Syria and Lebanon: The secret plan unveiled

Jihad Bitar*

  

Let me start by saying that I do not really have access to any secret plans. Working in communications, I understand the importance of a teasing title in attracting readers. After all, yet another article about Syria and Lebanon can be as exciting as a report on our president Michel Suleiman weekly visitors.

That said, this article does compile some secret information: and by secret, I mean information you probably had no time to assess, even though it was all readily available. My job as a media analyst and “dissector” has taught me how to read between the lines of any political event: analyze semantics and cross information. My team and I use tools developed by social and media scientists, and these tools do unveil some secrets:

Syria’s approach to gaining more influence in Lebanon involves a constitutional change. Any political analysis of Lebanon and Syria’s regional role must take this into account.

Prior to the June 2009 legislative elections, Michel Aoun visited Syria. A few weeks later, billboards – orange billboards (Aoun’s FPM party’s color)- appeared in all of Lebanon with the slogan “The Third Republic”. Lebanon currently lives under the Saudi sponsored Taef agreement – that “ended” Lebanon’s 1975 war- the 2nd Republic. Any communication expert would tell you that no advertiser would put such a “pivotal” political statement without a direct recommendation from the client. The message- such a few weeks after the visit to Syria- was very clear: the March 8th alliance (pro-Syrian and Hezbollah, of which Aoun is part) was promoting a change in the constitution.

Lebanon’s Head of Parliament, Nabih Berri, is a Shiite political figure very closely aligned with Hezbollah’s politics. But Berri is more Syria’s ally than Iran’s. If Hezbollah represents the Iranian influence, Amal (Berri’s party) is Syria’s main ally. A shrewd politician, Berri is known for his double language. What he says is not always what he aims for. Semantic analysis of his speeches has shown quite a few references to the “need to change the way things are structured in Lebanon”. Berri’s repetitive calls for the end of the sectarian system – even though he is one of its main figures- further highlights his ultimate objective for changing the constitution. The frequency of these “system” speeches are actually correlated with visits by Berri’s main political advisor to Syria.

On the 13th of March 2011, the March 14th coalition (pro-Saudi Arabia and USA) held a major anti-Hezbollah rally in Beirut’s central square. Pro-March 8th media attacked the event and tried to portray it as a failure. Orange TV (Aoun’s television) estimated participants at 25,000, while Mustakbal TV (owned by Saad Hariri) at 800,000. My own estimate ranges between 250,000 and 350,000. Walid Joumblatt, the Druze leader that recently switched from March 14th to March 8th (and close to Syria), criticized the event as promoting sectarianism. Interestingly enough, his party’s website ran an op-ed that same evening, describing the rally as “highly successful”, and “showing that the weapons should never be used internally” (a direct reference to Hezbollah’s usage of its weapons in the local political conflict, the main point March 14th leaders were addressing). The ambiguity of Joumblatt’s position actually reflects Syria’s own little secret game: attack March 14th openly and severely, but without destroying them completely. This attitude highlights Syria’s real intentions to weaken March 14th while keeping them powerful enough to stand-up to Hezbollah (another Syrian ally, but under Iranian supervision).

Syria wants the conflict between the two sides to always require it’s intervention to calm things down (as reflected by the self proclaimed role of two close Syrian allies, President Michel Suleiman and Prime Minsiter Nagib Mikati), but for many reasons the current constitutional structure does not guarantee Syria’s long term control: Taef was built as a system dealing with Christian/Muslim equilibrium – with Syria’s military presence as referee. A new constitution will mainly tackle the current Sunnite/Shiite rift that is shaking Lebanon and the whole region, and Syria wants to continue playing the referee – even without the presence of its 30,000 troops.

This Syrian attitude is also reflected in its regional policies. Syria is the Iran’s closest ally (the Shiites’ main sponsor), but is trying very hard to get close to Saudi Arabia (the Sunnites’ main sponsor) and to the United States and the European Union. This attitude provides Syria with three key benefits:

- Regain control of Lebanon (by playing the ultimate referee between Sunnites and Shiites)

- Shield itself from any potential regional conflict (between Iran and Saudi Arabia – directly or through proxies)

- Make itself – and its regime- indispensable as a power broker in the region

To achieve this referee role, Syria needs to continue doing what it has always done best: let the left hand light the fire, so the right hand can intervene and turn it off. This is exactly what it is currently doing in Lebanon. The next fire will probably be a sharp rise in tensions between Hezbollah and Mustakbal (the main Sunnite party), and the constitutional change will be the water that extinguishes it. A Hezbollah war with Israel could be the sparkle.

The success of this strategy depends on another key factor: Hezbollah and Iran’s own ambitions. For the Iranians, Lebanon is just another fighting ground between them and the Saudis. Iran’s influence is reaching Yemen, Kuwait and even the Saudi oil rich regions (populated by Shiites). Saudi Arabia has answered by “invading” Bahrain (in a civil war status between Shiites and Sunnites). Syria’s next move will also depend on how Iran will play its Hezbollah card.

While this chess game unfolds, Syria is facing its own internal problems. Some protests (even though small) have been reported. Syria is not Tunisia, but then again who said Tunisia would ever fall that fast.

