavy intervention in internal affairs by conflicting outside powers. Thus, the Arab revolutionaries in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and soon Syria would be well advised to avoid anything resembling the Lebanese or Iraqi “democracies”.

Arab people across the region deserve the freedom and democracy they have paid for with decades of oppression and poverty and months of bloodshed. They also deserve a democracy likely to sustain them in the long term. They deserve a democracy that will allow their societies to develop solid economies, modern educational systems, sustainable infrastructures and institutes of knowledge creation. The brave young Arabs who rose to defy the heritage of their defeated and defeatist fathers, but also in equal measure the dark prophecy and evil instruments of small but violent minority of religious extremists, deserve a future in which they are all equal in rights and duties regardless of age, gender, ethnic origin, spiritual conviction and life style. Those who paid with their bodies and risked their lives, and the memories of those who lost theirs, deserve a future in which Arab peoples stand in social solidarity within and between their countries, while respecting each other’s right to independence and self-determination.

All these gifts do not come cheap and they do not come easy. All these rights and privileges are not given, but rather created. All this promise held within the very nature and course that the Arab revolutions have decided to take, does not come merely through claiming democracy and holding elections. Lebanon and Iraq are a sadly non-shining example. For the Arab spring to someday shine a beautiful sunlight and for the Arab tree to finally bear the fruit of progress, it needs to be planted in the soil of secular, socialized democracy. Any other form is short-term recipe for regression to the dictatorship of tribalism and its favorite mechanism of governance: civil war!

Zeid Hamdan and General Suleiman: The Authoritarianism of Fragile Egos (or vice versa)

Karl Sharro

Republished with permission from Karlremarks. Follow him also on twitter @Karlremarks.

Message from Zeid Hamdan in prison: 'Dear friends, I am now in the prison of the police station of the palace of justice in Beirut because of my song "General Soleiman". They are prosecuting me for defammation of President Soleiman. I dont know, until when I am staying in prison. Please mobilize!'

The Lebanese musician Zeid Hamdan, recently back from participating in the Shubbak Festival in London, sent this message from his detention cell in Beirut earlier today. Shubbak was intended as a 'window on contemporary Arab culture', the bitter irony is that this incident has now given an all too realistic view of the contemporary culture of repression and arbitrary use of power in Lebanon. The song in question, General Suleiman, is a light-hearted reggae number that has has provoked the humourless authorities to go after Zeid Hamdan, in all likelihood for the 'offence' of demeaning the position of the President of the Republic. This archaic residue of the French mandate period has often been used by the authorities to clamp down on the freedom of expression.

Last year I reviewed General Suleiman, and I may have been too harsh on the borrowed imagery in the video clip and the soft satire it employed. Zeid explained at the time that the idea for the song came out of the political frustrations of the power vacuum that the country experienced, and how he saw the election of General Suleiman as a positive step. The song is in fact is a plea for change, for stability, for normalcy. As a result of the authorities' incompetence, lack of humour and heavy-handedness, perhaps it will now spark a genuine drive for change. The reaction to the detention has been swift, the news travelled very quickly and protest will hopefully follow very soon.

While it's tempting to defend Zeid on the basis that the song isn't actually offensive, I think this is the wrong approach. What we need to defend here is the freedom of expression, without qualifications, and push for abolishing the archaic laws that provide the legal basis for such arrests. No politician or public figure should be beyond critique, and they shouldn't be allowed to use those laws in a desperate bid to gain the respect that their political record hasn't gained them. The role of art and music isn't to flatter the fragile egos of insecure public figures. Let's say a resolute no to these forms of intellectual intimidation and fight for our freedom to offend the clique of fools that is ruling us.

Join the Free Zeid page on facebook.

Why Syria’s Christians Should Not Support the Assad Regime

Elie Elhadj*

At the Dormition of Our Lady Greek Catholic cathedral in Old Damascus, Father Elias Debii raises his hands to heaven and prays for divine protection for embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Bishop Philoxenos Mattias, a spokesman for the Syriac Orthodox Church said: “We are with the government and against these movements that oppose it”.

Those among Syria's Christian clerics and civic leaders who publicly support the Asad regime are short sighted. They are courting long-term disaster for themselves and their congregations. Why? Because, the Asad regime will not remain in power forever; it is immoral to support non-representative unjust rule; the Asad clan’s exploitation of Sunni Islam has emboldened Islamism and thwarted the development of secularism in Syria; and because scaremongering for blackmail legitimacy will not work forever. The following explains each reason.

The Asad regime will not remain in power forever

Since the March 8, 1963 military coup d’état against the democratically elected parliament and government of President Nazim al-Qudsi, an unelected minority of the Alawite Asad clan has been ruling Syria with an iron fist; notwithstanding, those seven uncontested referendums for the two Asad presidents.

In addition to impoverishing Syria; despite billion of dollars in oil revenues, the regime has committed horrific atrocities—extra-judicial killings of hundreds of Muslim Brothers detainees in the Palmyra prison in 1980, mass murder in 1982 of between 3,000 citizens, according to the regime’s apologists, and 38,000 in the city of Hama, let alone the torture of residents at the slightest suspicion and the disappearance of opponents. The killing of more than 1,000 demonstrators during the seven weeks since the March 26, 2011 popular uprising adds to the regime's grim catalogue of human rights violations.

