Lessons from Syria

Jade Salhab

There are two parts to this brilliant article by Beesaan el Shaikh in Al Hayat (Arabic) which I believe is an imperative read for anyone interested in the Arab uprising.

The first part of the article uses the tragedies generated by the revolution as a very compelling argument NOT to support it. The second part, near the end, turns the argument around making a simple but slam-dunk case for the revolution.

I want to use the first part to rephrase a position I expressed in the very beginning of this revolution, days before the first Assad speech and the subsequent violent turn of the uprising: I expressed then my hope that Assad would do the wise thing and grab the opportunity to reform the regime by himself, because that was the only transition that would avoid destroying Syria, or handing it to Islamic extremists.

I was naïve in my hopes, obviously. But I believe that hope is a moral imperative. I knew then, like all those who lived through Lebanon's civil war, that no matter where it happens on this earth, or why, or how legitimate, when an uprising turns into an armed rebellion, there is absolutely no controlling of the damage it can make to the structure of society and its ability to recuperate post conflict (think Iraq, Lebanon, but also Salvador, Tchetchnia, or Sri Lanka more globally).

The unspeakable price of civil violence in terms of social dismantling (even more so than the toll on human life and heritage), is why I still believe that any people who has regime change in progress (i.e Tunisia, Egypt) - or in perspective (i.e Jordan, Morocco, or the Gulf in the coming 5 to 15 years) - must bend itself backwards twice, maybe thrice, before engaging in violent struggle, or violent ‘defense of the achieved revolution’ – as opposed to radically peaceful rebellion or political compromise.

One of the reasons I respect Moaz el Khatib so deeply is his awareness of this fact, and his courage to remain constantly open to compromise with the regime for the sake of ending violence – because he knows that no matter how high the price of such compromise is, it will always be lower than the one of sustained violence.

Don’t get me wrong, just like Beesaan el Sheikh says in her article, I believe that there is no choice BUT to support the Syrian revolution because it is the only legitimate and humanly acceptable path forward. But I certainly hope that idealists learn the lesson and understand that wars are, under all circumstances, unwinnable: because even by winning them, we destroy the basic social infrastructure that makes that victory worth anything.

This might sound obvious to some, but the consequence is less so: only a slower transition, or a stubbornly peaceful uprising can come at a lower cost.

I want to end by drawing a relevance to Tunisia and Egypt: compromise is a high price you might need to pay to avoid the higher price of a torn society. And if compromise is impossible (and it should take a lot before you get to this conclusion), than maintain your struggle peaceful at all cost (i.e no military repression of ‘medieval forces’). The alternative is worse than you can ever imagine or calculate.

Everyone wants a piece of the revolution

Lama Bashour

Re-published with permission from Lama's Scrapbook

Before we get into this, I'd like to clarify two things:

I am fully aware that the situation we are in is most likely the result of years and years of bad government policies and opportunistic behaviour by a select few.

I am even more aware that I will probably never make an impact in the real world, because my ideals are too extreme and frustratingly impractical.

Fortunately for me, and maybe unfortunately for you, technology has given me this platform to let my voice be heard, if only by a small number of people. I know that a lot of us are still high on the domino effect of democracy that started with Mohamed Bouazizi's desperate act of giving up on his country. Yet, we are struggling to find our own path, some of us asking for reform, others for a secular government. I am not quite sure, however, if we are just riding the wave of revolution or if there is a genuine desire (I had argued in an earlier post that I don't believe there is a real need) for change. Are we certain that we don't just want the desire to change, instead of change itself?

I look around me and all I see are individuals who are part of the system they want to change, benefiting from it and sometimes bending the rules when it suits their purpose. I see people demanding of their government economic reform, and asking it for more jobs for their followers. I see people lobbying for a secular government, claiming it's the other sect that is preventing it. I see people insisting on anti-corruption laws, and requesting a relative to make sure that their government application is processed quickly. And of course, time and time again, I see people ignoring others - in a queue, crossing the street, driving a car - as if they were not members of the same community they are seeking a better future with. I see you, because I am you.