*Jihad Bitar is a communications, media and political analyst based in Beirut. Follow him on twitter @JihadTweet

The Peasant and the Student: Iran in the eyes of the West

By Jihad Bitar

Media Analyst

http://arabmediareview.blogspot.com

Just wondering…

“Iran’s Revolution” or “Iran’s Summer Breeze”? This debate has been going on in the western press for the last week. Is Iran heading towards a change of regime or is it just a “very unusual” event that will “eventually die down”.

I will publish later in the week a detailed report with numbers and data on how the Western and Arab media are viewing this “Revolutionary/Summer Breeze”; but first results suggest that the western press is actually divided on another matter:

Is the Iranian split between Ahmadinejad and Moussavi’s supporters, social or religious based?

It seems that US press is focusing on the religious divide between “fundamentalists” (Ahmadinejad supporters) and “reformists” (Moussavi), whereas European media prefers to talk about the clashes between “students” (Moussavi) vs. “rural” Iranians (Ahmadinejad), thus hinting at a socio/economic divide.

Some sources are mixing both visions, assuming that if you are a “student”, you must be a “reformist”, whereas “rural peasants” are surely fundamentalists…

If the western media is right, then if you ever meet a fundamentalist bearded student fighting it out with a clean-shaved reformist peasant; then you’d better either buy a new pair of glasses, or call your psychiatrist.

Persian Riddle

By Joseph El-Khoury

The Iranian theocracy is a regime ‘against nature’; one that defies the basic aspirations of human beings for freedom and emancipation. In a way, it is no different from the Soviet illusion, which seemed unshakable for decades only to collapse overnight like a pack of cards. These regimes shared a similar path, from popular revolutions against a Western backed Monarch they turned into authoritarian leviathans promoting the interests of a small group of self reproducing autocrats. The Soviet Union survived 70 years, despite its gross internal contradictions, buoyed by the International struggle against capitalism and its excesses. The US, The Pope or Radio Free Europe might be credited with its accelerating its demise but the reality is that it was the ordinary citizens of Russia, Romania and Poland who brought the rotten carcass to its knees, once it became obvious that the propaganda would never deliver happiness, wealth and the promised ‘new socialist man’. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran might have changed the world and introduced a new dimension to International politics but it has failed on one essential account: Changing the character of the Iranian beyond recognition. From under the veils and behind the Beards, has emerged that same Iranian who still asks tough questions and expect reasonable intelligent answers from a regime he has supported against all odds since its inception. The future will depend on the ability of the institutions to answers these questions without shaking the foundations of the ‘Wilayat Al Faqih’.

Taking the comparison between the Soviets and the Mullahs further, one could argue that the grievances against Ahmadi-najad are the tip of an iceberg of objections against the principles of the Islamic Revolution itself and the restrictions it imposes on personal freedom. From there to concluding that a counter-revolution is imminent is a giant leap. The result if the elections might just be an excuse for initiating this movement , the fruit of years of frustration among a section of the youth, specifically the educated lot that resides in the comfortable suburbs of Teheran and is wired to the world wide web through Twitter and Facebook. This is a vibrant section of the country that should certainly be reckoned with, but they are probably a visible and noisy minority. This is a repetition of the heavily mediatised anti-Chavez rallies in Caracas a few years ago. Organised by the discredited elite and attended by the cosmopolitan middle class, they showed a selective but hardly representative image of Venezuela. It is interesting that in their coverage of the recent events, few foreign correspondents mentioned the fact that pre-elections polls had predicted a win for Ahamdinajjad (even the Washington Post had predicted a 2:1 defeat for Mousavi)(Read the BBC’S Jim Muir. Even fewer ventured outside of the capital, possibly due to security concerns. The fact remains that high turnout could have easily been a further reaction to what many considered blatant interference in internal Iranian affairs by a biased International press. And so far besides vague accusations of a ‘charade’, the opposition has failed to publicly denounce any specific instances of fraud that could explain the 63% figure claimed by the incumbent. In a typical display of ‘Persian pride’ an Iranian expat in New Zealand contacted the BBC to explain the reasons behind her casting her vote for the vilified president: The economical program and Iran’s security. Plain and simple: No pressure, no intimidation... just misguided support for a controversial figure.

The demonstrations are inevitably the start of something, an awakening perhaps that will hopefully be followed by a process of political maturation. But talk of a pro-American ‘democratic’ Iran is wishful thinking limited to western powerhouses and their media outlets...these same outlets who brought us the ‘liberation’ of Iraq and the ‘pacification’ of Afghanistan.

The Next Israeli War on Lebanon

By Bachir Habib

Israel bombing the surroundings of Beirut International Airport
during 2006 war. (Source: National Geographics).

It seems that time is ripe for the next Israeli war on Lebanon. It might not take place within the next few days or months, but it is definitely on the horizon.
On the eve of two major events; the Israeli elections taking place on the 10th of February and the first commemoration of the assassination of Hezbollah’s “commander in chief” Imad Mughnieh, the situation is worrying, dangerous and more volatile than ever.

The pieces of the puzzle start with the declarations coming from Teheran last week. Meeting with Iranian Air Force commanders, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared that “Iran's Islamic Revolution has been the source of great political changes”. He added that the "The popularity of the message of the Revolution can be clearly witnessed in what happened in Gaza, and before that in the 33-day war in Lebanon. The well-equipped Israeli army backed by the US was incapable of defeating a handful of besieged youth who had nothing but their faith in God."
When Ayatollah Khamenei mentions the popularity of the Islamic Revolution outside the Iranian borders, we are automatically redirected to the classical Iranian dogma of "Exporting the Revolution". The Iranian establishment seems satisfied with the spread of its doctrine abroad, specifically in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories.