Such a system of governance is unsustainable. It cannot last forever. When the day of reckoning will come, the support that certain priests and civic leaders had given to the regime will place all Christians in danger.

It cannot be predicted when the Asad regime might fall. However, should the demonstrations become larger and spread to downtown Damascus and Aleppo, the demonstrators could overwhelm the security forces; rendering a Hama or a Palmyra type atrocity impossible. If the demonstrations get bigger, more Sunni clerics would join the uprising. Ultimately, even the Sunni palace ulama could turn against their benefactor president.

There is no love lost between Sunnis and Alawites on a religious level. Accommodation between the Asad regime and Sunni palace ulama is a matter of convenience. Orthodox Sunnis regard Alawites as heretics. Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), condemned the Alawites as being more dangerous than the Christians, and encouraged Muslims to conduct jihad against them. Likewise, Alawites despise Sunnis. To Alawites, the howls of jackals that can be heard at night are the souls of Sunni Muslims calling their misguided co-religionists to prayer.

If parts of the army, which is a conscripted institution, would refuse killing demonstrators or if the army would stand up to the republican guards and the intelligence brigades, then the regime might very well collapse.

It is immoral to support non-representative unjust rule

That leading priests of certain Syrian churches publicly support the Asad dictatorship does not reflect well on the sense of justice, morality, or benevolence of the priests. It is not very Christian for priests to abandon their duty to stand up to oppression, corruption, and injustice.

There might be an argument in favour of tolerating an illegitimate dictatorship if the dictator were benevolent. But, Mr. Asad’s dictatorship is neither legitimate nor benevolent.

For some priests and civic leaders to publicly embrace short-term convenience and abandon long-term security and defense of justice and human rights can be very expensive for the Christian community as a whole. Syria’s Sunni majority will forever remember Christians’ support of Mr. Asad’s misrule. A thousand years later, the memories of Christian and Alawite support of the Crusades are still vivid in the collective consciousness of Sunnis.

The Asad clan’s exploitation of Sunni Islam emboldened Islamism and impeded the development of secularism in Syria

Islamism has been gaining strength over the recent decades, thanks to the Asad clan’s strategy of exploiting Sunni Islam to prolong their hold on power.

That the regime and its apologists and propagandists describe Mr. Asad’s rule as ”secular” is an exaggeration, if not false. The Asad regime is neither secular nor sincere in its promotion of the Sunni creed. Since their seizure of absolute power more than four decades ago, the Asad government did not secularize Syria in the slightest. Syria of 2011 is no less Islamic than Syria of 1963.

Exploiting Sunni Islam, together with the excesses of the ruling elite, corruption, abuse of human rights, poverty, and unemployment have been driving increasing numbers of young men and women to extremism. The longer this situation continues, the more fertile the ground will become for Islamism to grow.

Here is how the Asad dynasty has been impeding the development of secularism in Syria and exploiting Sunni Islam.

Article 3.1 of the Syria constitution makes Islam the necessary religion of the president. Christians are barred from the country’s highest political office. Article 3.2 makes Islam as “a main source” of legislation.

Seventh century Shari’a laws and courts are in force in personal status, family, and inheritance affairs (Christians follow their own archaic religious courts). Shari’a law is the antithesis of the liberal laws of the modern age. It denies women legal rights compared with Muslim men. It impinges on women’s human rights. Shari’a law reduces the status of women to that of chattel—a Muslim man can marry four wives, divorce any one of them without giving reason (with limited child custody rights, housing, or alimony), a Muslim woman is prohibited from marrying a non-Muslim man while the Muslim man is allowed to marry non-Muslim women, a woman cannot pass her nationality on to her foreign husband and children while the man can, “honour killing” of a woman by a male relative results in a light sentence for murder, and two women equal one man in legal testimony, witness, and inheritance. Such maltreatment of one half of Syria’s society is in spite of the regime’s energetic attempts to project an image of secularism, modernity, and equality between the genders.

The Islamic curriculum in Syria’s elementary, middle, and high schools teaches Muslim Sunni Islam regardless of the Islamic sect to which they belong. The textbooks are discriminatory, divisive, and intolerant of non-Muslims.

More mosques, bigger congregations, and more veiled women than ever before have become the order of the day in Syrian cities. To flaunt his Islamic credentials, President Bashar Asad even ordered a special rain prayer throughout Syria's mosques performed on December 10, 2010 in order for God to send rain.

Following the March 2011 violent demonstrations, Mr. Asad acted to gain support from the Sunni palace ulama and mollify the Sunni street. The popular Sunni cleric Muhammad Saiid al-Bouti praised Mr. Asad’s response to many of the requests submitted by a number of Sunni clerics. In his weekly religious program on April 5, 2011 on Syrian government television, Sheikh al-Bouti applauded Mr. Asad’s permission to allow niqab-wearing (black face cover) female teachers; transferred in July 2010 to desk duties, to return to classrooms. Sheikh al-Bouti had attributed the drought in December 2010 to the transfer from classrooms of the niqab-wearing female teachers. Sheikh al-Bouti also praised Mr. Asad for the formation of the Sham Institute for Advanced Shari’a Studies and Research, and for the establishment of an Islamic satellite television station dedicated to proclaiming the message of true Islam. Also, the first and only casino, which had enraged orthodox clerics when it opened on New Year’s Eve, was closed as well.