The thing is, we can't ask for change, if we are unwilling to make it ourselves. So if any of us are serious about this revolution or whatever you want to call it, let's all take a long look at ourselves, and if we can't find anything worth improving, then we're not looking hard enough. And if what needs to be improved requires too much of a sacrifice, then we're not ready for it. And if we don't look at every single mistake, not just the ones that inconvenience us, as unacceptable, then we may never be.

You can join all the Facebook groups you want and retweet every piece of news you read, but the barrier of fear that was broken in Tunisia and Egypt is not the same as ours. Ours is much more difficult to overcome, because the enemy we fear is in us.

The Hypocrite Inside of Me

Joseph El-Khoury 

"The true hypocrite is the one who ceases to perceives his deception, the one who lies with sincerity" Andre Gide (1869-1951)

So much has happened over the past few weeks that I struggled initially to find a specific thread for this piece.

To state the obvious, the Middle East is on the move after decades of stagnation and the absence of meaningful macro-political evolution, effectively since the 1980s. Being one of those who spent their University days dreaming of a new dawn of ‘Arab Revolt’ that would reverse the status quo emanating from the last Arab Revolt (Think Lawrence of Arabia, Lord Balfour and Sykes-Picot), I was bound to be shaken and stirred by the sight of hundreds of thousands of Arab men and women taking to the streets of Tunis, Cairo, Sana’a and now Manama and Benghazi in the name of a basic right to human decency. But a lot has been written about the emotional connection that transcends the fictitious borders established by the colonialists and their heirs. With my growing dose of cynicism, I will not be able to compete with the revolutionary fervour that has swept Tahrir square but also Twitter and Facebook to land at the doorstep of every Liberal Orientalist enthusiast. So I will stick to pointing out the slightly perverse side of the current maelstrom (not to be confused with Tsunami in the Lebanese context).

The Arab uprisings and specifically the Egyptian chapter of it uncovered a latent hypocrisy that defines the position of pretty much everyone interested in the Middle Eastern question. Many insist that Democracy is at the core of their wishes for this region. I would argue that it is more a case of democracy with a small ‘d’ that we all humbly aspire for. The US administration, which is contemplating the most serious threat to its regional pack of cards within matter of months proclaimed its understanding of the people’s aspiration, having spent decades and millions propping up the ugliest authoritarian regimes. You only need to google images of ‘Obama and Mubarak’ to confirm the admiration that the former had for the latter, until 10 minutes prior to his departure from office. France’s 180 degrees on the defunct Tunisian regime was as sharp. Ben Ali got on his plane believing Sarkozy was a genuine buddy to be disowned by the time he flew over Sardinia. But hypocrisy is not particular to our American friends. Fellow Arabs, of the ragtag Leftist, Islamist, Nationalist, Anti-Zionist alliance have so far successfully managed to shut down half of their brain matter in the assessment of the credentials of their own anti-imperialist allies. Iran, Syria and to a lesser degree Qatar are either ignored or reluctantly mentioned under duress as textbook examples of authoritarian, autocratic and intolerant regimes. The Baath party’s fondness for the art of political imprisonment and the Iranian Mullah’s tendencies for repressive social regulation are weighed against their supposed determination to liberate Palestine. I will not even comment on the Israeli government position, as the ‘Only democracy in the Middle East’ Pin-up verges on losing its misleading title while eyeing another expansionist adventure to its North and to its South. As for me, I will come clean and declare that I am torn between my animosity for the dictatorships and my discomfort at Islamist movements taking over the task of defining the next few decades, which I believe to be the likely outcome of recent events (and I say this out of conviction rather than scaremongering).

So the Egyptians rioting in Tahrir have also displaced the fig leaf and we have all been revealed stark naked for our biased, selective and superficial subscription to democratic principles, nominally the rule of the majority within a system guaranteeing the safeguard of individual and communal rights. Displacing one tyrant is no guarantee of freedom and prosperity. All is not lost and Democracy with a ‘D’ can be earned through the multifaceted struggle that begins once the naive anarchist fantasies of some are satisfied. This struggle will need to be led by reformists in the old tradition of a spearheading core with a solid perspective on the near and distant future. The uprising, beyond its very powerful symbolism in shattering the psychological wall of Arab impotence, should remain a means to an end. That end is still ill defined among true reformists and incomplete revolutions offered on a platter to military opportunists or retrograde faith/ethnically based organisations may yet bring a series of new challenges.