The echo of such perturbing declarations is heard in Beirut, where the Iranian fist is strongest. On the 16th of February, Hezbollah is organizing a massive rally to commemorate Mughnieh. Leaked information already suggests that "There is no other way but a revenge equal in its magnitude to scale and meaning of Haj Raduan’s (aka Mughnieh) assassination". Hezbollah officials have been reported saying in private circles that "The planned reprisal act will surprise Israel on many levels, and that Israelis should pay in order to refrain from assassinating other leaders".
Hezbollah is indeed an expert at surprising the public opinion and Israel. The party promised and delivered on many occasions. However, Israel’s reaction will not come as a a surprise to anyone this time, and the Party of God knows it well. This time, Hassan Nasrallah cannot tell us what should not have been said after the 2006 war, when he declared: "If I only knew the scale of the Israeli retaliation I would not have ordered the capture of the two Israeli soldiers (operation Honest Promise)".

Since Lebanon is officially at war with Israel, and since the military balance of power is in Israel’s favor in terms of fire power, the Israeli Ministry of defense has always handy in its drawers a draft plan for an eventual war on Lebanon.
If we go back in time, a dangerous precedent shows how Israel can use any pretext to start a war when it needs it. For example, in 1982, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon started "in response" to the assassination attempt against Israel’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov.
After it failed in achieving its goals in the 2006 war; after the Vinograd commission report and its impact on troops morale, Israel is in desperate need for a war that will restore its lost supremacy. Such would be the plan of a future Likud government.

Hezbollah, from his part, appears ready to fulfill the promise by inflicting a painful revenge on Israel no matter what the result is, even if the price of Mughnieh’s blood will end up being paid by thousands of Lebanese lives. Finally, and by giving the order for the so called spectacular revenge, Hassan Nasrallah will give Tel Aviv a rare opportunity, while the best strategy would be to leave it stuck in the post Lebanon 2006, and Gaza 2009 era of failed wars.

The fight is no more one

By Wael Abdelraheem

In October 2008, Syrian Foreign minister Waleed Moallem visited London where he held meetings with the British officials and voiced certain opinions on the Israeli Syrian negotiations. In an interview on one of the satellite stations he announced that the indirect negotiations between the two countries had reached a crucial point, and that Syria had received a commitment from Israel to retreat to the 4th of June 1967 borders. A commitment similar to Rabin’s promise in a previous round of negotiations. Moallem also noted that the Israelis had been informed by the Turkish mediator of the UN documents which specify the borders of the 4th of June line; an essential point according to him.
More intriguing was his answer to a question about the possibility of an agreement between the two countries, regardless of a comprehensive regional peace that would resolve the Palestinian issue. He literarily said that this was a possibility in the event of a successful outcome for the ongoing negotiations.
How does that translate politically for the Syrian regime? It simply means that it is backtracking on its previous commitment to the principles emerging from the 1991 Conference in Madrid but also the foundations of Syrian diplomacy for the past 40 years, in accordance with the Baath party ideological speech and the statements of the National Progressive Front. These same foundations, which consider a fair and comprehensive peace the only satisfactory option, were used in the criticism of past Bilateral agreements between Israel and Egypt at Camp David, and the ones that followed at Oslo and Wadi Araba with the Palestinians and Jordanians.
In practice, Moallem’s statement means Syria could sign a peace treaty with Israel in return for the Golan Heights even if the independent Palestinian state remains a fantasy, if the Palestinian refugees never return, and if East Jerusalem is engulfed in a Greater Jewish Capital.
Hence who follows the developments of the Syrian position finds that they have been consistent in their demand to recover the whole of the Golan Heights, but have reneged the basis of the negotiation techniques that Damascus adopted for decades. There is no ambiguity about this speech, and I will not speculate on whether the Syrians are stating their true intentions. But it is no doubt a curious complexity in the position of the Iranian and Syrian axis and their allies. It seems that the resistance speech heard in Beirut, Damascus and Tehran aims essentially at the return of the Golan, occupied in the war to free Palestine. The Baathists relied on that same speech to reach power in Syria. There is also possibly a hidden contradiction between Teheran and Damascus on the best way to approach the Arab-Israeli conflict including the negotiations.
If there is no contradiction but cooperation and complementation, then a number of important questions require consideration: what do the protestors want from Palestine, since they do not mind signing a peace agreement with Israel regardless of whether the Palestinian issue is resolved or not? Why do they insist on keeping an active front in Lebanon? Why not reopen the old fronts with Israel if they sincerely wish to continue the struggle? And finally why do they consider that the missiles are the optimal method of resistance but never use their own rocket batteries that are more efficient than the Kassams, the Grads and other Katiushas?
But if the Syrians and Iranians disagree on the outlook for the conflict with Israel, and if Iran has broader targets than only reaching a just solution for the Palestinians, then what are they? It is to eliminate Israel from existence, in the name of a fight against imperialism? It has so far refrained from engaging foreign troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, with which it shares common borders? In fact, it barely resisted the occupation of these two countries in the first place, while foreign presence is likely to threaten Iranian security.
Perhaps these are simple and naïve questions but the answers are in the hands of the Palestinians who have to think twice about the call for a united fight against a mutual enemy launched by the protesting regimes … The fight is not one, and neither are the rules of engagement. Over the past 25 years we have only seen the blood of the Palestinians and the Lebanese being shed in the name of this common. So enough lies.