Why exploit Islam and fight secularism?

To rule Sunni dominated Syria, it would be helpful to the Asad clan to uphold the influence of Sunni Islam instead of wading in the muddy waters of Shari’a reform and secularization, even if that meant throwing the Baath Party’s constitution away.

Islam is helpful to Muslim rulers. Not only in Syria, other Arab regimes (except Lebanon and Tunisia) exploit Islam to stay in power. Islam demands obedience of Muslims to the Muslim ruler.

The Quran, the Prophetic Sunna, and opinions of famous jurists enjoin Muslims to obey the Muslim ruler blindly. In 4:59, the Quran orders: “Obey God and obey God’s messenger and obey those of authority among you.” Answering how a Muslim should react to a ruler who does not follow the true guidance, the Prophet reportedly said, according to Sahih Muslim: “He who obeys me obeys God; he who disobeys me, disobeys God. He who obeys the ruler, obeys me; he who disobeys the ruler, disobeys me.” Abi Da’ud (d. 888) and Ibn Maja (d. 886) quote the Prophet as imploring Muslims to hear and obey the ruler, even if he were an Ethiopian slave. Al-Bukhari (d. 870) quotes similar traditions. The palace ulama invoke one thousand year old opinions of famous jurists such as Al-Ghazali (1058-1111), Ibn Jama’a (1241-1333), and Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328). These men taught that the Muslim ruler must be obeyed blindly because even an unjust ruler is better than societal unrest.

Syria’s palace ulama threaten the Muslim faithful with eternal damnation if they fail to obey Mr. Asad (waliy al-amr). In the hands of the Asad clan, Islam has become a psychological weapon supplementing a brutal security machine.

Scaremongering for Blackmail legitimacy will not work forever

That certain priests and civic leaders subscribe to unsubstantiated scaremongering regarding future Islamist/salafi persecution of Christians is unwise. Those in the Christian community who warn of the slaughter awaiting Christians if the Asad regime collapses fall for the regime’s Machiavellian practice of blackmail legitimacy. Neither historical precedence nor credible evidence today supports such scare tactics. Blackmail legitimacy, like the crying-wolf syndrome, does not work forever.

Islamists/salafis who might harbor violent intentions against Christians are a tiny minority of Syria’s 23-million population. There are no accurate statistics or opinion polls to suggest otherwise. Syria’s Islamists/salafis are not representative of Syria’s Sunnis. The great majority of Syria’s Sunnis, around 75% of the population, are moderate Muslims who have lived rather harmoniously with their fellow Christians for centuries.

During the first 15 years of independence and until the advent of the Asad clan, Syria’s Christians enjoyed peace and shared whatever prosperity was available at that time with the Sunni majority. The suggestion that Syria’s Sunnis would kill Syria’s Christians is malicious misinformation to divide and rule. The regime’s media, apologists, and propagandists who circulate such stories are wicked. Those who believe such tales are naive. Syria’s Christian minority’s best interest could not be separate from the interest of the Sunni majority.

That the options to Syrians today are reduced to either accepting the current poor state of affairs or contend with an Islamist/salafi rule; even civil war, is blackmail used by the regime to perpetuate its monopoly on power and avoid genuine reform. That genuine reform is not an option does not bode well for the country. That President Asad insisted in his address to the parliament on March 30, 2011 that Syria’s protesters had been “duped” into damaging the nation on behalf of its enemies, and his infamous billionaire cousin, Rami Makhlouf, stated in an interview with The New York Times that, “Syria will fight protests till ‘the end’” spell danger to all Syrians. Like a pressure cooker, the longer a dictatorship stays in power the more violent the end will be.

Sunnis, like Christians, are threatened by Islamist/salafi ideology, violence, and seventh century way of life. While systematic long-term persecution of Christians by Sunnis will not happen in Syria, acts of revenge by extremist groups might occur during the chaotic days of a popular revolt against; not only Alawites and Christians, but also against non-Christian supporters of the Asad clan altogether.

To spare Syria a potential catastrophe, Mr. Asad should institute a comprehensive and genuine political reforms, in particular; multi-party parliament and contested presidential elections. Scaremongering priests can help. They must desist from misinformation and hypocrisy. They ought to become honest to the teaching of their churches. They should defend legitimacy, justice, and the rule of law.

Wise men and women; Alawites, Christians, and Sunnis must council the president and his immediate family that genuine reform; not cosmetic retouches, not the use of the tank, is the only way forward.

Hafiz Asad and his son, Bashar, have saddled the Alawite community plus the regime’s supporting groups with a terrible burden, a potential disaster. The Asad family must understand that four decades of misrule are kifaya.

Bashar Asad has a rare opportunity today to become the leader who saved Syria from a frightening future. Would he? Or, indeed, can he?

