The Suicide Pact

By Joseph El-Khoury

Four personal stories managed to sneak into the headlines recently, breaking through the deafening cacophony that characterises Lebanese News. On 4/06/08 a Lebanese Army soldier shot himself in the head after killing his girlfriend in a rage of jealousy. This incident occurred in the Zarif neighbourhood of Beirut. On 12/08/08 in the suburb of Jal-El-Dib Janet Hajal (62) slit her wrists after fatally stabbing her son Roy Al-Ashkar (37). Hers was an act of desperation motivated by the fear of seeing her son, who suffers from the severe mental illness Schizophrenia, left to fend for himself in the event of her death. In her emotional turmoil a violent death for her son seemed preferable to a miserable life in a Lebanon where the mentally ill are neglected and stigmatised. On 20/08/08 in the northern village of Batroumin, Psychiatrist Dr Jack Hreiki (42) shot himself after killing his love interest Chantal Ghanem (26) her sister and their father. Dr Hreiki, who had years of international experience in the field of mental health, had clearly failed to act on the ‘demons’ that tormented his own soul. On the 10/10/08 Ali Marai (20) shot his fiancée Micheline Kahloun (18) before turning the gun against himself. His act was a public one, committed on the steps of a busy shopping Mall in Ashrafieh, Beirut.

 

5 months, 4 episodes and 10 casualties: An insignificant statistic when two hot days in May can result in 63 ‘political deaths’. This form of suicide is not a Lebanese exception, and neither is it a recent development in our society. Nonetheless, a few concerns should be raised over the availability of firearms in the hands of civilians and their visibility. A taboo was broken last spring and since weapons have made a reappearance as a symbol of status and a legitimate tool in settling personal disputes. Over the past few months their use has extended beyond the political sphere and the traditionally armed clans of the periphery. This phenomenon coupled with the political and economical context of desperation created by the perpetual state of conflict since 2005 is a lethal cocktail. There is no doubt that it is starting to impact on the mental state of the Lebanese. Individuals do not operate in a void and at least partially derive their sense of self from their interactions with others, society in general, institutions and government as an agent of social regulation. When these fail to protect, reassure, motivate and guide, psychological instability is to be expected in the more vulnerable elements, those in less supportive environments or under additional emotional stress for a variety of reasons. The political elite are either unaware or uninterested in the ramifications of the climate of uncertainty imposed on this nation and the aggressive discourse displayed on a daily basis. The suicide pact is well in gear between the opposing factions...or should we call it homicide pact, as I suspect that at the first sign of collapse they will find refuge in a European Capital, washing their hands from our descent into anarchy...just like in the good old days.

A Political 'Star Academy'

By Joseph El-Khoury

Just imagine the Lebanese Council of Ministers meetings in a Reality TV Show Format. A compromise between ‘Big Brother’ and ‘Star Academy’ that could run all the way until the 2009 elections. Except for the female eye candy, all the ingredients are provided for popcorn entertainment. It would be presented by Marcel Ghanem and May Chidiac. A phone-in voting competition would certainly spice things up and increase youth interest in the political process. I say political process because Lebanese youth consider themselve already politicized. They certainly swear allegiance to one or the other faction before they are old enough to have a girlfriend. But you would only consider them politicized if you were also of the view that ‘Rambo’ is a political drama. The audience (18 and above) would vote out the least popular minister at every meeting. President Suleiman would be excluded for fear of damaging his pristine image. The voting pattern would follow confessional lines with Khaled Kabbani securing the majority of the votes in Tarik Jedide and Mohammad Fneish dominating in Dahye. As a consequence the first to go would be representatives of minority sects: The Armenians, the Greek Catholics and Talal Arslan, unless they manage to come up with unlikely popular proposals. Since accountability remains an alien concept in that part of the world, they could propose 24 hour electricity, reduced mobile phone tariffs or reclaiming the Lebanese coast as state property open to all. Once the voting over they would deny having promised anything. Walid Joumblatt would be accused of back stabbing, manipulation and inconsistency to which he would respond by ‘So What...I am only playing the game!’. Elias Murr would maintain a low profile until forced to make his views clear in the Diary Room. Jean Ogassapian would be voted out unintentionally, many majority supporters confusing him with Alain Tabourian. Ali Qanso would be disqualified for threatening to execute his fellow ministers over minor disagreements. 28 weeks later Ziad Baroud would emerge a clear winner as the most popular minister while Jibran Bassil alleges vote-rigging carried out through his ministry.

The Christians as a Minority

By Joseph El-Khoury

I was brought up believing that we, the Lebanese Christians and at their core the Maronites, would never become a minority. That we would dominate this landscape for eternity, if not numerically then politically and economically. I was brought up believing that our religious and cultural links to the West would guarantee us its tutelage in the face of the surrounding threat.  We had lost martyrs: young men and women who had given up their lives repelling the Palestinian guerrillas and their Muslim proxies bent on destroying our ‘way of life’. This was alas a delusion and the disillusion that followed, as the civil war ended in 1991, was a painful one. The irony is that those who created and fed us that delusion are today still in charge of our fate. In a continuation of the fratricide war of the late 80s the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement are today fighting it out over ‘Christian representation’ in the sectarian bazaar that has characterized the country since 2005. The events over the past Two years indicate clearly that Christian politicians have become marginal bystanders with occasional cameo roles. The Christian political scene functions as a side-show to the essential confrontation slowly building up between the Hezbollah-Amal tandem on one hand and the Sunni bulldozer of the Hariri clan. This side-show loses its importance as soon as the confrontation moves to the main stage, as happened in the streets of Beirut this last May.  As soon as the militiamen from both sides took over the streets of West Beirut, The Christian sections of the capital and the surrounding heartland became a haven of tranquillity. Michel Aoun and Samir Geagea lost their panache and summoned their supporters to order.  The same scenario was replayed during the clashes in Tripoli with both sides settling for vague condemnation of the turn of events.  The Doha accord altered the political discourse between government and opposition, with a return to a more muted tone with criticism by innuendo. The reconciliations followed between the PSP and its Druze counterparts, The PSP and Hezbollah, Hezbollah and Al-Mustaqbal, Al-Mustaqbal and Alaouite dignitaries in the North. Interestingly this is the time that our Christian heroes, buoyed by the prospect of parliamentary elections in 2009, decide to revert to insults, accusations and counter-accusations opening the dirty files of the civil war and scuppering all attempts at building bridges. Occasionally this degenerates into lethal skirmishes as recently in the Koura region. Nonetheless, the self-assigned importance claimed by all Christian factions is a symptom of the delusion mentioned earlier. While it is true that the fate of the next majority will be decided in Kesrwan, Jbail and the Matn, a win for either party will have the only function of reinforcing the position of their allies until the next flashpoint. Revelling in the nostalgic themes of the Christian Resistance in its less than glorious stages from Suleiman Franjieh in Amchit to Michel Aoun at the French embassy through Samir Geagea in Deir el Kamar will not change the fact that the Christians in 2008 lack a vision for the country and are starting to feel the effect of their minority status. Challenging the sectarian model might be the only solution.