The New Middle East

By Bachir Habib

Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moualem warned on Monday of military retaliation in the event of future cross-border American raids, saying: "If they do it again, we will defend our territory."
Why didn’t they retaliate this time? Why didn’t they retaliate after the bombing of what the US and Israel pointed at as “nuclear or chemical facility under construction” in September 2007. Why didn’t the Syrian – Iranian mutual defense agreement apply in both cases? And where do we go from here?
Ever since the invasion in 2003, Iran has had the upper hand in Iraq. The “Democratic” elections brought to power an Iraqi establishment close to Teheran and somewhat “Made in Teheran”.
Is it a coincidence that the so called Surge strategy is succeeding and the level of violence in Iraq has reached its lower records since American ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and his Iranian counterpart Hassan Kazemi–Qomi held series of meetings in Baghdad discussing “exclusively” the security issue in Iraq? Although the invasion of Iraq probably had ideological roots in terms of “spreading the Western model of Democracy and creating a New Middle East”; on the ground this war has evolved in a more pragmatic direction. Washington is now seeking a safe exit for its troops, and on the other hand an Iraqi-American Agreement that will preserve its interests. The negotiations over that agreement were conducted by the Iraqi government, meaning an Iranian approval is implicitly given.
There is an Iranian American diplomatic tango going on, and it is at times getting quite intimate: In May 2008 reports revealed how Washington blocked an Israeli decision to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. More recently the Israeli press publishes a report titled: Bush to declare renewal of ties with Iran (Haaretz, 25/10/2008).
Americans are apparently acting as if nothing is possible in Iraq without the help of Teheran. And it is only a matter of time before the American implicit recognition of the Iranian role becomes a formal and declared one. The price is going to be paid in Iraq, by Iraqis. It may have the face of an American brokered “Iraqi Taef” (in reference to the Taef conference that ended the Lebanese civil war in 1989) where Washington will recognize an Iranian role in Iraq, similar to the one Syrians used to have in Lebanon.
In exchange, the Iranians have established themselves as the only de facto power able to provide security guarantees to Israel: On the nuclear level, an Iranian agreement with the International community is the only nuclear security guarantee for Israel worthy of notice. On the northern Israeli front, Iran is the only actor able to ease Hezbollah’s pressure in south Lebanon and pacify the border. On the Palestinian front, Teheran has a very crucial role in guiding Syria’s policy towards radical Palestinian factions. All this comes at a time Damascus is desperately trying to reintegrate the International community after years of isolation, and when indirect Israeli Syrian peace negotiations via Turkey seem to be on a positive track.
There is a serious chance the next phase opening with a new US administration in office from November will be characterized by a climate of pragmatic negotiations. The re-defining of roles and shifting alliances will all be paving the way for an honorable and safe exit of the US Army from Iraq.
Finally, regarding Washington dropping its traditional allies such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the pragmatic Americans will find a very diplomatic way securing arms selling to the Arab Gulf Monarchies and other Arab countries, and on the other hand making them smoothly understand that Teheran is capable to give Israel in terms of security what they were never able to provide.

The Partnership

By Wael Abdelraheem

The supporters of the Syrian regime in Lebanon argue that Syria is not in a hurry to make peace with Israel, nor is it in a haste to normalise its relation with the USA.
The USA is in the quagmire of the economic backlash that is casting its dark shadows across the whole world, and stalling its imperial project. These circumstances, along with the imminent threat of Iran and the ever growing power of Hizbullah, render Israel unable to make any individual decision without consulting with Washington and thus fearful of a confrontation.
As for Syria it is benefiting from Russia's resentment to seek military support, reviving the Port of Tartoos and reestablishing Russian political influence in the Near east. Not to mention the military support of Iran that protects Syria from serious danger.This means that Syria does not need the US or Israel because they have nothing to offer once the normalization is in gear and the peace treaties signed.
In addition, the Baath Regime is in no hurry to reestablish its military presence in Lebanon now that it regained its political leverage there through its allies, namely Hizbullah and Michel Aoun.
All these arguments sound logical and plausible.
The American project in the Middle East is in trouble, and the parties that gambled on its success especially in Lebanon are suffering from disillusion. Their Regional allies seem to have redirected their support to the Islamic militias in the course of their open war against Iran.This is only a glimpse of the general picture…
But the people who really care about the future of Lebanon and the region, and those who call for true democratic reforms, social justice as well as for maintaining the struggle against Israel on the basis that it is at the heart of the national liberation movement, perceive the alleged Iranian Syrian victory as an additional blow to their efforts.
Yes we are defeated because Iran and Syria on one hand and the USA on the other work to destroy every chance of a democratic project.

They are accomplices in breaking down our people into bickering sects and groups.
They are accomplices in using up our political potential in petty conflicts.
They are accomplices in supporting Islamic terrorism in words and actions.
They are accomplices in liquidating the Palestinian cause for the sake of other causes.
They are accomplices in eliminating hope from our dictionary for the foreseeable future.
This partnership between enemies is the knife that killed us in the past and is still killing us today.

We are losing the fight without any confrontation. We have no choice but to regroup and reunite, moving from the margin into the heart of the battleground with the intention to fight with our own weapons and our own values. Otherwise we might as well be consigned to the ‘Rubbish Bins of History’ as the old Leftist expression goes.