 

*Dr Elie Elhadj, born in Syria, is a veteran international banker. He was Chief Executive Officer of Arab National Bank in Saudi Arabia during most of the 1990s. Upon early retirement, he received a Ph.D. from London University's School of Oriental and African Studies. He writes on Middle Eastern and Islamic affairs. www.daringopinion.com

For more information follow the link to his website

Low airfares or the piecemeal Lebanese revolution

Charbel Gereige

It is such an exciting time to watch the news in the Arab world. When the news of the toppling of Ben Ali and his regime in Tunisia came through, my first reaction was: Bringing down a bad politician is the easy part, replacing him with a good politician is the hard part. Initially, the news failed to excite me. I couldn’t feel the wind of freedom and was too sceptical it could spread. I only started getting excited when the Egyptian people rose to topple their president, and with the signs that movements in Libya, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen were following their example.

Yet my excitement was still tinged with a slight sense of envy. I wished something could be done in my own country, Lebanon. Around that time, a shy movement appeared in Lebanon consisting of youth that wanted to argued for a change of the confessional political system. A few vocal demonstrations took place, and still continue at a slower pace. Although I doubt they will be able to change anything in that direction. The number of those who oppose such reform is overwhelming.

Of course Lebanon is different. Compared to the thousands of secularists who took to the streets, the million citizen marches took place in a different context, the notorious year 2005 and the so called Beirut Spring. Over a million came to commemorate the assassination of Hariri and another million came to support his opponents.

There is a Lebanese exception in that we do not have a dictator at the top of the political system. For all their sins, our presidents are elected and leave at the end of their term. Despite the backdoor deals, our prime ministers still need to seek the approval of the majority of parliament members.We do have a democratic system, but our system is far from perfect. So when it comes to reform, we cannot revolt against one person that would embody the anger of the nation. It was relatively easy to get a vast majority of Egyptians to agree that they want Mubarak to go away. It’s not easy to get a majority of Lebanese to agree that any political side needs to be made accountable. The Lebanese are so divided, and this means change is at first look impossible. All the Lebanese agree that there is something wrong, but cannot agree on a solution or a direction. You can bet that any suggestion will automatically be opposed by the other half under one excuse or the other. It is our dilemma: we want democracy, but so far it has proven on balance to be bad for us
.

Faced with this, a possible strategy would be to find common ground between the overwhelming majority of Lebanese on single issues, and get them to rally for it. Something that touches the day-to-day life of people, a simple issue, not abstract values.

For example: A group of concerned citizen is now working to try open up the Lebanese airspace to fair competition, which could benefit us all. This is one amongst many more issues that can be improved, like cheaper mobile phone fares, and better internet connection.

I think the originality of the idea, consists in normal citizens, who do not have political aspirations, lobby for cheaper airfare to and from Beirut. If we can’t have our Arab revolution in one go, why not go for it piecemeal. An issue like this does have political ramification, but in the right direction. It is not a secret that many politicians have direct or indirect interests in MEA. So it is not unconceivable that they are keeping the monopoly in their own interest. In a more competitive market, the margins are smaller, and MEA would have to bring down their tickets price, and improve their service quality. And to survive, they might in the process get rid of the huge bulge of politically backed employees, who are poor value for money.

Why would this unite all the Lebanese, because even those who do not personally travel will have a relative abroad. So this would save them a nice sum yearly. I see no reason why a ticket from London to Beirut is £600 while it can be as low as £100 to Cyprus. This is an issue that would unite all the Lebanese no matter what is their social class, or political affiliation, or religious affiliation. Besides, for people living not far from Lebanon, this means it becomes affordable to go back home for the weekend and contribute further to the local economy.

On the other hand, this is an issue that might unite most of the politicians from all camps...against it. You can see now how this is edging nearer to the Arab Revolution? We manage to unite all the people against all the politicians on a single issue. But once this issue is resolved, others can follow with an established mechanism in place. Think mobile phone fares (highest in the world) or slow internet (slowest in the world) etc. As a consequence our life as Lebanese is improved.

And by fighting a corrupt system, we would be encouraging our politicians to change or perish.

Going back to the practical aspect...

As a first step, a meeting is taking place in London with a few young professional Lebanese people to discuss a suitable strategy. Hopefully we will be able to announce the launch of a campaign and get the ball rolling.

We will have our own revolution, without having to answer questions on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon or on Hezbollah’s arms. We don’t have to debate the things that divide us to bring the changes that unite us.

حملة إسقاط النظام الطائفي: التحدِيات

خالد برّاج

حسناً فعل الشبّان و الشابات بإطلاق حملة إسقاط النظام الطائفي في لبنان و جميلة تلك اليافطات التي رفعت في التحركات مطالبة بنظامٍ علماني بديلاً عن نظامنا الطائفي العفن, الصورة بحدِ ذاتها جميلة و معبِرة في بلد يُراد فيه الطائفي كأساس و العلماني كإستثناء.