By all accounts this promises to be an exciting year... but then so was 1918. Unless!

!فليتوحد اللبنانيين في ثورتهم جميعاُ

داليا عبيد

دفعت أحداث تونس اللبنانيين إلى التسلح بالحماس الشديد وقد لمست ذلك عن قرب عبر الشعارات التي رفعت على المواقع والمدونات الالكترونية حيث عكست المتابعة الدقيقة للشباب والنخب اللبنانيين خاصة الذين ليسوا على ارتباط مباشر بأطراف الحكم.

أثناء سقوط بن علي، كانت تسقط حكومة ائتلاف وطني في بيروت ولكن ليس عبر ثورة شعبية داخلية أتت نتيجة احتراق جسد مناضل للقمة العيش يدعى محمد بو العزيزي، بل نتيجة أزمة مستمرة تتفاعل منذ احتراق جسد رفيق الحريري في بيروت في شباط 2005. هذا الجسد الذي أدى بدوره إلى إشعال ثورة شعبية دفعت الناس بالزحف إلى وسط مدينة بيروت.

في ذلك الوقت، لم تتلاحم مكونات هذه الثورة وعناصرها. فلم تأخذ شكل كتلة مجتمعية واحدة موحدة تتظاهر نقمة على النظام السياسي اللبناني أو غضباً في مواجهة الأزمات الاقتصادية. إنما تشكلت من كتل طائفية ذو دعم دولي (تختلف الأسباب التي دفعت بكل منها إلى ساحة الحرية) في مواجهة كتلة طائفية أخرى ذو عمق إقليمي. وقد أتت اللحظة المليونية بثمارها ودفع رفيق الحريري ثمن تخلص اللبنانيين من شبح الخوف فخرج الجيش السوري الذي كان يحكم لبنان بقبضة بوليسية. وأمام تأملنا لهذه الأحداث، نستنتج بأن ما حصل لم يكن بالمسألة العادية بل هو حدث تاريخي كان بمثابة حلم لمعظم اللبنانيين صغاراً وكباراً.

وقد قدر لأقلية خارجة عن السياق الطائفي، شاركت في صنع الحدث، أن تتأمل في متابعة الثورة باتجاه تقويض دعائم النظام السياسي اللبناني ولكنها اصطدمت بهذا الحائط اصطداماً شديداً بعد أن خرج نظام الأسد من لبنان ولم يخرج معه رموزه اللبنانيين من دائرة الحكم. واستمر تفاؤل هذه الأقلية بالتآكل وصولاً إلى الانقراض حيث ظهر ذلك جلياً في تصاعد حماسهم تجاه ثورة الياسمين واختفاء وسائل تعبيرهم أمام ثورة تقويض الاستقرار اللبناني. وقد نتجت هذه اللامبالاة عن اليأس والملل من تكرار السيناريوهات المعهودة بعد كل أزمة: فراغ حكومي فوساطات دولية وإقليمية(بالرغم من نكهة تركية مميزة هذه المرة) فاحتقان في الشارع فدماء فاغتيالات ف ف ف ..... حيث النتيجة معلقة بانتظار تطور الأحداث في الأيام المقبلة التي من الممكن أن تكون سوداء قاتمة!

وهذا السيناريو إذ يبرهن على شيء فهو على وهن مشهد يعيد نفسه منذ الاستقلال الأول ويدل على فشل النظام السياسي اللبناني في الاستمرار وعلى قدراته الانفجارية المتجددة نتيجة احتدام تناقضاته! وقد كان زلزال الحرب الأهلية الذي اخذ معه مئات الآلاف من الأجساد المحترقة بنيران القصف العشوائي، أحد انجازات هذه التناقضات. ولم تؤدي دماء هؤلاء الشهداء ودموع الأمهات ونحيب الآباء إلى الاعتذار من اللبنانيين والاعتراف بالمجازر والمحاولة لإعادة النظر ببنية صلبة للبنان بل ذهبت الآلام هدراً واستمرينا في إنتاج الأزمات!