A Syrian crane made in France

By Bachir Habib

Picture: www.lefigaro.fr

What we witnessed in Paris was not a Euro Mediterranean summit. The French are not dupe, neither the Europeans; and the occasion provided a good cover. What we witnessed was simply Syria’s reintegration into the International Community. Bashar Assad’s visit to Paris is his first successful international visit since 2004.
This visit has to be placed in a context, and that context is not European, it is purely Middle Eastern and challenging after the failure of the regional American project. What happened in Paris is also a European move on the international foreign policy chessboard; a daring maneuver from French President Nicolas Sarkozy who succeeded in convincing his European counterparts that the time was right for distancing themselves from previous alignment on US policy towards the region. This is even more necessary before Washington itself operates a foreign policy shifting leaving Brussels behind. Not to forget that in the United States, it is now “Time to Change” as said by the Democratic presidential contestant Barack Obama.
Sarkozy opened wide the gates of Europe and the world to the Syrian President. Paris tried to show that Assad is received only because he responded positively to the French demands: Reducing interference in Lebanon or using positive influence to help in unlocking the Lebanese political deadlock, pushing towards a Hamas – Israel truce through pressure on his Palestinian allies, and finally proving a true will to make peace with Israel and continue visibly what started secretly between the two countries two years ago as the July 2006 war raged on Lebanese soil.
This is the tip of the iceberg, but at its base resides a more serious issue: A new balance of power is being formed in the Middle East, there’s a decline (at least temporary) of American influence after decades of direct management of the region while a new Iranian (de facto) regional super power will emerge in case Teheran’s nuclear program is not halted.
This new context is highly important to France and Europe, because it’s not only the American “Greater Middle East” that is broken, but because the post cold war American Dream of a Unipolar World that has been crushed.
Is it the new dawn of Multipolarity that we’re witnessing? It might be. But it is definitely not the Multipolarity the West was dreaming of. It is one where Europe and the US will have to deal with countries like Iran, Pakistan and Venezuela (…) as regional super powers that have a National Interest to protect, same as Washington, Brussels or Moscow.
French diplomacy reveals its conviction that reintegrating Syria in the international community is the only way to take it back from Iran’s arms. But Assad declared this week that following a request from France, Syria would hold talks with Iran to try and resolve the crisis over its nuclear programme! Nicolas Sarkozy knows that this is not how Assad can be stolen from Ali Khamenei, and it is unrealistic, at least for now, to expect Damascus to take a distance from Teheran. It is rather the Iranians who are on the verge of being recognized as a great regional power, by using a Syrian crane made in France.
By the way, was Husni Mubarak there? And even if Saudi King Abdullah was with him, Assad would have remained the only star. It is simply not a good time for US allies.

Iran and the New Israeli Diplomacy

By Bachir Habib

The New York Times announced on Friday that Israel has carried out a rehearsal for an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The large military exercise took place over the Eastern Mediterranean and Greece during the first week of June 2008 and involved more than 100 F15 and F16 warplanes.

The bells of war may not be tolling yet, but the diplomatic fire alarm has been triggered. The IAEA Director Mohamed el Baradei said he would resign if there was a military strike on Iran, warning that such an attack would turn the region into a “fireball”. Russia’s UN envoy commented on the rehearsal saying that threatening Iran with military action could undermine newfound momentum to resolve the standoff with Tehran.

The diplomatic momentum M. Churkin mentioned appears to compete with a military one already in the pipeline.

Today, the risk of an American attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities seems unrealistic, due to many reasons related to security in the Gulf and the Middle East. But the scenario of an Israeli attack on Iran nuclear plants looked like a reality after the report published on Friday by the NY Times.

The credibility of this scenario resides a Realpolitik process that has been running for months now, between the Jewish State and the Iranian proxies in the Middle East such as Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah.

It comes while Turkish brokered negotiations between Damascus and Tel Aviv are going forward, with the Syrian President and the Israeli PM attending the same summit in France on the 13^th of July. It comes as well after Israel and Hamas succeeded in agreeing an Egyptian brokered truce in Gaza. And finally it coincides with a German brokered exchange of prisoners between Israel and Hezbollah that begun with the release of Nassim Nisr weeks ago, and the possibility of freeing Samir Kuntar (prisoner in Israel since 1979) in the next few days. There are also diplomatic signs from Israel towards a possible pullout from Shebaa farms due to what appears to be serious US-UN efforts to transfer sovereignty over the farms from Israel to the UN as a first step.

If Tel Aviv agrees on the two latter points, Hezbollah and mostly its popular base will suffer an existential crisis because the party of god always pretended keeping its weapons till the liberation of Shebaa farms and the release of Lebanese prisoners in Israel including Kuntar.

The new “positive” Israeli diplomacy towards Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah generated many question marks lately, but it is now possible to consider that the answers are starting to be uncovered. The Israeli military rehearsal over the Eastern Mediterranean might help in bringing answers to the surface. In that sense, it might be an American-Israeli synchronized preventive diplomacy aiming at impeaching any Iranian proxy reaction in case Teheran is attacked.

If this logic prevails, the timing of the Israeli attack on Iran will then be carefully chosen after a pullout from Shebaa and the liberation of Kuntar, and after the Mediterranean Summit in Paris next month where the Israeli Syrian talks will be informally on the schedule. And by this time, the truce between Israel and Hamas may have passed its critical phase.