و بغض النظر عن إختلافنا الفكري أو السياسي مع بعض المشاركين في التظاهرات من أحزابٍ أو جمعياتٍ شبه حزبية فإنّه من الممكن التأسيس على هذه الحملة كوسيلة ضغط بوجه النظام و عملائه ( و أقصد هنا نظام 1943 و تعديلاته أمّا العملاء فهم السياسيين من "موالٍ مستجد/معارض سابق" إلى "معارضٍ مستجد/موالٍ سابق") إلاّ أنّ الحملة في مرحلة إختبار مفصلي و الطريق معبّد بالأشواك و لعلّ بوادر تلك الأشواك ظهرت إلى العلن للمرّة الأولى في مظاهرة يوم الأحد 20/03/2011 علماً أنّ في الخفايا ما يدلّ على أكثر من إشكالية و منها ما ينسف جوهر هذا التحرُك من أساسه و يجعل عنوانه جميل و برّاق لكن محتواه فارغ أو على نقيض مع عنوانه.

و هنا تبرز الإشكاليات الحقيقية التي على القيميين و المشاركين في الحملة و المظاهرات العمل سريعاً على إزالتها و تخطِيها و يمكن تلخيص تلك الإشكاليات بالنقاط التالية:

أ‌- شعور البعض أنّ الحملة ليست بعيدة عن التجاذب و الإنقسام السياسي الحاصل في البلد بالرغم من تأكيد القيِيمين على الحملة و المتظاهرين أنّ الحملة لا تستهدف سياسي معيّن أو طرف سياسي واحد بل أنّ الحملة هي بوجه جميع السياسيين من فريقي 8 و 14 أذار و من خلفهما النظام الطائفي المهترىء (الأفضل هنا إستعمال عبارة الزعماء السياسيين لما تحتوي تلك العبارة على مدلول طائفي/مذهبي/إقطاعي/زبائني)

ب‌- محاولة الزعماء السياسيين (لا جدوى من إعادة تكرار عبارة الطائفيين فهي من المسلّمات) سرقة التحرّك عبر تأييده أو إرسال بعض أعضاء المكاتب السياسية للمشاركة في التحرّك/المظاهرة و قد ظهرت في وسائل الإعلام منذ بدأ التحركات عبارة جديدة يمكن إضافتها إلى قاموس العبارات السياسية اللبنانية و هي "عضو المكتب السياسي الأستاذ أو السيِد أو الحج فلان الفلاني شارك في صورة مستقِلة" و ذلك بالرغم من وجود الضادين في تلك العباراة (عضو مكتب سياسي و صورة مستقلة).

ت‌- إشكالية سلاح حزب الله لما يشكِل هذا السلاح من معوقات فعلية من الناحية العملية (بغض النظر عن الإنقسام الحالي حوله بين طرفي النزاع في لبنان و الأطماع الإسرائيلية الدائمة من إجتياح أو عدوان) و ذلك للأسباب التالية:

1. أولاً: للتعارض مع مفهوم القوة العامة (من شرطة و جيش إلخ...) التي تختصر الأمن و تمتلك حصرية السلاح في الأنظمة الحديثة و أي بناء لدولة أو نظام سياسي يجب أن يلحظ بشكل أساسي مبدأ حصرية السلاح بيد القوة العامة التي هي ركن مركزي في بناء السلطة العامة.

2. ثانياً: لكون السلاح أساساً هو بيدِ حزب ديني على خلاف جزري و عقائدي مع مفهوم الدولة العلمانية (و ليس من باب المصالح كعيِنة كبيرة من الأحزاب و السياسيين اللبنانيين), هذا لا يعني أنّ الحزب يؤيِد النظام الطائفي الحالي و لكن نظرته للنظام تختلف بل تكاد تكون نقيضة للدولة العلمانية و هي تلتقي إلى حد كبير مع نظرة التيارات الإسلامية "السنِية" لشكل و مفهوم الدولة (الرجاء مراجعة أدبيات الحزب منذ نشوءه إلى يومنا هذا فيما يخصّ الطائفية و نظام الحكم في لبنان).

3. ثالثاً: لإرتباط هذا السلاح بالصراع في المنطقة.

4. رابعاً: لإرتباط الحزب العضوي بالجمهورية الإسلامية في إيران و تأكيده مراراً على أهمية هذا الإرتباط من الناحية الدينية و الفقهية و الفكرية و السياسية.

ث- إشكالية الإستثناءات في التعبير عن رفض النظام الطائفي و الزعماء الطائفيين و هنا يلاحظ أنّ بعض المتظاهرين يفضِلون التصويب على زعماء معيّنين و إستثناء آخرين علماً أنّ طائفية كل الزعماء هي واضحة إلى العلن و لعلّ الإشكال الذي حصل يوم الأحد 20/03/2011 أثناء رفع يافطة تنتقد فيها أحد الزعماء و الأسلوب الميلشيوي الذي أقدم عليه بعض "اللاطائفيين" لإنتزاع تلك اليافطة خير دليل على ذلك.

الحملة تواجها تحدِيات كبيرة و منزلقات وعرة و لعلّ حجم المشاركة في تظاهرة الأمس هي خير دليل على وجود وعي عند مجموعة كبيرة من اللبنانيين (و منهم من الأصدقاء و الرفاق الذين نعتز بصداقتهم و نضالهم) بأنّ الخلل يكمن في نظامنا الحالي و إنّه قد آن الأوان للإنتهاء من مقولة " النظام يعيد إنتاج نفسه بوسائل أخرى" كما حصل في محطات 1958, 1969, 1973, 1990, 2000 و إنتخابات 2005 و إتفاق الدوحة 2009.