لقد أعاد مشهد جسد محمد بو العزيزي المحترق إليَ مشاهد الجثث المحترقة في الحرب الأهلية والتي ذهبت تضحيات أصحابها هباءً (المقارنة قائمة حول مشهد النار فقط) ولكن لم يعيد الشعب التونسي الموحد والمنتفض على الديكتاتورية إلا انبعاث أحاسيس بالانكسار وبذل الحصار. ولكنها في الوقت عينه، وأمام عجزي عن مواجهة الطرق المسدودة في لبنان وبالرغم من إدراكي لاثمان معرفة الحقيقة الباهظة، فهي جعلتني انتفض على حصاري وعلى انكساري وعلى نفسي وعلى كل اللبنانيين المتموضعين في الخنادق الطائفية والمذهبية والخارجية والداخلية لأواجه الظلم اللاحق بالشعب اللبناني ولأقول لنفسي:

ليس في لبنان ديكتاتور كبن علي ومعظم زملائه العرب (الذين لم يسقطوا بعد) ولكنه في لبنان ديكتاتوريات قادرة أن تضع الشعب اللبناني في خندق واحد في مواجهة: الفوضى والفقر والبطالة والارتهان للخارج، وفي إسقاط ديكتاتور الطوائف الأكبر الذي يتسلط على رقاب المواطنين!

فأليست هذه الأسباب بالوافية والكفيلة لتوحد اللبنانيين في ثورتهم جميعاُ؟

Lebanon: The Clash of Narratives

By Joseph El-Khoury

If the leaked New TV Hariri recordings reveal anything, it is the extent of the rift between the Lebanese. Since 2005, two narratives have evolved in parallel with no intersection points, even during periods of intense crisis or external aggression, such as in July 2006. Given any political development, half the country is almost guaranteed to reach an opposite interpretation and draw different conclusions from the other half. Concomitantly there is a dehumanising process in full motion of the other, initially the politician belonging to the other camp, but which is rapidly extending to the ordinary supporter or member of a religious sect. Lebanon is not alien to this process, which mirrors the sequence of events from the late 1960s and the growing conflict around the Palestinian resistance and culminated with the non-discriminatory sectarian killings of 1976. It is not unusual to hear in a Beirut salon the total denigration of Hariri as morally corrupt in pervasive sense of the word: financially, politically and...Sexually. In another salon, Michel Aoun, who gathers the unwavering support of a significant constituency among the Maronite Christian population, is called a ‘nutter’ with references to a supposed mental imbalance and psychiatric illness. There are very few individuals capable of escaping this narrow-minded classification of all things Lebanese into two camps: March 8th and March 14th, Pro-resistance and anti-Hezbollah, pro- Iranian and pro-American, in essence Good and Evil (not in any particular order).

Even the latest events in Tunis were adopted by both camps as a vindication of their respective struggles. Those excitable elements within the March 14th forces that still believe in a democratic offensive led by the US department of State (or the Pentagon when the former falters) twinned it with their Cedar revolution. In their enthusiasm they omitted to mention the admiration that French and American administrations held for the Ben Ali regime until he made the request to land his plane in Paris-CDG en route to exile. Their counterparts in the pro-Resistance camp saw it as an extension of their anti-imperialist struggle against all things foreign while happily gathering support from other undemocratic Middle Eastern regimes in Iran, Syria and Qatar. Many tried to draw more intelligent comparisons between the two developing stories in Beirut and Tunis with little success. Yes both countries are part of the Arab league and marred by corruption, foreign influence and underdevelopment but Tunisia is a country with a homogenous population and no minorities. Its recent involvement in the Israeli-Arab struggle has been an emotional one and its importance in the geo-strategic quagmire of the Middle East is peripheral. Lebanon is by all measures a more complicated affair. The most obvious question would be which Lebanon would have to rise up and against which heads of state?

I get asked a lot about my solutions for the Lebanese problem, given that I spent a significant amount of time lamenting the absence of a political movement able to challenge the structural flaws in the Lebanese system. I still believe that bold grass-root work motivated by clear democratic, secular and socially responsible principles would be a winning formula. Interestingly, one element that could explain the success in toppling the regime in Tunis is the presence of an active secular left-leaning opposition with influence within the middle classes. The Islamist movement, although active, did not appear to have taken a leading role in the uprising. I might be wrong and the days to come will reveal the full picture.