But all this looks very easy, and things tend to become more complicated, because what is expected is a preventive Iranian diplomacy hijacking the Israeli American plans before they get to the crucial moment of attacking. The Israeli game is now uncovered, and it’s time for Teheran to play.

It’s yet very early to proclaim a winner, and uncertain that there will be one.

It Works with Donkeys, not with Serious Countries

"A heavy-handed sticks and carrots policy may work with donkeys but not with serious countries. The United States would have a better chance of success if the White House abandoned its threats of military action and its calls for regime change". In the below article published in the Washington Post on the 27th of May 2008, Zbigniew Brzezinski (a National Security Adviser in the Carter Administration) and William Odom (a retired Army lieutenant general, and a former director of the National Security Agency), criticize the US policy towards the Islamic Republic and examine other constructive options. Both are affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Arabdemocracy

A Sensible Path on Iran

By Zbigniew Brzezinski and William Odom

Image: www.bbc.co.uk

Current U.S. policy toward the regime in Tehran will almost certainly result in an Iran with nuclear weapons. The seemingly clever combination of the use of "sticks" and "carrots," including the frequent official hints of an American military option "remaining on the table," simply intensifies Iran's desire to have its own nuclear arsenal. Alas, such a heavy-handed "sticks" and "carrots" policy may work with donkeys but not with serious countries. The United States would have a better chance of success if the White House abandoned its threats of military action and its calls for regime change.

Consider countries that could have quickly become nuclear weapon states had they been treated similarly. Brazil, Argentina and South Africa had nuclear weapons programs but gave them up, each for different reasons. Had the United States threatened to change their regimes if they would not, probably none would have complied. But when "sticks" and "carrots" failed to prevent India and Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons, the United States rapidly accommodated both, preferring good relations with them to hostile ones. What does this suggest to leaders in Iran?

To look at the issue another way, imagine if China, a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a country that has deliberately not engaged in a nuclear arms race with Russia or the United States, threatened to change the American regime if it did not begin a steady destruction of its nuclear arsenal. The threat would have an arguable legal basis, because all treaty signatories promised long ago to reduce their arsenals, eventually to zero. The American reaction, of course, would be explosive public opposition to such a demand. U.S. leaders might even mimic the fantasy rhetoric of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad regarding the use of nuclear weapons.

A successful approach to Iran has to accommodate its security interests and ours. Neither a U.S. air attack on Iranian nuclear facilities nor a less effective Israeli one could do more than merely set back Iran's nuclear program. In either case, the United States would be held accountable and would have to pay the price resulting from likely Iranian reactions. These would almost certainly involve destabilizing the Middle East, as well as Afghanistan, and serious efforts to disrupt the flow of oil, at the very least generating a massive increase in its already high cost. The turmoil in the Middle East resulting from a preemptive attack on Iran would hurt America and eventually Israel, too.

Given Iran's stated goals -- a nuclear power capability but not nuclear weapons, as well as an alleged desire to discuss broader U.S.-Iranian security issues -- a realistic policy would exploit this opening to see what it might yield. The United States could indicate that it is prepared to negotiate, either on the basis of no preconditions by either side (though retaining the right to terminate the negotiations if Iran remains unyielding but begins to enrich its uranium beyond levels allowed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty); or to negotiate on the basis of an Iranian willingness to suspend enrichment in return for simultaneous U.S. suspension of major economic and financial sanctions.

Such a broader and more flexible approach would increase the prospects of an international arrangement being devised to accommodate Iran's desire for an autonomous nuclear energy program while minimizing the possibility that it could be rapidly transformed into a nuclear weapons program. Moreover, there is no credible reason to assume that the traditional policy of strategic deterrence, which worked so well in U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and with China and which has helped to stabilize India-Pakistan hostility, would not work in the case of Iran. The widely propagated notion of a suicidal Iran detonating its very first nuclear weapon against Israel is more the product of paranoia or demagogy than of serious strategic calculus. It cannot be the basis for U.S. policy, and it should not be for Israel's, either.

An additional longer-range benefit of such a dramatically different diplomatic approach is that it could help bring Iran back into its traditional role of strategic cooperation with the United States in stabilizing the Gulf region. Eventually, Iran could even return to its long-standing and geopolitically natural pre-1979 policy of cooperative relations with Israel. One should note also in this connection Iranian hostility toward al-Qaeda, lately intensified by al-Qaeda's Web-based campaign urging a U.S.-Iranian war, which could both weaken what al-Qaeda views as Iran's apostate Shiite regime and bog America down in a prolonged regional conflict.

Last but not least, consider that American sanctions have been deliberately obstructing Iran's efforts to increase its oil and natural gas outputs. That has contributed to the rising cost of energy. An eventual American-Iranian accommodation would significantly increase the flow of Iranian energy to the world market. Americans doubtless would prefer to pay less for filling their gas tanks than having to pay much more to finance a wider conflict in the Persian Gulf.

Ignorance Strikes Again: Persepolis Banned in Beirut

By Bachir Habib

Picture: Courtesy of www.fourteenfilms.typepad.com

Once again, ignorance strikes in Lebanon. Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis is the latest victim of our very “intellectual” General Security Censorship Department.
I first discovered Persepolis in Beirut, when I came across the series of comic books on which the movie is based.