The Liberal illusions of March 14th

Joseph El-Khoury

In preparation for their planned show of force on their birthday, or at least the day before, the 14th March camp in Lebanon ( self-defined as liberal, pro-western and patriotic) have launched an all guns blazing online campaign heavily reliant on social media.This is mostly done through the blog page  ayyawatan (what type of homeland?) which prominently feature posters allegedly comparing a Hezbollah dominated state to the one of the Hariri led alliance.

http://www.ayyawattan.com/


http://www.facebook.com/ayyawatan#!/ayyawatan?closeTheater=1

So far so good! ...until further scrutiny reveals that the latter vision is strongly inspired by the perspective of the traditional Chrsitian Right. (To be understood the one that fought the civil under the banner of the now defunct Lebanese Front). This is not particularly surpising as the communication team at the heart of this campaign is likely to include Kataeb or Lebanese Forces affiliated individuals. But portraying 'their Lebanon' as a fully westernised Middle Class paradise where blue eyed children spend their weekend skiing just smacks of complete lack of sensitivity. How is it not a PR disaster after a 15 years civil war was fought over the country's identity and affiliation with the Arab world. This approach is also a major rebuff to recent calls from within the movement to appeal directly to the Shiite power base.

One particular poster that has mysteriously disappeared showed side to side a distressed elderly veiled lady hugging a crying child and another younger casually dressed model hugging her similing progeny. It caused outcry from a number of circles, which might explain its withdrawal.

Still, some of the ones in use are only slightly less offensive in my opinion. I wonder at what point the Hariri communication machine will understand that playing the dichotomy card (Good vs.Evil, Life vs. Death, Ugly vs.Beautiful, Poor vs.Prosperous) can only alienate a substantive section of the population across the sectrarian divide, that  have neither experienced nor aspire to the 'Switzerland of the Middle East'.

The Madness of King Muammar

Joseph El-Khoury

In addition to entertaining us Arabs with his antics and word games for decades, Gaddafi can be credited with turning everyone from the milkman to the news presenter into a diagnostician of mental illness. Words such as ‘nutter’ and ‘madman’ became ‘delusional’ and ‘psychotic’ in the hands of those more sophisticated twitter crowds. The consensus being that the dictator of Libya for the past 40 years is indeed clinically insane. And there lies the problem. This ‘madman’ has been ruling a country of 6 million inhabitants with an iron grip, has managed to fund every single revolutionary movement and subversive outfit throughout the 70s and 80s (From the Abu Nidal group to the Basque ETA passing by the Irish Republican Army), has charmed 2 US presidents and challenged many more while finally turning friend of the West in the trade deal of the Century. And what does that say about us then, the rest of humanity, blessed by sanity and mental equilibrium but until 2 weeks ago bending backward to accomodate the Libyan ruling clan's outrageous behaviour. Few have actually attempted to, publicly at least, get to the bottom of Gaddafi’s modus operandi. I suspect that much more of that effort is being done behind closed doors within intelligence agencies where psychological analysis if foreign dignitaries is a routine exercise. Nonetheless, I have my doubts over how successful Western experts have been at studying human psychology outside a narrow Western context. Indeed one former UK ambassador urged analysts to view Gaddafi’s speeches from the angle of his target audience: His supporters and foes on Libyan soil, which he respectively attempts to embolden and terrorise. Using direct, unconditional street language might look strange to a Washington official but not to a militiaman in Green Square.

On one hand Gaddafi’s eccentricity is not in contention and independent of any cultural relativism. The man is capricious and unpredictable. But these are personality traits common to many and not signs of madness, at least not the type that diminishes one’s executive functioning and ability to skilfully manipulate and lead. The difference between Gaddafi and the common man is that he is able (and enabled by others) to live his fantasies in a very public manner and on a scale that impacts on the Libyan people and on the international scene. We have to remind ourselves that this man of humble background reached absolute power aged 27, faced little opposition from the start and is granted the status of patron of an international revolutionary movement for decades Based on what I have seen and heard so far, I suspect Gaddafi is neither psychotic nor on drugs (Interesting that he uses the same accusation for the rebels opposing him). His smile to Jeremy Bowen as he unashamedly declares that the Libyan people loved him is similar tactical posturing to his son’s tongue-in-cheek comment that Libya was ‘the most democratic country in the world’ which earned him laughs and applause at the LSE.

The way to read Gaddafi is to remember that absolute monarchs/leaders have always behaved irrationally/emotionally the way we all do sometime. In the absence of any systems of checks and balances the people find themselves at the receiving end of such behaviour. World history is littered of such figures from Alexander the Great to the Roman emperors and medieval Kings to modern day autocrats. Unfortunately for us, the Colonel is an all too common 20th century dictator with a superficial penchant for theatricality. Dismissing him as an ineffective ‘nutcase’ is simply an insult to the Libyan people shedding blood and tears to oust him from power.

Everyone wants a piece of the revolution

Lama Bashour

Re-published with permission from Lama's Scrapbook

Before we get into this, I'd like to clarify two things:

I am fully aware that the situation we are in is most likely the result of years and years of bad government policies and opportunistic behaviour by a select few.

I am even more aware that I will probably never make an impact in the real world, because my ideals are too extreme and frustratingly impractical.

Fortunately for me, and maybe unfortunately for you, technology has given me this platform to let my voice be heard, if only by a small number of people. I know that a lot of us are still high on the domino effect of democracy that started with Mohamed Bouazizi's desperate act of giving up on his country. Yet, we are struggling to find our own path, some of us asking for reform, others for a secular government. I am not quite sure, however, if we are just riding the wave of revolution or if there is a genuine desire (I had argued in an earlier post that I don't believe there is a real need) for change. Are we certain that we don't just want the desire to change, instead of change itself?

I look around me and all I see are individuals who are part of the system they want to change, benefiting from it and sometimes bending the rules when it suits their purpose. I see people demanding of their government economic reform, and asking it for more jobs for their followers. I see people lobbying for a secular government, claiming it's the other sect that is preventing it. I see people insisting on anti-corruption laws, and requesting a relative to make sure that their government application is processed quickly. And of course, time and time again, I see people ignoring others - in a queue, crossing the street, driving a car - as if they were not members of the same community they are seeking a better future with. I see you, because I am you.

The thing is, we can't ask for change, if we are unwilling to make it ourselves. So if any of us are serious about this revolution or whatever you want to call it, let's all take a long look at ourselves, and if we can't find anything worth improving, then we're not looking hard enough. And if what needs to be improved requires too much of a sacrifice, then we're not ready for it. And if we don't look at every single mistake, not just the ones that inconvenience us, as unacceptable, then we may never be.

You can join all the Facebook groups you want and retweet every piece of news you read, but the barrier of fear that was broken in Tunisia and Egypt is not the same as ours. Ours is much more difficult to overcome, because the enemy we fear is in us.

The Hypocrite Inside of Me

Joseph El-Khoury 

"The true hypocrite is the one who ceases to perceives his deception, the one who lies with sincerity" Andre Gide (1869-1951)

So much has happened over the past few weeks that I struggled initially to find a specific thread for this piece.

To state the obvious, the Middle East is on the move after decades of stagnation and the absence of meaningful macro-political evolution, effectively since the 1980s. Being one of those who spent their University days dreaming of a new dawn of ‘Arab Revolt’ that would reverse the status quo emanating from the last Arab Revolt (Think Lawrence of Arabia, Lord Balfour and Sykes-Picot), I was bound to be shaken and stirred by the sight of hundreds of thousands of Arab men and women taking to the streets of Tunis, Cairo, Sana’a and now Manama and Benghazi in the name of a basic right to human decency. But a lot has been written about the emotional connection that transcends the fictitious borders established by the colonialists and their heirs. With my growing dose of cynicism, I will not be able to compete with the revolutionary fervour that has swept Tahrir square but also Twitter and Facebook to land at the doorstep of every Liberal Orientalist enthusiast. So I will stick to pointing out the slightly perverse side of the current maelstrom (not to be confused with Tsunami in the Lebanese context).

The Arab uprisings and specifically the Egyptian chapter of it uncovered a latent hypocrisy that defines the position of pretty much everyone interested in the Middle Eastern question. Many insist that Democracy is at the core of their wishes for this region. I would argue that it is more a case of democracy with a small ‘d’ that we all humbly aspire for. The US administration, which is contemplating the most serious threat to its regional pack of cards within matter of months proclaimed its understanding of the people’s aspiration, having spent decades and millions propping up the ugliest authoritarian regimes. You only need to google images of ‘Obama and Mubarak’ to confirm the admiration that the former had for the latter, until 10 minutes prior to his departure from office. France’s 180 degrees on the defunct Tunisian regime was as sharp. Ben Ali got on his plane believing Sarkozy was a genuine buddy to be disowned by the time he flew over Sardinia. But hypocrisy is not particular to our American friends. Fellow Arabs, of the ragtag Leftist, Islamist, Nationalist, Anti-Zionist alliance have so far successfully managed to shut down half of their brain matter in the assessment of the credentials of their own anti-imperialist allies. Iran, Syria and to a lesser degree Qatar are either ignored or reluctantly mentioned under duress as textbook examples of authoritarian, autocratic and intolerant regimes. The Baath party’s fondness for the art of political imprisonment and the Iranian Mullah’s tendencies for repressive social regulation are weighed against their supposed determination to liberate Palestine. I will not even comment on the Israeli government position, as the ‘Only democracy in the Middle East’ Pin-up verges on losing its misleading title while eyeing another expansionist adventure to its North and to its South. As for me, I will come clean and declare that I am torn between my animosity for the dictatorships and my discomfort at Islamist movements taking over the task of defining the next few decades, which I believe to be the likely outcome of recent events (and I say this out of conviction rather than scaremongering).

So the Egyptians rioting in Tahrir have also displaced the fig leaf and we have all been revealed stark naked for our biased, selective and superficial subscription to democratic principles, nominally the rule of the majority within a system guaranteeing the safeguard of individual and communal rights. Displacing one tyrant is no guarantee of freedom and prosperity. All is not lost and Democracy with a ‘D’ can be earned through the multifaceted struggle that begins once the naive anarchist fantasies of some are satisfied. This struggle will need to be led by reformists in the old tradition of a spearheading core with a solid perspective on the near and distant future. The uprising, beyond its very powerful symbolism in shattering the psychological wall of Arab impotence, should remain a means to an end. That end is still ill defined among true reformists and incomplete revolutions offered on a platter to military opportunists or retrograde faith/ethnically based organisations may yet bring a series of new challenges.