Reading Persepolis was an amazing experience; I can easily label it as “Iran’s modern history for dummies”. Watching the movie was even better, for it operates on several levels. On one level it is a very simple and accessible piece of work that even a child can watch and enjoy. It is a highly emotional autobiography that tells the simple story of an Iranian girl growing up in the last years of the Pahlawi’s dynasty in Iran. She witnesses the rise of the Islamic Republic after 1979 and the implementation of the strict Islamic social and cultural code of conduct.
On another level It can be viewed as a very complex work focusing on how psychologically painful the experience of a teenager who is sent to live alone in a country with a very different culture (in 1983, at the age of 14, Satrapi was sent to Austria, by her parents in order to flee the Iranian regime).

The most sophisticated part of the movie is the historical and political angle through which Satrapi tells a vastly ignored part of Iran’s History. Through the experience of her socialist and communist family, from intimidation to imprisonment and killing, she shows how the Iranian Islamic Regime established its legacy by anihilating the Left who was the real avant-garde of the social and political movement that ended the Shah’s reign.

Banning Satrapi’s work in Iran may not be surprising, but banning it in Lebanon has a very different signification. I will not go into a political diatribe to convince my reader that Hezbollah is an Iranian proxy. But simply, this movie and comic books add to the debate about Hezbollah’s role and political ambitions the kind of argumentation the party wants to avoid because it ruins years of efforts to give the very fundamentalist party of god a “modern and tolerant” face.
Those who know about Lebanese politics know for sure how powerful Hezbollah is in certain spheres of the Lebanese Administration, notably the General Security where the committee of censorship sits.

The outright banning of Persepolis is an added clue to the true Hezbollah. But the lesson from the Film is elsewhere, it is for the emerging “Neo-Left” in Lebanon and the Arab World, who picture Hezbollah today as the natural heir to the socialist and nationalist liberation movements of the sixties and seventies. For those “leftists” engaged in a marketing and propaganda campaign on behalf of “the resistant Hezbollah-Damascus-Teheran-Caracas Axis” Persepolis sends a very clear message: Help the fundamentalists to power once again and you will be at the receiving end of their first bullit.

Persepolis won the Jury Prize of Cannes Film Festival (2007), and was nominated for an Academy Award for Best Animated Feature in January 2008.

Iranian students banned from studying at a Dutch University

By Joseph El-Khoury



Soon after 9/11 many impulsive souls advocated that Arabs should be prevented form attending flying schools with the hope that this would help fight terrorism. Now other well meaning officials feel that Iranians cannot be trusted to handle technological knowledge. Recently, Dutch Universities started restricting access of Iranian students to some courses for fear that they might end up working on the Iranian nuclear program. It is doubtful whether in this day and age access to knowledge can be restricted in such an archaic manner. And how hard would it be to hire a former Soviet scientist or a North Korean engineer!? At first view these measures might seem reasonable and proportional but the ethical and moral implications are disturbing. Being born in one country or one ethnic group have always played a role in determining your chances in life or your career path but individuals with exceptional skills and determination managed to break through that ring fence and achieve in their chosen field. The price was usually emigration to the west and the brain drain. These new trends of University departments working closely with immigration officials threaten the credibility and independence of academic institutions in Europe and other parts of the world. It is a short-termist undemocratic move which, coupled with calls on developing countries to restrict their economic growth in order to help fight climate change, can only fuel the resentment of the third world towards the ‘arrogant’ West. It can also push countries such as Iran, which are at political odds with the US-led camp, on further self-reliance and opacity in their dealings with the International community on the nuclear programme and other contentious issues.

Dutch university bans Iranian students
Fri. 04 Jan 2008
Radio Netherlands

By Ruben Temming

Iranian students are not welcome at the Technical University Twente in the town of Enschede. At the request of the Education Ministry and the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the university has agreed not to admit any Iranian students. The government fears that Iranian students and workers would steal sensitive nuclear information to help their government develop nuclear weapons. The university's decision is the direct result of a 2006 UN resolution calling on member states to prevent Iran from gaining access to nuclear knowledge

For the rest of the article follow the link below
http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=13714

Iran’s circle of power

By Nasrin Alavi

The replacement of Iran's chief nuclear negotiator is part of a Tehran power-play that is more troubling for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad than it appears, says Nasrin Alavi.

published on www.opendemocracy.net

A surprise announcement on 20 October 2007 is generating fresh questions about Iran's strategic policy and ambitions. The resignation of Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani from this position is both a signal of tensions inside Iran's complex, multi-layered power-network, and the withdrawal of a figure who acted as a rational interlocutor with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and western governments. In a jittery climate where Washington is heightening its rhetoric in a manner reminiscent of the pre-Iraq-war period, Larijani's move is more likely to reinforce than to moderate current dangers.

The news has been met with some dismay even by conservative figures inside Iran; on 22 October, 183 mostly conservative members of the majlis (parliament) affirmed their support for Larijani. Ali Akbar Velayati, former foreign minister and international-affairs adviser to Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, commented that "it was best if this hadn't happened."

The first deputy speaker of the majlis (parliament) Mohammad Reza Bahonar told reporters on 21 October that there were "deep-rooted problems" between Larijani and Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, that "could not be solved". Such differences were exposed in the varying reactions to Vladimir Putin's proposal on the nuclear stand-off made on 16 October, during the Russian president's visit to Iran; while Larijani acknowledged that Tehran was considering Putin's offer to Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (who himself said it was "ponderable"), the spokesman for Ahmadinejad's government denied the existence of any such proposal or the possibility of a compromise deal.