By all accounts this promises to be an exciting year... but then so was 1918. Unless!

"اتركوا شجرة واحدة لحبل مشنقتكم"

داليا عبيد

"اليوم حريق وغداً غريق والحكومة في إجازة شهود الزور" هو أحد الشعارات التي رفعها صديق عزيز لي على صفحة الفايسبوك. أول عبارة قالها لي عندما سألته عن أحواله: انه بخير، ما زال صامدا في لبنان ويستخدم هذه الشبكة الالكترونية "لفشّ الخلق". لم أريد أن أتطفل عليه أكثر وأسأله عما يدور في باله من أفكار تضعه في دائرة المتأففين ولكني فهمت الجواب من العنوان ورسمت له صفحة أسباب تقهره بسبب تماسه المباشر معها وتقهرني بسبب بعدي عنها والتماسي اليومي لها عبر صفحات الصحف الصادرة في بيروت.

سوف يبدأ صديقي من أخبار اليوم الطازجة ليخبرني بأن لبنان كله كان على موعد البارحة مع الحرائق الطبيعية التي حرقت قلوب الناس على رزقهم وعلى المواسم الضائعة أصلاً. سيضغط على أحرف حاسوبه ليقول لي بأن الغصة عمت في قلبه على "ذهب" لبنان الأخضر الذي يقضم سنة بعد سنة وبأن دموعه جفت في عينيه وهو يبتهل المطر الذي تأخر. سيفكر قليلاً ويعود ويقول لي بأن كتاب التاريخ اللبناني لم يكن الوحيد المخيب لأماله المتسعة بل انضم إليه اليوم كتاب الجغرافيا الذي خذله وتمرد على معلوماته حول مناخ لبنان وطبيعته ومياهه العذبة !

سأسأله عن دور الحكومة، سيجيبني بأنها غاشية وغائبة في كوما القرار الظني وبأنها غير مبالية حتى بيومياتنا. ومن ثم سوف يبدأ ليقول لي بأننا تحولنا إلى أشباه أحياء، بأن المسارح والمقاهي وصالات السينما وملاعب الفوتبول قد أسقطت من ذاكرتنا ومن حساباتنا، بأننا لم نعد نخرج حتى للعشاء في الخارج لأن القدرة الشرائية قد هزلت مرة واحدة، بأننا ما زلنا نشم رائحة الشعر المحترق كما شممناه منذ عشرين عاماً عند انكبابنا على احد الكتب للدراسة أو للقراءة على ضوء الشمع الأبيض ذاته الذي نعرفه منذ أيام الحرب الأهلية، بأننا ما زلنا نخرج لشراء المياه المعبأة للشرب وبأننا عدنا لشراء مياه الاستعمال أيضا، بأننا ما زال نقدم الشهداء بالرغم من الاستقرار المؤقت، نقدمهم ذبيحة لإله السرعة والتهور، بأننا ننتظر حرباً وبأننا اعتدنا على تجهيز أمتعتنا فقط في أوقات الحروب أو في الساعات التي تسبقها. سأسأله إن كان بخير، إن كان يشكُ من أمراض، سيقول لي لم نعد نعرف ماذا نأكل وماذا نشرب وماذا نتنفس ولا أريد أن اعرف إذ كنت بخير أو لا، لا أملك مالاً كافياً لهذا النوع من الكماليات! سأسأله عن أخبار الأصدقاء المشتركين، سيقول لي بأن الطريق إلى مطار بيروت سالكة حاليا وبأنه يودع يومياً الطامحين إلى النفاذ بجلدهم، كما فعلت أنت تماماً، وقد اعتاد على ذلك منذ سنوات مراهقته .

سأسأله عن الناس وعن الأفراح والأعياد، سيقول لي بأنه احتفل بعيد البربارة مؤخراً وبأنه "هشل" مع الناس مقنعاً بوجوه الرؤساء والوزراء والنواب.

سأسأله عن صديقته الجميلة وعن علاقتهما وعن زواجهما المحتمل، سيضحك كثيراً ويقول لي أن بمقدورهما شراء حائط أو أكثر بقليل، وبأن "الموعد مرجأ كالمطر" يا صديقتي.

سأتوقف، سأتنهد، سوف أحزن وقد لا تجف دمعتي. سوف أعود واكتب له واسأله عن أخبار الحرائق المائة والعشرين، لن يجيبني مباشرة بل سيكتب شعاراً جديداً على حائطه المجاني يودعني به قبل أن يخلد إلى النوم في هذه الليلة السوداء. باحتراق متجدد وبصرخة مبحوحة تصل اليَ، حيث أنا في هذه البلاد الباردة، سيقاوم نعاسه ويقول لي ولجميع الرواد على الصفحة الالكترونية:

"اتركوا شجرة واحدة لحبل مشنقتكم".