Bahonar, a hardline conservative, also raised questions about the credentials of Larijani's replacement, Saeed Jalili; "can someone who is not even a member of the supreme national security council be appointed as its secretary?" The 42-year-old Jalili is one of Ahmadinejad's chief advisors, one of a growing number of Ahmadinejad clones that seem to have appeared from the Iranian political wilderness since the president's election in 2005; his decade of uninspiring service in the foreign office had culminated in the post of deputy foreign minister for European and American affairs, where he is credited with orchestrating Iran's closer "south-south" relationship with Latin American states (particularly Hugo Chávez's Venezuela).

In the west, Larijani is often described as a pragmatic conservative. He had long been critical of the government's handling of Iranian nuclear negotiations under the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), and his appointment in 2005 to head the supreme national security council was at the time generally seen as a toughening of Iran's stand on the nuclear issue. Yet with the election of Ahmadinejad, figures such as Larijani - who had stood against Ahmadinejad in the election - came increasingly to be viewed as doves. Ali Abtahi, Iran's deputy president under Khatami, described Larijani's resignation as "dangerous" and recalled his description of Iran's agreed suspension of its uranium-enrichment programme in 2004 as akin to "a precious pearl in return for a sweet". Why cannot Larijani "carry on with his work", Abtahi asked.

Saeed Jalili's welcome

President Ahmadinejad's posse was in full view during his visit to New York in September 2007 for the opening of the United Nations general assembly (and his speech at Columbia University). In addition to Jalili himself were the government spokesman Gholam-Hossein Elham (whose wife has penned a book calling Ahmadinejad "the miracle of the third millennium") and another powerful presidential advisor, Mojtaba Hashemi-Samareh. In a political system where sycophancy is equated with good manners, the camera invariably spies Samareh's habit of physically fawning at the end of each presidential utterance. All the president's men are tightly bonded by their allegiance to Ahmadinejad's spiritual adviser, Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi.

Saeed Jalili was asked in March 2007 by a Fars news-agency journalist whether he was Ahmadinejad's "direct representative in the foreign ministry" and whether he has "provided the president with many of his foreign-policy ideas". Jalili responded that he was merely one of many advisors to the president. He denied having masterminded Ahmadinejad's questioning of the Nazi holocaust or his spasm of letter-writing to President Bush (he elaborated: "perhaps as we think alike and we go back a long way, some may be under this impression".

But resistance to Jalili's appointment is widely shared; several prominent conservatives regard the new chief nuclear negotiator as lacking pedigree and experience. Ahmad Tavakkoli, director of the influential "parliamentary strategic research centre" has previously backed some of the presidents' policies; this time, he expressed disappointment at the resignation of Larijani, whose political stature is far greater than the "inexperienced ex-foreign minister" who replaces him.

Tehran's power-games

These critical murmurings are part of a rising chorus of antagonism from powerful conservatives and reformists alike towards the president and his coterie for their bungling economic policies at home and aggressive policies abroad. In 2005, Jalili may well have been Ahmadinejad's initial choice for foreign minister; but the opposition the new president soon faced in installing candidates for his cabinet (an oil minister was sworn in after a three-month parliamentary deadlock, including three failed attempts to secure a vote of confidence) was always likely to touch the inexperienced Jalili. The post-election confusion ended with a political bargain when Manouchehr Mottaki (who had campaigned for Ali Larijani in the presidential race) was appointed foreign minister.

Larijani, even after his resignation, still holds the important position of Ayatollah Khamenei's representative in the national security council; in this capacity, he is accompanying Jalili to scheduled talks with the European Union's foreign-policy chief, Javier Solana, in Rome on 23 October; his deputy and right-hand man Javad Vaeedi will also be there, and Larijani's close alliance with Mottaki survives. It remains to be seen whether these personnel shifts will be reflected in a policy reversal, or whether Iran will continue to follow the "work plan" proposed by the IAEA to settle the unresolved questions over its Iran's nuclear activities.

Saeed Jalili responded sharply to the Fars journalist who questioned the possible "costs" of Iran's foreign policy by asking "what costs? Today even westerners say that Iran is more powerful than ever before". In reality, any "success" that Ahmadinejad has enjoyed owes less to his government's cunning foreign strategies and more to the United States's strategic ineptitude in the region. Yet Ahmadinejad is adept on a rhetorical level: he has used an aggressive US stance to his advantage by portraying his government and its Revolutionary Guard partners as the only entity inside Iran willing and able to stand up to an America bent on the regime's destruction, and for which the nuclear issue is only a pretext.

At the same time, it cannot be said that Larijani's departure means that Ahmadinejad has taken over the nuclear programme and Iran's nuclear-related dealings with the west; for other powerful figures within Iran's circles of power, including Larijani himself and his foreign-office allies, are still in the picture. What can be said with certainty is that Ahmadinejad is doing his best to consolidate his power within the system. Whether he succeeds depends partly on the internal dynamics inside Iran and partly on the mounting external pressures that to date have helped only to empower him.

Nasrin Alavi is the author of We Are Iran: The Persian Blogs (Portobello Books, 2005).

She spent her formative years in Iran, attended university in Britain and worked in London, and then returned to her birthplace to work for an NGO for a number of years. Today she lives in Britain.